A flaw was found in Dogtag PKI's ACME responder where the HTTP-01 challenge validator accepts IP address literals as dns identifiers and follows HTTP redirects without validating that the target is a public address. An unauthenticated ACME account holder can exploit this to perform server-side request forgery (SSRF), making the Dogtag server send HTTP GET requests to internal network services. With the InMemory database backend, the response body of internal targets is disclosed to the attacker through the ACME challenge error.

A flaw was found in Dogtag PKI's ACME responder where the HTTP-01 challenge validator accepts IP address literals as dns identifiers and follows HTTP redirects without validating that the target is a public address. An unauthenticated ACME account holder can exploit this to perform server-side request forgery (SSRF), making the Dogtag server send HTTP GET requests to internal network services. With the InMemory database backend, the response body of internal targets is disclosed to the attacker through the ACME challenge error.

A flaw was found in Dogtag PKI's ACME responder where the HTTP-01 challenge validator accepts IP address literals as dns identifiers and follows HTTP redirects without validating that the target is a public address. An unauthenticated ACME account holder can exploit this to perform server-side request forgery (SSRF), making the Dogtag server send HTTP GET requests to internal network services. With the InMemory database backend, the response body of internal targets is disclosed to the attacker through the ACME challenge error.

A flaw was found in Dogtag PKI's ACME responder where the HTTP-01 chal ...

A flaw was found in Dogtag PKI's ACME responder where the HTTP-01 challenge validator accepts IP address literals as dns identifiers and follows HTTP redirects without validating that the target is a public address. An unauthenticated ACME account holder can exploit this to perform server-side request forgery (SSRF), making the Dogtag server send HTTP GET requests to internal network services. With the InMemory database backend, the response body of internal targets is disclosed to the attacker through the ACME challenge error.