Поиск уязвимостей

ALT-PU-2023-7049: package `golang` update to version 1.20.11-alt1

A malicious HTTP sender can use chunk extensions to cause a receiver reading from a request or response body to read many more bytes from the network than are in the body. A malicious HTTP client can further exploit this to cause a server to automatically read a large amount of data (up to about 1GiB) when a handler fails to read the entire body of a request. Chunk extensions are a little-used HTTP feature which permit including additional metadata in a request or response body sent using the chunked encoding. The net/http chunked encoding reader discards this metadata. A sender can exploit this by inserting a large metadata segment with each byte transferred. The chunk reader now produces an error if the ratio of real body to encoded bytes grows too small.

ELSA-2024-12264: olcne security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12263: olcne security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12262: olcne security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12261: olcne security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12226: conmon security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12225: conmon security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12191: container-tools:4.0 security update (MODERATE)

ELSA-2024-12190: conmon security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12189: conmon security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-1149: skopeo security update (MODERATE)

Уязвимость пакета net/http языка программирования Go, позволяющая нарушителю раскрыть защищаемую информацию

Security update for go1.20-openssl

ELSA-2024-2272: containernetworking-plugins security update (MODERATE)

ELSA-2024-2245: buildah security update (MODERATE)

ELSA-2024-2193: podman security update (MODERATE)

The filepath package does not recognize paths with a \??\ prefix as special. On Windows, a path beginning with \??\ is a Root Local Device path equivalent to a path beginning with \\?\. Paths with a \??\ prefix may be used to access arbitrary locations on the system. For example, the path \??\c:\x is equivalent to the more common path c:\x. Before fix, Clean could convert a rooted path such as \a\..\??\b into the root local device path \??\b. Clean will now convert this to .\??\b. Similarly, Join(\, ??, b) could convert a seemingly innocent sequence of path elements into the root local device path \??\b. Join will now convert this to \.\??\b. In addition, with fix, IsAbs now correctly reports paths beginning with \??\ as absolute, and VolumeName correctly reports the \??\ prefix as a volume name. UPDATE: Go 1.20.11 and Go 1.21.4 inadvertently changed the definition of the volume name in Windows paths starting with \?, resulting in filepath.Clean(\?\c:) returning \?\c: rather than \?...

The filepath package does not recognize paths with a \??\ prefix as special. On Windows, a path beginning with \??\ is a Root Local Device path equivalent to a path beginning with \\?\. Paths with a \??\ prefix may be used to access arbitrary locations on the system. For example, the path \??\c:\x is equivalent to the more common path c:\x. Before fix, Clean could convert a rooted path such as \a\..\??\b into the root local device path \??\b. Clean will now convert this to .\??\b. Similarly, Join(\, ??, b) could convert a seemingly innocent sequence of path elements into the root local device path \??\b. Join will now convert this to \.\??\b. In addition, with fix, IsAbs now correctly reports paths beginning with \??\ as absolute, and VolumeName correctly reports the \??\ prefix as a volume name. UPDATE: Go 1.20.11 and Go 1.21.4 inadvertently changed the definition of the volume name in Windows paths starting with \?, resulting in filepath.Clean(\?\c:) returning \?\c: rather than \?\c:

Insecure parsing of Windows paths with a \??\ prefix in path/filepath