In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the NSM device into msg->resp.len without bounding it to the response buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check. Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic is unaffected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the NSM device into msg->resp.len without bounding it to the response buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check. Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic is unaffected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the NSM device into msg->resp.len without bounding it to the response buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check. Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic is unaffected.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: m ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: bound the device-reported response length nsm_sendrecv_msg_locked() stores the virtqueue used-ring length reported by the NSM device into msg->resp.len without bounding it to the response buffer. A malicious or buggy backend can report a length larger than the response buffer; parse_resp_raw() then copies that many bytes out of the fixed buffer to user space, disclosing adjacent kernel heap (an out-of-bounds read). The request path already floors its length in fill_req_raw(); the response path lacks the symmetric check. Clamp the stored length to the size of the response buffer. Well-behaved devices report no more than the posted buffer size, so conforming traffic is unaffected.