Количество 13
Количество 13
CVE-2025-38722
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been". Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() only w...
CVE-2025-38722
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been". Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() only w...
CVE-2025-38722
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been". Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() only
CVE-2025-38722
habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf()
CVE-2025-38722
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: h ...
GHSA-mq33-37wv-8g5g
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been". Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() on...
SUSE-SU-2025:3725-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
SUSE-SU-2025:03601-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
SUSE-SU-2025:03602-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
SUSE-SU-2025:03633-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
SUSE-SU-2025:3751-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
SUSE-SU-2025:03600-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
SUSE-SU-2025:03634-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
Уязвимостей на страницу
Уязвимость | CVSS | EPSS | Опубликовано | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2025-38722 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been". Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() only w... | 0% Низкий | 2 месяца назад | ||
CVE-2025-38722 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been". Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() only w... | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | 2 месяца назад | |
CVE-2025-38722 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been". Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() only | 0% Низкий | 2 месяца назад | ||
CVE-2025-38722 habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() | 0% Низкий | 2 месяца назад | ||
CVE-2025-38722 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: h ... | 0% Низкий | 2 месяца назад | ||
GHSA-mq33-37wv-8g5g In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf() As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF. dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been". Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() on... | 0% Низкий | 2 месяца назад | ||
SUSE-SU-2025:3725-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 20 дней назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2025:03601-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 27 дней назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2025:03602-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 27 дней назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2025:03633-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 25 дней назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2025:3751-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 19 дней назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2025:03600-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 27 дней назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2025:03634-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 25 дней назад |
Уязвимостей на страницу