Количество 2
Количество 2
CVE-2026-88857
Joomla Extension - OrdaSoft.com - Authenticated, Privileged Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla Gallery extension for Joomla < 6.2.7 - The extensions saveWatermark() copied an uploaded file into a web-accessible directory using the client-supplied filename exactly as sent, with no extension check, no content check, and no filename sanitisation of any kind. An authenticated core.manage user could upload a .php file disguised with an image Content-Type header and execute it directly by requesting the resulting path.
GHSA-7jj4-5xhm-pp7r
Joomla Extension - OrdaSoft.com - Authenticated, Privileged Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla Gallery extension for Joomla < 6.2.7 - The extensions saveWatermark() copied an uploaded file into a web-accessible directory using the client-supplied filename exactly as sent, with no extension check, no content check, and no filename sanitisation of any kind. An authenticated core.manage user could upload a .php file disguised with an image Content-Type header and execute it directly by requesting the resulting path.
Уязвимостей на страницу
Уязвимость | CVSS | EPSS | Опубликовано | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2026-88857 Joomla Extension - OrdaSoft.com - Authenticated, Privileged Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla Gallery extension for Joomla < 6.2.7 - The extensions saveWatermark() copied an uploaded file into a web-accessible directory using the client-supplied filename exactly as sent, with no extension check, no content check, and no filename sanitisation of any kind. An authenticated core.manage user could upload a .php file disguised with an image Content-Type header and execute it directly by requesting the resulting path. | 0% Низкий | 3 дня назад | ||
GHSA-7jj4-5xhm-pp7r Joomla Extension - OrdaSoft.com - Authenticated, Privileged Remote Code Execution in OrdaSoft Joomla Gallery extension for Joomla < 6.2.7 - The extensions saveWatermark() copied an uploaded file into a web-accessible directory using the client-supplied filename exactly as sent, with no extension check, no content check, and no filename sanitisation of any kind. An authenticated core.manage user could upload a .php file disguised with an image Content-Type header and execute it directly by requesting the resulting path. | 0% Низкий | 3 дня назад |
Уязвимостей на страницу