Node.js — программная платформа, основанная на движке V8 (компилирующем JavaScript в машинный код)

Security update for nodejs8

Security update for nodejs10

Security update for openssl-1_0_0

Security update for openssl-1_0_0

Keep-alive HTTP and HTTPS connections can remain open and inactive for up to 2 minutes in Node.js 6.16.0 and earlier. Node.js 8.0.0 introduced a dedicated server.keepAliveTimeout which defaults to 5 seconds. The behavior in Node.js 6.16.0 and earlier is a potential Denial of Service (DoS) attack vector. Node.js 6.17.0 introduces server.keepAliveTimeout and the 5-second default.

In Node.js including 6.x before 6.17.0, 8.x before 8.15.1, 10.x before 10.15.2, and 11.x before 11.10.1, an attacker can cause a Denial of Service (DoS) by establishing an HTTP or HTTPS connection in keep-alive mode and by sending headers very slowly. This keeps the connection and associated resources alive for a long period of time. Potential attacks are mitigated by the use of a load balancer or other proxy layer. This vulnerability is an extension of CVE-2018-12121, addressed in November and impacts all active Node.js release lines including 6.x before 6.17.0, 8.x before 8.15.1, 10.x before 10.15.2, and 11.x before 11.10.1.

If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data. In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do anyway). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2r (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2q).

If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls SSL ...

If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data. In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do anyway). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2r (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2q).

If an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls SSL_shutdown() twice (once to send a close_notify, and once to receive one) then OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an invalid MAC. If the application then behaves differently based on that in a way that is detectable to the remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data. In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use. Stitched ciphersuites are optimised implementations of certain commonly used ciphersuites. Also the application must call SSL_shutdown() twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do anyway). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.0.2r (Affected 1.0.2-1.0.2q).