In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size [Why & How] The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9] and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe. Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t() before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and get_integrated_info_v2_1(). (cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size [Why & How] The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9] and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe. Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t() before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and get_integrated_info_v2_1(). (cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size [Why & How] The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9] and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe. Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t() before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and get_integrated_info_v2_1(). (cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size [Why & How] The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9] and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe. Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t() before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and get_integrated_info_v2_1(). (cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69)

drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: d ...

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel