Количество 6
Количество 6
CVE-2024-45004
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply convert this field to hex and send it to userspace. With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK) in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload. BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text. Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead of the encrypted BEK to userspace. This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key blob and then just use it without exporting it again. Fix this by performing BEK decrypt...
CVE-2024-45004
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply convert this field to hex and send it to userspace. With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK) in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload. BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text. Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead of the encrypted BEK to userspace. This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key blob and then just use it without exporting it again. Fix this by performing BEK decrypt...
CVE-2024-45004
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply convert this field to hex and send it to userspace. With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK) in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload. BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text. Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead of the encrypted BEK to userspace. This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key blob and then just use it without exporting it again. Fix this by performing BEK decry
CVE-2024-45004
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: K ...
GHSA-g596-f5rr-4qjp
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply convert this field to hex and send it to userspace. With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK) in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload. BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text. Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead of the encrypted BEK to userspace. This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key blob and then just use it without exporting it again. Fix this by performing BEK de...
BDU:2024-08053
Уязвимость ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю получить ключи шифрования
Уязвимостей на страницу
Уязвимость | CVSS | EPSS | Опубликовано | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2024-45004 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply convert this field to hex and send it to userspace. With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK) in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload. BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text. Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead of the encrypted BEK to userspace. This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key blob and then just use it without exporting it again. Fix this by performing BEK decrypt... | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 1 года назад | |
CVE-2024-45004 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply convert this field to hex and send it to userspace. With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK) in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload. BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text. Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead of the encrypted BEK to userspace. This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key blob and then just use it without exporting it again. Fix this by performing BEK decrypt... | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 1 года назад | |
CVE-2024-45004 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply convert this field to hex and send it to userspace. With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK) in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload. BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text. Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead of the encrypted BEK to userspace. This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key blob and then just use it without exporting it again. Fix this by performing BEK decry | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 1 года назад | |
CVE-2024-45004 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: K ... | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 1 года назад | |
GHSA-g596-f5rr-4qjp In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply convert this field to hex and send it to userspace. With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK) in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload. BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text. Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead of the encrypted BEK to userspace. This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key blob and then just use it without exporting it again. Fix this by performing BEK de... | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 1 года назад | |
BDU:2024-08053 Уязвимость ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю получить ключи шифрования | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 1 года назад |
Уязвимостей на страницу