Next.js — открытый JavaScript фреймворк, созданный поверх React.js для создания веб-приложений

Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. Starting in version 9.5.0 and prior to versions 15.5.13 and 16.1.7, when Next.js rewrites proxy traffic to an external backend, a crafted `DELETE`/`OPTIONS` request using `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` could trigger request boundary disagreement between the proxy and backend. This could allow request smuggling through rewritten routes. An attacker could smuggle a second request to unintended backend routes (for example, internal/admin endpoints), bypassing assumptions that only the configured rewrite destination/path is reachable. This does not impact applications hosted on providers that handle rewrites at the CDN level, such as Vercel. The vulnerability originated in an upstream library vendored by Next.js. It is fixed in Next.js 15.5.13 and 16.1.7 by updating that dependency’s behavior so `content-length: 0` is added only when both `content-length` and `transfer-encoding` are absent, and `transfer-encoding` is n

Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. Starting in version 10.0.0 and prior to version 16.1.7, the default Next.js image optimization disk cache (`/_next/image`) did not have a configurable upper bound, allowing unbounded cache growth. An attacker could generate many unique image-optimization variants and exhaust disk space, causing denial of service. This is fixed in version 16.1.7 by adding an LRU-backed disk cache with `images.maximumDiskCacheSize`, including eviction of least-recently-used entries when the limit is exceeded. Setting `maximumDiskCacheSize: 0` disables disk caching. If upgrading is not immediately possible, periodically clean `.next/cache/images` and/or reduce variant cardinality (e.g., tighten values for `images.localPatterns`, `images.remotePatterns`, and `images.qualities`).

Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. Starting in version 16.0.1 and prior to version 16.1.7, a request containing the `next-resume: 1` header (corresponding with a PPR resume request) would buffer request bodies without consistently enforcing `maxPostponedStateSize` in certain setups. The previous mitigation protected minimal-mode deployments, but equivalent non-minimal deployments remained vulnerable to the same unbounded postponed resume-body buffering behavior. In applications using the App Router with Partial Prerendering capability enabled (via `experimental.ppr` or `cacheComponents`), an attacker could send oversized `next-resume` POST payloads that were buffered without consistent size enforcement in non-minimal deployments, causing excessive memory usage and potential denial of service. This is fixed in version 16.1.7 by enforcing size limits across all postponed-body buffering paths and erroring when limits are exceeded. If upgrading is not im

A request smuggling flaw has been discovered in Next.js. when Next.js rewrites proxy traffic to an external backend, a crafted `DELETE`/`OPTIONS` request using `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` could trigger request boundary disagreement between the proxy and backend. This could allow request smuggling through rewritten routes. An attacker could smuggle a second request to unintended backend routes (for example, internal/admin endpoints), bypassing assumptions that only the configured rewrite destination/path is reachable.

An unbounded disk usage flaw has been discovered in Next.js. The default Next.js image optimization disk cache (`/_next/image`) did not have a configurable upper bound, allowing unbounded cache growth. An attacker could generate many unique image-optimization variants and exhaust disk space, causing denial of service.

Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. Starting in version 16.0.1 and prior to version 16.1.7, `origin: null` was treated as a "missing" origin during Server Action CSRF validation. As a result, requests from opaque contexts (such as sandboxed iframes) could bypass origin verification instead of being validated as cross-origin requests. An attacker could induce a victim browser to submit Server Actions from a sandboxed context, potentially executing state-changing actions with victim credentials (CSRF). This is fixed in version 16.1.7 by treating `'null'` as an explicit origin value and enforcing host/origin checks unless `'null'` is explicitly allowlisted in `experimental.serverActions.allowedOrigins`. If upgrading is not immediately possible, add CSRF tokens for sensitive Server Actions, prefer `SameSite=Strict` on sensitive auth cookies, and/or do not allow `'null'` in `serverActions.allowedOrigins` unless intentionally required and additionally prote

Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. Starting in version 16.0.1 and prior to version 16.1.7, in `next dev`, cross-site protection for internal websocket endpoints could treat `Origin: null` as a bypass case even if `allowedDevOrigins` is configured, allowing privacy-sensitive/opaque contexts (for example sandboxed documents) to connect unexpectedly. If a dev server is reachable from attacker-controlled content, an attacker may be able to connect to the HMR websocket channel and interact with dev websocket traffic. This affects development mode only. Apps without a configured `allowedDevOrigins` still allow connections from any origin. The issue is fixed in version 16.1.7 by validating `Origin: null` through the same cross-site origin-allowance checks used for other origins. If upgrading is not immediately possible, do not expose `next dev` to untrusted networks and/or block websocket upgrades to `/_next/webpack-hmr` when `Origin` is `null` at the proxy

A denial of service flaw has been discovered in Next.js. A request containing the `next-resume: 1` header (corresponding with a PPR resume request) would buffer request bodies without consistently enforcing `maxPostponedStateSize` in certain setups. The previous mitigation protected minimal-mode deployments, but equivalent non-minimal deployments remained vulnerable to the same unbounded postponed resume-body buffering behavior. In applications using the App Router with Partial Prerendering capability enabled (via `experimental.ppr` or `cacheComponents`), an attacker could send oversized `next-resume` POST payloads that were buffered without consistent size enforcement in non-minimal deployments, causing excessive memory usage and potential denial of service.

A CSRF check bypass flaw has been discovered in Next.js. The `origin: null` was treated as a "missing" origin during Server Action CSRF validation. As a result, requests from opaque contexts (such as sandboxed iframes) could bypass origin verification instead of being validated as cross-origin requests. An attacker could induce a victim browser to submit Server Actions from a sandboxed context, potentially executing state-changing actions with victim credentials (CSRF).

A CSRF check bypass flaw has been discovered in Next.js. In the `next dev`, cross-site protection for internal websocket endpoints could treat `Origin: null` as a bypass case even if `allowedDevOrigins` is configured, allowing privacy-sensitive/opaque contexts (for example sandboxed documents) to connect unexpectedly. If a dev server is reachable from attacker-controlled content, an attacker may be able to connect to the HMR websocket channel and interact with dev websocket traffic. This affects development mode only. Apps without a configured `allowedDevOrigins` still allow connections from any origin.