In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: pressure: bmp280: fix stack leak in bmp580 trigger handler bmp580_trigger_handler() declares its scan buffer on the stack without an initializer and then memcpy()s 3 bytes of 24-bit sensor data into each 4-byte __le32 field. The high byte of comp_temp and comp_press is left uninitialized, and the channel storagebits is 32, so two bytes of stack are pushed to userspace per scan. This is a regression from when the buffer lived in the private data, the move to a stack-local struct dropped the implicit zeroing. bme280_trigger_handler() was fixed up to handle this bug, but this driver was not fixed because there was no padding hole, but rather a short-fill issue. Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: pressure: bmp280: fix stack leak in bmp580 trigger handler bmp580_trigger_handler() declares its scan buffer on the stack without an initializer and then memcpy()s 3 bytes of 24-bit sensor data into each 4-byte __le32 field. The high byte of comp_temp and comp_press is left uninitialized, and the channel storagebits is 32, so two bytes of stack are pushed to userspace per scan. This is a regression from when the buffer lived in the private data, the move to a stack-local struct dropped the implicit zeroing. bme280_trigger_handler() was fixed up to handle this bug, but this driver was not fixed because there was no padding hole, but rather a short-fill issue. Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: pressure: bmp280: fix stack leak in bmp580 trigger handler bmp580_trigger_handler() declares its scan buffer on the stack without an initializer and then memcpy()s 3 bytes of 24-bit sensor data into each 4-byte __le32 field. The high byte of comp_temp and comp_press is left uninitialized, and the channel storagebits is 32, so two bytes of stack are pushed to userspace per scan. This is a regression from when the buffer lived in the private data, the move to a stack-local struct dropped the implicit zeroing. bme280_trigger_handler() was fixed up to handle this bug, but this driver was not fixed because there was no padding hole, but rather a short-fill issue. Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: pressure: bmp280: fix stack leak in bmp580 trigger handler bmp580_trigger_handler() declares its scan buffer on the stack without an initializer and then memcpy()s 3 bytes of 24-bit sensor data into each 4-byte __le32 field. The high byte of comp_temp and comp_press is left uninitialized, and the channel storagebits is 32, so two bytes of stack are pushed to userspace per scan. This is a regression from when the buffer lived in the private data, the move to a stack-local struct dropped the implicit zeroing. bme280_trigger_handler() was fixed up to handle this bug, but this driver was not fixed because there was no padding hole, but rather a short-fill issue. Fix this all by just zero-initializing the structure on the stack.

Уязвимость функции bmp580_trigger_handler() модуля drivers/iio/pressure/bmp280-core.c драйвера различных типов встроенных датчиков ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю получить несанкционированный доступ к защищаемой информации