Visual Studio Code Python Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

Python 2.6 through 3.2 creates ~/.pypirc with world-readable permissions before changing them after data has been written, which introduces a race condition that allows local users to obtain a username and password by reading this file.

urllib in Python 2.x through 2.7.16 supports the local_file: scheme, which makes it easier for remote attackers to bypass protection mechanisms that blacklist file: URIs, as demonstrated by triggering a urllib.urlopen('local_file:///etc/passwd') call.

If the value passed to os.path.expandvars() is user-controlled a performance degradation is possible when expanding environment variables.

If the value passed to os.path.expandvars() is user-controlled a performance degradation is possible when expanding environment variables.

If the value passed to os.path.expandvars() is user-controlled a performance degradation is possible when expanding environment variables.

If the value passed to os.path.expandvars() is user-controlled a perf ...

Trust boundary violation in Visual Studio Code - Python extension allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally.

When loading a plist file, the plistlib module reads data in size specified by the file itself, meaning a malicious file can cause OOM and DoS issues

When loading a plist file, the plistlib module reads data in size specified by the file itself, meaning a malicious file can cause OOM and DoS issues

When loading a plist file, the plistlib module reads data in size specified by the file itself, meaning a malicious file can cause OOM and DoS issues

When loading a plist file, the plistlib module reads data in size spec ...

When reading an HTTP response from a server, if no read amount is specified, the default behavior will be to use Content-Length. This allows a malicious server to cause the client to read large amounts of data into memory, potentially causing OOM or other DoS.

When reading an HTTP response from a server, if no read amount is specified, the default behavior will be to use Content-Length. This allows a malicious server to cause the client to read large amounts of data into memory, potentially causing OOM or other DoS.

When reading an HTTP response from a server, if no read amount is specified, the default behavior will be to use Content-Length. This allows a malicious server to cause the client to read large amounts of data into memory, potentially causing OOM or other DoS.

When reading an HTTP response from a server, if no read amount is spec ...

When passing data to the b64decode(), standard_b64decode(), and urlsafe_b64decode() functions in the "base64" module the characters "+/" will always be accepted, regardless of the value of "altchars" parameter, typically used to establish an "alternative base64 alphabet" such as the URL safe alphabet. This behavior matches what is recommended in earlier base64 RFCs, but newer RFCs now recommend either dropping characters outside the specified base64 alphabet or raising an error. The old behavior has the possibility of causing data integrity issues. This behavior can only be insecure if your application uses an alternate base64 alphabet (without "+/"). If your application does not use the "altchars" parameter or the urlsafe_b64decode() function, then your application does not use an alternative base64 alphabet. The attached patches DOES NOT make the base64-decode behavior raise an error, as this would be a change in behavior and break existing programs. Instead, the patch deprecates ...

When passing data to the b64decode(), standard_b64decode(), and urlsafe_b64decode() functions in the "base64" module the characters "+/" will always be accepted, regardless of the value of "altchars" parameter, typically used to establish an "alternative base64 alphabet" such as the URL safe alphabet. This behavior matches what is recommended in earlier base64 RFCs, but newer RFCs now recommend either dropping characters outside the specified base64 alphabet or raising an error. The old behavior has the possibility of causing data integrity issues. This behavior can only be insecure if your application uses an alternate base64 alphabet (without "+/"). If your application does not use the "altchars" parameter or the urlsafe_b64decode() function, then your application does not use an alternative base64 alphabet. The attached patches DOES NOT make the base64-decode behavior raise an error, as this would be a change in behavior and break existing programs. Instead, the patch deprecates ...

When passing data to the b64decode(), standard_b64decode(), and urlsafe_b64decode() functions in the "base64" module the characters "+/" will always be accepted, regardless of the value of "altchars" parameter, typically used to establish an "alternative base64 alphabet" such as the URL safe alphabet. This behavior matches what is recommended in earlier base64 RFCs, but newer RFCs now recommend either dropping characters outside the specified base64 alphabet or raising an error. The old behavior has the possibility of causing data integrity issues. This behavior can only be insecure if your application uses an alternate base64 alphabet (without "+/"). If your application does not use the "altchars" parameter or the urlsafe_b64decode() function, then your application does not use an alternative base64 alphabet. The attached patches DOES NOT make the base64-decode behavior raise an error, as this would be a change in behavior and break existing programs. Instead, the patch deprec

When passing data to the b64decode(), standard_b64decode(), and urlsaf ...