Описание
Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 38 for SLE 15 SP3)
This update for the Linux Kernel 5.3.18-150300_59_141 fixes several issues.
The following security issues were fixed:
- CVE-2021-47383: Fixed out-of-bound vmalloc access in imageblit (bsc#1225211).
- CVE-2024-26923: Fixed false-positive lockdep splat for spin_lock() in __unix_gc() (bsc#1223683).
- CVE-2024-26828: Fixed underflow in parse_server_interfaces() (bsc#1223363).
- CVE-2024-23307: Fixed Integer Overflow or Wraparound vulnerability in x86 and ARM md, raid, raid5 modules (bsc#1220145).
Список пакетов
SUSE Linux Enterprise Live Patching 15 SP2
SUSE Linux Enterprise Live Patching 15 SP3
Ссылки
- Link for SUSE-SU-2024:2342-1
- E-Mail link for SUSE-SU-2024:2342-1
- SUSE Security Ratings
- SUSE Bug 1220145
- SUSE Bug 1223363
- SUSE Bug 1223683
- SUSE Bug 1225211
- SUSE CVE CVE-2021-47383 page
- SUSE CVE CVE-2024-23307 page
- SUSE CVE CVE-2024-26828 page
- SUSE CVE CVE-2024-26923 page
Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: Fix out-of-bound vmalloc access in imageblit This issue happens when a userspace program does an ioctl FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO passing the fb_var_screeninfo struct containing only the fields xres, yres, and bits_per_pixel with values. If this struct is the same as the previous ioctl, the vc_resize() detects it and doesn't call the resize_screen(), leaving the fb_var_screeninfo incomplete. And this leads to the updatescrollmode() calculates a wrong value to fbcon_display->vrows, which makes the real_y() return a wrong value of y, and that value, eventually, causes the imageblit to access an out-of-bound address value. To solve this issue I made the resize_screen() be called even if the screen does not need any resizing, so it will "fix and fill" the fb_var_screeninfo independently.
Затронутые продукты
Ссылки
- CVE-2021-47383
- SUSE Bug 1225208
- SUSE Bug 1225211
Описание
Integer Overflow or Wraparound vulnerability in Linux Linux kernel kernel on Linux, x86, ARM (md, raid, raid5 modules) allows Forced Integer Overflow.
Затронутые продукты
Ссылки
- CVE-2024-23307
- SUSE Bug 1219169
- SUSE Bug 1220145
Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cifs: fix underflow in parse_server_interfaces() In this loop, we step through the buffer and after each item we check if the size_left is greater than the minimum size we need. However, the problem is that "bytes_left" is type ssize_t while sizeof() is type size_t. That means that because of type promotion, the comparison is done as an unsigned and if we have negative bytes left the loop continues instead of ending.
Затронутые продукты
Ссылки
- CVE-2024-26828
- SUSE Bug 1223084
- SUSE Bug 1223363
Описание
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect() Garbage collector does not take into account the risk of embryo getting enqueued during the garbage collection. If such embryo has a peer that carries SCM_RIGHTS, two consecutive passes of scan_children() may see a different set of children. Leading to an incorrectly elevated inflight count, and then a dangling pointer within the gc_inflight_list. sockets are AF_UNIX/SOCK_STREAM S is an unconnected socket L is a listening in-flight socket bound to addr, not in fdtable V's fd will be passed via sendmsg(), gets inflight count bumped connect(S, addr) sendmsg(S, [V]); close(V) __unix_gc() ---------------- ------------------------- ----------- NS = unix_create1() skb1 = sock_wmalloc(NS) L = unix_find_other(addr) unix_state_lock(L) unix_peer(S) = NS // V count=1 inflight=0 NS = unix_peer(S) skb2 = sock_alloc() skb_queue_tail(NS, skb2[V]) // V became in-flight // V count=2 inflight=1 close(V) // V count=1 inflight=1 // GC candidate condition met for u in gc_inflight_list: if (total_refs == inflight_refs) add u to gc_candidates // gc_candidates={L, V} for u in gc_candidates: scan_children(u, dec_inflight) // embryo (skb1) was not // reachable from L yet, so V's // inflight remains unchanged __skb_queue_tail(L, skb1) unix_state_unlock(L) for u in gc_candidates: if (u.inflight) scan_children(u, inc_inflight_move_tail) // V count=1 inflight=2 (!) If there is a GC-candidate listening socket, lock/unlock its state. This makes GC wait until the end of any ongoing connect() to that socket. After flipping the lock, a possibly SCM-laden embryo is already enqueued. And if there is another embryo coming, it can not possibly carry SCM_RIGHTS. At this point, unix_inflight() can not happen because unix_gc_lock is already taken. Inflight graph remains unaffected.
Затронутые продукты
Ссылки
- CVE-2024-26923
- SUSE Bug 1223384
- SUSE Bug 1223683