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RLSA-2026:98493

Опубликовано: 13 нояб. 2026
Источник: rocky
Оценка: Important

Описание

Important: jackson-core security update

Core part of Jackson that defines Streaming API as well as basic shared abstractions.

Security Fix(es):

  • com.fasterxml.jackson/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson-core: Jackson-core: Denial of Service via regular expression backtracking (CVE-2026-89407)

  • com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core: Jackson-core: Denial of Service via unbounded StringBuilder growth during malformed token processing (CVE-2026-89425)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

Затронутые продукты

  • Rocky Linux 9

НаименованиеАрхитектураРелизRPM
pki-jackson-corenoarch1.el9_9.1pki-jackson-core-2.21.6-1.el9_9.1.noarch.rpm

Показывать по

Связанные CVE

Связанные уязвимости

rocky
27 дней назад

Moderate: jackson-core security update

oracle-oval
28 дней назад

ELSA-2026-86706: jackson-core security update (MODERATE)

suse-cvrf
около 1 месяца назад

Security update for jackson-annotations, jackson-core, jackson-databind

suse-cvrf
около 2 месяцев назад

Security update for jackson-annotations, jackson-bom, jackson-core, jackson-databind, jackson-dataformat-xml, jackson-dataformats-binary, jackson-modules-base

CVSS3: 7.5
ubuntu
около 2 месяцев назад

NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates "stringified numbers" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run. Matching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length. An attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float). Because StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex...