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Impact: undici's ProxyAgent silently drops the requestTls option when configured with a SOCKS5 proxy URI (socks5:// or socks://). The target HTTPS connection through the SOCKS5 tunnel falls back to Node's default trust store, ignoring user-configured ca, cert, key, rejectUnauthorized, and servername settings. Applications that pin to an internal or corporate CA via requestTls.ca will, when their proxy URI is SOCKS5, get the default Mozilla CA bundle as the trust anchor instead. Any cert signed by any publicly-trusted CA for the target hostname is accepted, breaking the intended pin and enabling MITM read and tamper of the HTTPS exchange. Affected applications are those that use undici's ProxyAgent (or Socks5ProxyAgent directly) with SOCKS5 AND rely on requestTls for TLS scope restriction. The bug was introduced in undici 7.23.0 when SOCKS5 support was added. Patches: Upgrade to undici v7.28.0 or v8.5.0. Workarounds: No workaround is available within the SOCKS5 path. If a SOCKS5 prox...

Impact: undici's ProxyAgent silently drops the requestTls option when configured with a SOCKS5 proxy URI (socks5:// or socks://). The target HTTPS connection through the SOCKS5 tunnel falls back to Node's default trust store, ignoring user-configured ca, cert, key, rejectUnauthorized, and servername settings. Applications that pin to an internal or corporate CA via requestTls.ca will, when their proxy URI is SOCKS5, get the default Mozilla CA bundle as the trust anchor instead. Any cert signed by any publicly-trusted CA for the target hostname is accepted, breaking the intended pin and enabling MITM read and tamper of the HTTPS exchange. Affected applications are those that use undici's ProxyAgent (or Socks5ProxyAgent directly) with SOCKS5 AND rely on requestTls for TLS scope restriction. The bug was introduced in undici 7.23.0 when SOCKS5 support was added. Patches: Upgrade to undici v7.28.0 or v8.5.0. Workarounds: No workaround is available within the SOCKS5 path. If a SOCKS5 prox...

Impact: undici's ProxyAgent silently drops the requestTls option when configured with a SOCKS5 proxy URI (socks5:// or socks://). The target HTTPS connection through the SOCKS5 tunnel falls back to Node's default trust store, ignoring user-configured ca, cert, key, rejectUnauthorized, and servername settings. Applications that pin to an internal or corporate CA via requestTls.ca will, when their proxy URI is SOCKS5, get the default Mozilla CA bundle as the trust anchor instead. Any cert signed by any publicly-trusted CA for the target hostname is accepted, breaking the intended pin and enabling MITM read and tamper of the HTTPS exchange. Affected applications are those that use undici's ProxyAgent (or Socks5ProxyAgent directly) with SOCKS5 AND rely on requestTls for TLS scope restriction. The bug was introduced in undici 7.23.0 when SOCKS5 support was added. Patches: Upgrade to undici v7.28.0 or v8.5.0. Workarounds: No workaround is available within the SOCKS5 path. If a SOCKS5 pro

undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropped requestTls in SOCKS5 ProxyAgent

Impact: undici's ProxyAgent silently drops the requestTls option when ...

Уязвимость nodejs-undici

undici vulnerable to TLS certificate validation bypass via dropped requestTls in SOCKS5 ProxyAgent

Уязвимость механизма TLS-соединений через SOCKS5-прокси HTTP-клиента Undici программной платформы NodeJS, позволяющая нарушителю оказать воздействие на конфиденциальность и целостность защищаемой информации

Important: nodejs:24 security, bug fix, and enhancement update

Important: nodejs:24 security, bug fix, and enhancement update

Important: nodejs24 security, bug fix, and enhancement update

ELSA-2026-39868: nodejs:24 security, bug fix, and enhancement update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2026-35891: nodejs:24 security, bug fix, and enhancement update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2026-35841: nodejs24 security, bug fix, and enhancement update (IMPORTANT)