AVideo (WWBN/AVideo) through 29.0 (commit e01e41ecc) is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery. objects/videoAddNew.json.php disables AVideo's automatic CSRF guard ($global['skipAutoCSRFCheck']) and the untrusted-request check ($global['bypassSameDomainCheck']) merely because 'user' and 'pass' parameters are present in the request; the values are never validated and are read from $_REQUEST, so an attacker can supply them in the query string of a cross-site request. Because User::loginFromRequestIfNotLogged() returns immediately when a session already exists, a victim who is authenticated by cookie satisfies the check while the attacker-supplied credentials are discarded. An attacker who lures an authenticated user with upload rights to visit a crafted page can therefore submit cross-origin requests that modify video records — including ownership transfer (setUsers_id), deletion of user-group access restrictions, can_download, can_share, only_for_paid, video_password, rating, status

AVideo (WWBN/AVideo) through 29.0 (commit e01e41ecc) is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery. objects/videoAddNew.json.php disables AVideo's automatic CSRF guard ($global['skipAutoCSRFCheck']) and the untrusted-request check ($global['bypassSameDomainCheck']) merely because 'user' and 'pass' parameters are present in the request; the values are never validated and are read from $_REQUEST, so an attacker can supply them in the query string of a cross-site request. Because User::loginFromRequestIfNotLogged() returns immediately when a session already exists, a victim who is authenticated by cookie satisfies the check while the attacker-supplied credentials are discarded. An attacker who lures an authenticated user with upload rights to visit a crafted page can therefore submit cross-origin requests that modify video records — including ownership transfer (setUsers_id), deletion of user-group access restrictions, can_download, can_share, only_for_paid, video_password, rating, sta...