In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hugetlbfs: release subpool on fill_super failure hugetlbfs_fill_super() allocates a hugepage subpool when size or min_size mount options are specified. hugepage_new_subpool() may also reserve huge pages for min_size. If root dentry creation fails after the subpool is created, the failure path frees the subpool with kfree(). This bypasses hugepage_put_subpool() and can leave min_size reservations charged. Use hugepage_put_subpool() on the failure path, matching the normal put_super path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: phy: qcom: qmp-usb-legacy: Fix possible NULL-deref on early runtime suspend There is a small window where the runtime suspend callback may run after pm_runtime_enable() and before pm_runtime_forbid(). In this case, a crash occurs because runtime suspend/resume dereferences qmp->phy pointer, which is not yet initialized: `if (!qmp->phy->init_count) {` This can also happen if user re-enables runtime-pm via the sysfs attribute before qmp phy is initialized. Similarly to other qcom phy drivers, introduce a qmp->phy_initialized variable that can be used to avoid relying on the possibly uninitialized phy pointer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: phy: qcom: snps-femto-v2: Fix possible NULL-deref on early runtime suspend Runtime PM must be enabled before creating the PHY, since phy_create() only enables runtime PM on the PHY device if it is already enabled on this parent device. However, the runtime PM callbacks dereference the hsphy instance, which is not yet ready, leaving a window where a suspend callback may trigger a NULL pointer dereference. Take a runtime PM usage reference with pm_runtime_get_noresume() before enabling runtime PM and release it once the PHY has been created, so that no runtime suspend can run before the PHY is ready. This also prevents a short window where an unnecessary runtime suspend can occur. Use the devres-managed version to ensure PM runtime is symmetrically disabled during driver removal for proper cleanup.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: phy: qcom: qmp-usb: Fix possible NULL-deref on early runtime suspend There is a small window where the runtime suspend callback may run after pm_runtime_enable() and before pm_runtime_forbid(). In this case, a crash occurs because runtime suspend/resume dereferences qmp->phy pointer, which is not yet initialized: `if (!qmp->phy->init_count) {` This can also happen if user re-enables runtime-pm via the sysfs attribute before qmp phy is initialized. Similarly to other qcom phy drivers, introduce a qmp->phy_initialized variable that can be used to avoid relying on the possibly uninitialized phy pointer.

The CorvusPay WooCommerce Payment Gateway plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Payment Bypass via Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in all versions up to, and including, 2.7.4. The `corvuspay_success_handler` function registers the REST endpoint `POST /wp-json/corvuspay/success/` with `'permission_callback' => '__return_true'`, and while it calls `$this->client->validate->signature()` and stores the boolean result in `$res`, the result is never evaluated in a conditional — it is only written to the debug log — causing execution to unconditionally reach `$order->payment_complete()` regardless of whether the cryptographic signature is valid. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to mark any pending WooCommerce order as fully paid by sending a POST request to the success endpoint containing an arbitrary or forged signature value, allowing them to obtain goods or services without payment. Because WooCommerce order IDs are sequential integers, target order

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/raid5: round bitmap stripes with sector division raid5_bitmap_sector_map() aligns the array range to full RAID5 stripe widths before converting it to component sectors. That width is chunk_sectors multiplied by the number of data disks, and it is not always a power of two. Reproduce with a 4-disk RAID5, 1024-sector chunks, and three data disks. The full-stripe width is 3072 sectors. For a one-sector write at array sector 3072, correct rounding gives array range [3072, 6144), which maps to component range [1024, 2048). The old round_down()/round_up() logic instead gives [1024, 4096), which maps to [0, 1024). Use sector_div() based arithmetic so the rounded range is aligned to the actual RAID5 stripe width. The deterministic mapper test now reports the fixed component range as [1024, 2048), while the old mask-based range was [0, 1024).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md: wait for behind writes before destroying bitmap __md_stop() destroyed the bitmap before calling mddev_detach(). That made mddev_detach() skip bitmap_ops->wait_behind_writes(), because the bitmap was already disconnected from mddev. This was still safe for the legacy bitmap because bitmap_destroy() waits for behind writes itself. llbitmap keeps that wait in its ->wait_behind_writes() operation instead, while ->destroy() tears down the llbitmap storage. With the old ordering, RAID1 behind-write completions could still run after llbitmap storage had been freed. Call mddev_detach() before md_bitmap_destroy() so the common detach path can wait for behind writes while the bitmap is still alive. Only destroy the bitmap after those users are gone.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/md-llbitmap: prevent create failure bitmap UAF llbitmap_create() publishes mddev->bitmap before reading the bitmap superblock. This is needed because llbitmap_read_sb() can initialize a new bitmap and flush it through helpers that use mddev->bitmap. If llbitmap_read_sb() fails, the old cleanup dropped bitmap_info.mutex and freed llbitmap before clearing mddev->bitmap. Readers such as /proc/mdstat rely on bitmap_info.mutex to keep the bitmap pointer stable while collecting bitmap stats, so they could observe the stale pointer after the failed create path released the mutex. Clear mddev->bitmap while still holding bitmap_info.mutex, then free the failed llbitmap after dropping the mutex. This makes mutex-protected readers see either a live bitmap or no bitmap.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/md-llbitmap: stop daemon timer rearm on destroy llbitmap_destroy() deletes pending_timer before flushing md_llbitmap_io_wq. However, daemon_work can still be queued or running after the timer has been deleted, and the daemon path can arm pending_timer again when it finds dirty chunks that are not ready to flush yet. If that happens during teardown, pending_timer can remain armed after llbitmap is freed and later dereference freed memory. Add a BITMAP_SHUTDOWN bit to llbitmap->flags, set it before deleting the timer, and make the timer and daemon paths stop queueing or rearming work once teardown starts. Cancel daemon_work before flushing the shared workqueue so no already queued daemon instance can race with the free. Use timer_shutdown_sync() so a daemon instance that passed the shutdown check before teardown cannot rearm the timer afterward. BITMAP_SHUTDOWN is a runtime-only state. Mask it out when reading an

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: md/raid1: don't set array_frozen in raid1_takeover() raid1_takeover() sets conf->array_frozen = 1 on the newly-allocated r1conf and nothing ever clears it, so every I/O to the array stalls permanently once _wait_barrier() sees it stuck at 1. This used to be harmless: level_store() called mddev_resume() right after pers->run(), which called raid1_quiesce(mddev, 0) and cleared array_frozen back to 0 regardless of what raid1_takeover() set. Commit b39f35ebe86d ("md: don't quiesce in mddev_suspend()") removed that quiesce(mddev, 0) call, so the pre-set now sticks. setup_conf() already zero-initializes the new r1conf via kzalloc, so just don't set array_frozen here. Same class of bug as commit 892da88d1cd9 ("md/raid10: fix a 'conf->barrier' leakage in raid10_takeover()"), also triggered by b39f35ebe86d.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: etm4x: fix underflow for usage of (nrseqstate - 1) According to IHI006H Embedded Trace Macrocell Architecture Specification[0], TRCSEQEVR<n> is implemented only when TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b100, in which case n ranges from 0 to 2; otherwise, TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b000. IOW, the number of usage in the initialisation or setting TRCSEQEVR<n> with drvdata->nrseqstate - 1 in the loop could make underflow issue when TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b000. Therefore, introduce nr_seq_ctrls field and untie it from nrseqstate. As part of this introduce ETM_MAX_SEQ_TRANSITIONS macro and apply nr_seq_ctrls and above macro to TRCSEQEVR<n> relevant fields setup.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: etm4x: missing cscfg_csdev_disable_active_config() in perf enable In the perf enable path, there are missing cases where cscfg_csdev_disable_active_config() is not called: - Branch broadcast is selected but not supported by the hardware - etm4_enable_hw() fails This can lead to a leak of config_desc->active_cnt. Fix this by properly calling cscfg_csdev_disable_active_config() in these error paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: arm_pmuv3: Zero initialize hw_id branch stack field PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HW_INDEX is supported by BRBE so hw_id is passed to userspace, but it's never set by the BRBE driver. Zero initialize it as it should be according to the docs: * For the architectures whose raw branch records are * already stored in age order, the hw_idx should be 0. It's probably too risky to remove PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HW_INDEX from BRBE now in case anyone is setting it and reading the value, but zero initializing the whole struct also protects against the same issue with new fields that are added in the future.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm_mpam: Fix a NULL pointer dereference on unbinding after an error interrupt If a user unbinds an MSC after mpam_disable() has been run in response to an error interrupt then a dereference of a NULL pointer occurs as mpam_disable() sets the drvdata to NULL. Add an early return to the driver remove callback to avoid this.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm_mpam: Disable driver unbind to avoid UAF When a user unbinds an MSC and that MSC is the only MSC left for a component then the corresponding mpam_component will be freed. If the user then goes on to read the schemata file in the resctrl filesystem then the mpam_component will be accessed from resctrl_arch_get_config() leading to a use after free. As the MPAM driver is not a module the unbind sysfs interface is the only way to trigger the remove. Instead of dealing with the complexity of allowing some unused MSC to unbind just remove the unbind sysfs interface.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject load-acquire from pointers requiring fault protection A BPF_LOAD_ACQ is not rewritten to a BPF_PROBE_MEM load by the verifier, unlike a regular BPF_LDX, so the JIT emits a plain load with no exception table entry and a fault panics the kernel instead of being handled. Reject the source pointer types that a BPF_LDX would have had that fault protection applied to, i.e. the ones bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() turns into BPF_PROBE_MEM: a bare PTR_TO_BTF_ID, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY | PTR_UNTRUSTED. This is reachable e.g. by loading ->mm out of a trusted task_struct yields an untrusted pointer to mm_struct, and it is NULL for a kernel thread: [...] SEC("tp_btf/sched_switch") int BPF_PROG(demo, bool preempt, struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next) { struct mm_struct *mm = next->mm; /* untrusted *

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: sd: Fix error handling in sd_probe() after large pool creation failure After device_add(&sdkp->disk_dev) succeeds, sd_large_pool_create() failure must unregister disk_dev and let scsi_disk_release() free sdkp. Going through out_free_index kfree()s an already registered device and leaks the sysfs entry.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: sd: Fix special_vec mempool leak when scsi_alloc_sgtables() fails sd_set_special_bvec() allocates a special payload page for UNMAP and WRITE SAME commands. If scsi_alloc_sgtables() fails afterward in sd_setup_unmap_cmnd() or sd_setup_write_same{10,16}_cmnd(), the SCSI midlayer does not call uninit_command() because RQF_DONTPREP is not set yet, leaking the page. Call sd_uninit_command() on error, and clear RQF_SPECIAL_PAYLOAD after freeing the page.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: zoned: don't force read-only on transient -EAGAIN from reloc merge On a zoned FS, btrfs_delayed_refs_rsv_refill() returns -EAGAIN whenever the over-committed metadata plus the zone_unusable bytes exceeds the usable size in a metadata block-group to avoid heavy over-commit of metadata and early ENOSPC in one transaction. If this happens while doing reclaim, the transaction is getting aborted. Treat -EAGAIN as a soft, retryable condition in case of block-group reclaim.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: defrag: fix deadlock between defrag and delalloc space reservation While running fsstress with autodefrag and flushoncommit, hit a deadlock due to the fact that defrag reserves delalloc space while it's holding dirty and locked folios, besides the extent range lock. The stack traces are the following: [958.624] task:kworker/u50:3 state:D stack:0 pid:20365 tgid:20365 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000 [958.626] Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space [btrfs] [958.627] Call Trace: [958.628] <TASK> [958.628] __schedule+0x4be/0x10f0 [958.629] ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0 [958.630] schedule+0x26/0xd0 [958.631] wait_current_trans+0x102/0x160 [btrfs] [958.632] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [958.633] start_transaction+0x374/0x900 [btrfs] [958.634] btrfs_commit_current_transaction+0x1d/0x70 [btrfs] [958.635] flush_spac