Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., Content-Length and content-length). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting Content-Length values on the wire. Who is impacted: * Applications using undici.request(), undici.Client, or similar low-level APIs with headers passed as flat arrays * Applications that accept user-controlled header names without case-normalization Potential consequences: * Denial of Service: Strict HTTP parsers (proxies, servers) will reject requests with duplicate Content-Length headers (400 Bad Request) * HTTP Request Smuggling: In deployments where an intermediary and backend interpret duplicate headers inconsistently (e.g., one uses the first value, the other uses the last), this can enable request smuggling attacks leading to ACL bypass, cache poisoning, or credential hijacking

A flaw was found in undici, a Node.js HTTP/1.1 client. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending HTTP/1.1 requests that include duplicate Content-Length headers with different casing (e.g., "Content-Length" and "content-length"). This can lead to HTTP Request Smuggling, a technique where an attacker sends an ambiguous request that is interpreted differently by a proxy and a backend server. Successful exploitation could result in unauthorized access, cache poisoning, or credential hijacking. It may also cause a Denial of Service (DoS) if strict HTTP parsers reject the malformed requests.

Undici allows duplicate HTTP Content-Length headers when they are provided in an array with case-variant names (e.g., Content-Length and content-length). This produces malformed HTTP/1.1 requests with multiple conflicting Content-Length values on the wire. Who is impacted: * Applications using undici.request(), undici.Client, or similar low-level APIs with headers passed as flat arrays * Applications that accept user-controlled header names without case-normalization Potential consequences: * Denial of Service: Strict HTTP parsers (proxies, servers) will reject requests with duplicate Content-Length headers (400 Bad Request) * HTTP Request Smuggling: In deployments where an intermediary and backend interpret duplicate headers inconsistently (e.g., one uses the first value, the other uses the last), this can enable request smuggling attacks leading to ACL bypass, cache poisoning, or credential hijacking

Undici allows duplicate HTTPContent-Lengthheaders when they are provid ...

Undici has an HTTP Request/Response Smuggling issue