In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: always wait for ordered extents to avoid OE races [BUG] Syzbot reported a bug that there can be conflicting OEs for the same range: BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object alrea[ 179.162726][ T6897] BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object already exists) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:264! Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026 RIP: 0010:btrfs_alloc_ordered_extent+0x943/0xad0 Call Trace: <TASK> cow_file_range+0x744/0x12a0 fal

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: check if root is readonly when setting posix acl For a filesystem which has btrfs read-only property set to true, all write operations including acl and xattr should be denied. However, acl can still be set even if btrfs ro property is true. This happens because no function on the set_acl code path checks the root is readonly or not. It was checked in btrfs_setxattr_trans() but got removed in commit 353c2ea735e4 ("btrfs: remove redundant readonly root check in btrfs_setxattr_trans") That commit didn't check if all the callers properly check the root's read-only flag. A previous fix is commit b51111271b03 ("btrfs: check if root is readonly while setting security xattr"). Always check if the root is read-only before performing the set acl operation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: retry verity reads for not-uptodate Merkle folios btrfs_read_merkle_tree_page() can find a folio in the mapping that is not uptodate. After taking the folio lock, the current code treats that state as a read error and returns -EIO. That can make a previous transient read failure sticky. If the failed read left a not-uptodate folio in the mapping, later callers find that folio and fail instead of retrying the read. Keep the existing page-cache insertion and locking order, but retry the Merkle item read when a not-uptodate folio is found in the mapping. Also unlock the folio when read_key_bytes() fails so that a later caller can lock it and retry the read.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: zoned: flush active metadata block group at btree_writepages() start btree_writepages() writes the btree inode's dirty metadata in ascending logical address order. On a zoned filesystem only one metadata and one system block group is active for writing at a time, and check_bg_is_active() (via btrfs_check_meta_write_pointer()) pivots the active block group as writeback moves from one block group to the next. If the active block group sits at a higher logical address than another block group that also holds dirty metadata, the ascending walk reaches the lower one first and, to write it, has to finish the active block group and activate the lower one. It cannot finish a block group that still has unsent IO, and during WB_SYNC_ALL && !for_sync (commit) writeback it deliberately refuses to wait for that IO under fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock, as that can deadlock. The pivot thus cannot issue the submission itself ei

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: zoned: don't clobber the extent buffer when zeroing it out On a zoned filesystem a freed-but-still-dirty tree block is written out as zeros (EXTENT_BUFFER_ZONED_ZEROOUT) only to keep the zone write pointer advancing. btree_csum_one_bio() implemented this by memzeroing the extent buffer's own folios before submission. That destroys the in-memory buffer while it may still be referenced. In particular btrfs_free_tree_block() can run on it afterwards and reads the header to add a delayed reference; once the header has been zeroed it frees bytenr 0 and corrupts the extent tree (the btrfs_header_bytenr(buf) != 0 ASSERT in btrfs_free_tree_block(), or an "unable to find ref" abort). It is flaky and reproduces under fsstress, e.g. generic/461 and generic/013. Write the zeros to disk from the shared zero page instead and leave the extent buffer content untouched, so any later reference - including the delayed referenc

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: qgroup: fix a wrong length calculation in qgroup_free_reserved_data() In that function, we round down the start position and round up the ending position. But during the calculation of @len, we use "round_up(start + len, sectorsize)", which is the rounded up end position, not the rounded up length. Which results a much larger length, and later we are still using "start + len", which is completely incorrect. Fix it by declaring a local @aligned_start and @aligned_len and use them instead.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pinctrl: airoha: add missed IRQ resource helpers Without hooking .irq_request_resources, gpiolib cannot set GPIOD_FLAG_USED_AS_IRQ. This breaks pin direction locking and can allow userspace or another driver to reconfigure an active IRQ pin as an output

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: virtio_bt: avoid OOB read of build info string The virtbt_setup_zephyr() sends the Zephyr vendor command 0xfc08 (Read Build Information) and hands the response to bt_dev_info() and hci_set_fw_info() as a "%s" string starting at skb->data + 1, without checking the length. A backend that answers with status only leaves that pointer past the end of the received data, so the walk reads adjacent slab memory until it meets a NUL. Those bytes reach the kernel log and the firmware-info debugfs file. To fix this, print the string with a bounded "%.*s" limited to skb->len - 1. A short or unterminated response then prints as much as arrived instead of failing setup. This mirrors commit dd068ef04412 ("Bluetooth: bpa10x: avoid OOB read of revision string in bpa10x_setup()"), which fixed the identical pattern.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: use proto_lock for l2cap_data to fix l2cap_disconn_ind hci_conn::l2cap_data is accessed without locks in l2cap_disconn_ind via hci_conn_timeout (disc_work) -> hci_proto_disconn_ind -> l2cap_disconn_ind. This is UAF if the l2cap_conn is deleted concurrently. disc_work is disabled sync in hci_conn_del(), so we cannot take hci_dev_lock in disc_work. Fix by using proto_lock to guard l2cap_data, in addition to hdev->lock which is held in other access paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix the SCO setup context lifetime hci_setup_sync() queues a conn_handle_t with a NULL destroy callback, so the context is only freed if hci_enhanced_setup_sync() actually runs. An entry that is cancelled instead is leaked, as _hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry() does not release entry->data when there is no destroy callback, and hci_cmd_sync_clear() cancels every pending entry when the controller is unregistered. The context also stores a bare hci_conn pointer, so the connection can be freed while the work is queued. The dequeue in hci_conn_del() does not cover it either, as it matches on entry->data == conn and entry->data is the wrapper here. Same problem as commit 2f5d635ad590 ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: hold conn in hci_connect_acl/le_sync() callbacks"). Hold the connection and release both from a destroy callback. The submission failure path drops both, since hci_cmd_sync_submit() does not call the de

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: free the advertising instance on the failure and cancel paths adv_timeout_expire() hands a kmalloc()ed instance byte to hci_cmd_sync_queue() with a NULL destroy callback, and only adv_timeout_expire_sync() frees it. That leaks on two paths: - the return value is not checked, and hci_cmd_sync_queue() does not take ownership when it fails (-ENETDOWN, -ENODEV, -ENOMEM); - a cancelled entry is not released, as _hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry() does not free entry->data when there is no destroy callback. hci_cmd_sync_clear() cancels every pending entry when the controller is unregistered. Free the buffer from a destroy callback, and in the caller when the entry could not be queued at all.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: free the mesh send cancel command when it is cancelled mesh_send_cancel() queues the pending command with a NULL destroy callback, so it is only freed if send_cancel() runs. A cancelled entry is leaked, as _hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry() does not release entry->data when there is no destroy callback, and hci_cmd_sync_clear() cancels every pending entry when the controller is unregistered. Nothing else reclaims it either: mgmt_pending_new() does not put the command on hdev->mgmt_pending. The leak also pins the socket reference taken by mgmt_pending_new(), so the mgmt socket is never released. Free the command from a destroy callback.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: free the HCI command when it is cancelled mgmt_hci_cmd_sync() queues the pending command with a NULL destroy callback, so it is only freed if send_hci_cmd_sync() runs. A cancelled entry is leaked, as _hci_cmd_sync_cancel_entry() does not release entry->data when there is no destroy callback, and hci_cmd_sync_clear() cancels every pending entry when the controller is unregistered. Nothing else reclaims it either: mgmt_pending_new() does not put the command on hdev->mgmt_pending. The leak also pins the socket reference taken by mgmt_pending_new(), so the mgmt socket is never released. Free the command from a destroy callback. The now-empty done label is replaced by a direct return.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MSFT: validate evt_prefix_len against the response length read_supported_features() only checks that the response covers the fixed part of struct msft_rp_read_supported_features, which is 11 bytes: if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp)) { bt_dev_err(hdev, "MSFT supported features length mismatch"); goto failed; } evt_prefix[] is a flexible array member and rp->evt_prefix_len is an unvalidated u8 taken straight out of that response, so msft->evt_prefix = kmemdup(rp->evt_prefix, rp->evt_prefix_len, GFP_KERNEL); copies up to 255 bytes from a reply that may have carried none of them. What is copied is data the controller never sent, and it is then used to match incoming vendor events in msft_vendor_evt(). This is not an out-of-bounds access. An skb data allocation always has at least SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)) bytes past the payload, which is more than the 255 byte maximum, so the r

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, cgroup: Fix storage null-ptr-deref after replacing prog Syzkaller reported a storage null-ptr-deref issue after replacing prog. This occurs in the following scenario: 1. prog A, an empty prog, is attached to a cgrp. 2. prog B uses BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE and calls the bpf_get_local_storage helper. 3. link_update is called to replace prog A with prog B. The reason is that __cgroup_bpf_replace fails to alloc and assign the required cgrp storage for the incoming replacement prog. Consequently, the new prog inherits an uninit storage, leading to null-ptr-deref panic when kick the new prog. Fix this by rejecting a link update if new_prog's cgroup storage is incompatible with link->prog.

A Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability affecting Process Experience Studio in DELMIA Service Process Engineer from Release 3DEXPERIENCE R2024x through Release 3DEXPERIENCE R2026x could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary script code in user's browser session.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: light: gp2ap002: Fix unbalanced runtime PM on repeated event writes The IIO core does not filter duplicate writes to the event enable attribute, so writing the same value twice invokes write_event_config() twice. Enabling twice leaks a runtime PM reference, preventing the device from ever suspending again; disabling twice underflows the usage count and triggers a "Runtime PM usage count underflow" warning. Bail out early when the requested state matches the current state. While at it, switch to pm_runtime_resume_and_get() so a failed resume is propagated to userspace instead of silently marking the event enabled.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: fix teardown of an adopted proto on insert-race loss In tc_new_tfilter() the create branch sets tp_created = 1 before calling tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique(). When the caller loses the race (another request inserted a proto at the same chain/prio first), insert_unique() destroys the caller's own tp_new and returns the winner's proto with an extra reference. tp_created was never cleared, so the loser's errout path treated the winner's live proto as its own and called tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty() on it, silently unlinking an active classifier that the winning request already advertised via RTM_NEWTFILTER. Track the outcome of the insert step in a single tri-state variable so each errout path reacts correctly: - TP_NOT_CREATED: no proto created; pursue the old path. - TP_CREATED: proto inserted successfully; same code path as before. - TP_NOT_OWNED: New - lost the insert race; tp is another request's p

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix mmap_lock leak in irq_work path stack_map_get_build_id_offset() introduced a per-CPU irq_work to defer mmap_read_unlock() from NMI context, and bpf_find_vma() later reused the same mmap_unlock_work. Both callers only check whether the work is busy before taking mmap_lock, so a nested caller can reuse the slot before the first caller queues it. Two read locks may then be acquired while only one deferred unlock runs, leaking a read lock and blocking exit_mmap(). Reserve the per-CPU slot before mmap_read_trylock(). Use the same wrapper in stackmap and bpf_find_vma() so both callers release the reservation on trylock failure. Keep rejecting the slot while the irq_work remains busy. Release it after the irq_work callback unlocks the mm.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix integer overflow in verify_tags() bounds check verify_tags() validates the tagset table unpacked from a policy blob. For each set it reads a count and checks that advancing the index by that count stays inside sets.table[]: u32 cnt = tags->sets.table[i]; if (i+cnt >= tags->sets.size) { i, cnt and sets.size are all u32, so i+cnt is evaluated modulo 2^32. sets.table[] is filled by unpack_tagsets() with aa_unpack_u32(), so every entry is a raw unbounded 32-bit word taken from the policy blob, and verify_tags() is the function that is supposed to validate it. A count close to U32_MAX makes the sum wrap to a small value, the guard passes, and the inner loop then walks sets.table[++i] past the end of the kcalloc(size, sizeof(u32)) allocation. Note that sets.size is bounded by 65535, because unpack_tagsets() reads it with aa_unpack_array() as a u16, so the wrap cannot be reached by growing the table; it