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ubuntu Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΡ‚ΠΈΠΏ

CVE-2026-90090

4 дня назад

(In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: B ...)

EPSS: Низкий
nvd Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΡ‚ΠΈΠΏ

CVE-2026-90090

4 дня назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Fix out-of-bounds DMA read in the TX path btmtksdio_tx_packet() rounds the transfer size up to the SDIO block size of 256 bytes, but hands the host controller the SKB buffer as is: err = sdio_writesb(bdev->func, MTK_REG_CTDR, skb->data, round_up(skb->len, MTK_SDIO_BLOCK_SIZE)); Only skb->len bytes hold packet data, so the controller reads up to 255 bytes of uninitialised memory and sends it to the device over the SDIO bus. Depending on how much tailroom slack the SKB allocation happens to carry, that read can also extend past the end of the buffer. Compute the padded length up front, ensure the SKB has tailroom for it, and zero-fill the padding with skb_put_zero(). skb->len then covers the padding, so sdio_writesb() no longer needs to round up. byte_tx keeps counting the header and the payload only, and the error path restores the SKB so that the caller can requeue it. Writing behind

EPSS: Низкий
debian Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΡ‚ΠΈΠΏ

CVE-2026-90090

4 дня назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: B ...

EPSS: Низкий
github Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΡ‚ΠΈΠΏ

GHSA-v2q7-g7pp-vm78

4 дня назад

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Fix out-of-bounds DMA read in the TX path btmtksdio_tx_packet() rounds the transfer size up to the SDIO block size of 256 bytes, but hands the host controller the SKB buffer as is: err = sdio_writesb(bdev->func, MTK_REG_CTDR, skb->data, round_up(skb->len, MTK_SDIO_BLOCK_SIZE)); Only skb->len bytes hold packet data, so the controller reads up to 255 bytes of uninitialised memory and sends it to the device over the SDIO bus. Depending on how much tailroom slack the SKB allocation happens to carry, that read can also extend past the end of the buffer. Compute the padded length up front, ensure the SKB has tailroom for it, and zero-fill the padding with skb_put_zero(). skb->len then covers the padding, so sdio_writesb() no longer needs to round up. byte_tx keeps counting the header and the payload only, and the error path restores the SKB so that the caller can requeue it. Writing behi...

EPSS: Низкий

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ubuntu Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΡ‚ΠΈΠΏ
CVE-2026-90090

(In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: B ...)

0%
Низкий
4 дня назад
nvd Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΡ‚ΠΈΠΏ
CVE-2026-90090

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Fix out-of-bounds DMA read in the TX path btmtksdio_tx_packet() rounds the transfer size up to the SDIO block size of 256 bytes, but hands the host controller the SKB buffer as is: err = sdio_writesb(bdev->func, MTK_REG_CTDR, skb->data, round_up(skb->len, MTK_SDIO_BLOCK_SIZE)); Only skb->len bytes hold packet data, so the controller reads up to 255 bytes of uninitialised memory and sends it to the device over the SDIO bus. Depending on how much tailroom slack the SKB allocation happens to carry, that read can also extend past the end of the buffer. Compute the padded length up front, ensure the SKB has tailroom for it, and zero-fill the padding with skb_put_zero(). skb->len then covers the padding, so sdio_writesb() no longer needs to round up. byte_tx keeps counting the header and the payload only, and the error path restores the SKB so that the caller can requeue it. Writing behind

0%
Низкий
4 дня назад
debian Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΡ‚ΠΈΠΏ
CVE-2026-90090

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: B ...

0%
Низкий
4 дня назад
github Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΡ‚ΠΈΠΏ
GHSA-v2q7-g7pp-vm78

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtksdio: Fix out-of-bounds DMA read in the TX path btmtksdio_tx_packet() rounds the transfer size up to the SDIO block size of 256 bytes, but hands the host controller the SKB buffer as is: err = sdio_writesb(bdev->func, MTK_REG_CTDR, skb->data, round_up(skb->len, MTK_SDIO_BLOCK_SIZE)); Only skb->len bytes hold packet data, so the controller reads up to 255 bytes of uninitialised memory and sends it to the device over the SDIO bus. Depending on how much tailroom slack the SKB allocation happens to carry, that read can also extend past the end of the buffer. Compute the padded length up front, ensure the SKB has tailroom for it, and zero-fill the padding with skb_put_zero(). skb->len then covers the padding, so sdio_writesb() no longer needs to round up. byte_tx keeps counting the header and the payload only, and the error path restores the SKB so that the caller can requeue it. Writing behi...

0%
Низкий
4 дня назад

УязвимостСй Π½Π° страницу

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