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ELSA-2024-12262: olcne security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12261: olcne security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12226: conmon security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12225: conmon security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12191: container-tools:4.0 security update (MODERATE)

ELSA-2024-12190: conmon security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-12189: conmon security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2024-1149: skopeo security update (MODERATE)

Уязвимость пакета net/http языка программирования Go, позволяющая нарушителю раскрыть защищаемую информацию

ELSA-2024-2272: containernetworking-plugins security update (MODERATE)

ELSA-2024-2245: buildah security update (MODERATE)

ELSA-2024-2193: podman security update (MODERATE)

The filepath package does not recognize paths with a \??\ prefix as special. On Windows, a path beginning with \??\ is a Root Local Device path equivalent to a path beginning with \\?\. Paths with a \??\ prefix may be used to access arbitrary locations on the system. For example, the path \??\c:\x is equivalent to the more common path c:\x. Before fix, Clean could convert a rooted path such as \a\..\??\b into the root local device path \??\b. Clean will now convert this to .\??\b. Similarly, Join(\, ??, b) could convert a seemingly innocent sequence of path elements into the root local device path \??\b. Join will now convert this to \.\??\b. In addition, with fix, IsAbs now correctly reports paths beginning with \??\ as absolute, and VolumeName correctly reports the \??\ prefix as a volume name. UPDATE: Go 1.20.11 and Go 1.21.4 inadvertently changed the definition of the volume name in Windows paths starting with \?, resulting in filepath.Clean(\?\c:) returning \?\c: rather than \?...

The filepath package does not recognize paths with a \??\ prefix as special. On Windows, a path beginning with \??\ is a Root Local Device path equivalent to a path beginning with \\?\. Paths with a \??\ prefix may be used to access arbitrary locations on the system. For example, the path \??\c:\x is equivalent to the more common path c:\x. Before fix, Clean could convert a rooted path such as \a\..\??\b into the root local device path \??\b. Clean will now convert this to .\??\b. Similarly, Join(\, ??, b) could convert a seemingly innocent sequence of path elements into the root local device path \??\b. Join will now convert this to \.\??\b. In addition, with fix, IsAbs now correctly reports paths beginning with \??\ as absolute, and VolumeName correctly reports the \??\ prefix as a volume name. UPDATE: Go 1.20.11 and Go 1.21.4 inadvertently changed the definition of the volume name in Windows paths starting with \?, resulting in filepath.Clean(\?\c:) returning \?\c: rather than \?\c:

Insecure parsing of Windows paths with a \??\ prefix in path/filepath

The filepath package does not recognize paths with a \??\ prefix as sp ...

Using go get to fetch a module with the ".git" suffix may unexpectedly fallback to the insecure "git://" protocol if the module is unavailable via the secure "https://" and "git+ssh://" protocols, even if GOINSECURE is not set for said module. This only affects users who are not using the module proxy and are fetching modules directly (i.e. GOPROXY=off).

Using go get to fetch a module with the ".git" suffix may unexpectedly fallback to the insecure "git://" protocol if the module is unavailable via the secure "https://" and "git+ssh://" protocols, even if GOINSECURE is not set for said module. This only affects users who are not using the module proxy and are fetching modules directly (i.e. GOPROXY=off).

Using go get to fetch a module with the ".git" suffix may unexpectedly fallback to the insecure "git://" protocol if the module is unavailable via the secure "https://" and "git+ssh://" protocols, even if GOINSECURE is not set for said module. This only affects users who are not using the module proxy and are fetching modules directly (i.e. GOPROXY=off).

Command 'go get' may unexpectedly fallback to insecure git in cmd/go