A flaw was found in hawtio-operator. When deploying Hawtio in cluster mode, the operator creates a cluster-scoped OAuthClient with automatic grant approval (GrantMethod: auto) and no client secret (public client). The redirect URIs are derived from the operator-created Route, whose hostname is tenant-controlled via the Hawtio CR spec.routeHostName field. A malicious tenant can register an arbitrary hostname as a valid OAuth redirect target and, because grants are auto-approved, obtain OpenShift access tokens of any cluster user who visits the crafted authorization URL without any consent prompt.

A flaw was found in hawtio-operator. When deploying Hawtio in cluster mode, the operator creates a cluster-scoped OAuthClient with automatic grant approval (GrantMethod: auto) and no client secret (public client). The redirect URIs are derived from the operator-created Route, whose hostname is tenant-controlled via the Hawtio CR spec.routeHostName field. A malicious tenant can register an arbitrary hostname as a valid OAuth redirect target and, because grants are auto-approved, obtain OpenShift access tokens of any cluster user who visits the crafted authorization URL without any consent prompt.

A flaw was found in hawtio-operator. When deploying Hawtio in cluster mode, the operator creates a cluster-scoped OAuthClient with automatic grant approval (GrantMethod: auto) and no client secret (public client). The redirect URIs are derived from the operator-created Route, whose hostname is tenant-controlled via the Hawtio CR spec.routeHostName field. A malicious tenant can register an arbitrary hostname as a valid OAuth redirect target and, because grants are auto-approved, obtain OpenShift access tokens of any cluster user who visits the crafted authorization URL without any consent prompt.