In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: null_blk: register configfs subsystem after creating default devices In null_init(), configfs_register_subsystem() currently runs before register_blkdev(), so when null_blk is built as a module, a racing mkdir() + poweron from userspace can reach null_add_dev() while null_major is still 0. __add_disk() then hits WARN_ON(disk->minors) (major=0 with minors!=0) and fails: [root@fedora ~]# [ 2366.521436] WARNING: block/genhd.c:476 at __add_disk+0x8a7/0xde0, [ 2366.523552] Modules linked in: null_blk(+) nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib [ 2366.529081] CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 1600 Comm: sh Not tainted 7.2.0-rc1+ #66 PREEMPT(full) ...... [ 2366.547251] Call Trace: [ 2366.547575] <TASK> [ 2366.547831] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x84/0xe0 [ 2366.548260] add_disk_fwnode+0x114/0x560 [ 2366.548739] null_add_dev+0x102d/0x1b80 [null_blk] [ 2366.549310] ? __pfx_null_add_dev+0x10/0x10 [null_blk] [ 2366.549906] ? mutex_lock+0xd

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: null_blk: free global tag_set on init error path If shared_tags is enabled, null_setup_tagset() allocates the global tag_set via null_init_global_tag_set(). If device creation later fails, err_dev destroys the default devices and calls unregister_blkdev(), but never frees the global tag_set. Since module init failed, null_exit() is never invoked, so the global tag_set's tags and maps are permanently leaked. Free the global tag_set in err_dev, matching null_exit() which does if (tag_set.ops) blk_mq_free_tag_set(&tag_set).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: null_blk: free zones array on device power-off null_init_zoned_dev() allocates dev->zones when a zoned device is powered on, but null_del_dev() never frees it on power-off; dev->zones is only freed later in null_free_dev(), when the configfs directory is removed. If the device is powered off and then on again, null_init_zoned_dev() allocates a new array and overwrites the dev->zones pointer, leaking the previous allocation each power cycle. Free dev->zones in null_del_dev() via null_free_zoned_dev() to solve it. And calling null_free_zoned_dev() in null_free_dev() is no longer necessary because every caller already invokes null_del_dev() first: via nullb_group_drop_item() before nullb_device_release(), in the null_add_dev() error path of null_create_dev(), and in null_destroy_dev(). Remove the redundant call. And take &lock around zone_cond_store() in the two store wrappers to serialize dev->zones check-and-deref a

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: null_blk: reject per-device queue resize for shared tag set When shared_tags is enabled, null_setup_tagset() makes the device use the global tag_set, whose driver_data stays NULL. null_map_queues() therefore falls back to the module-wide g_submit_queues/g_poll_queues instead of any per-device value. Resizing submit_queues or poll_queues via configfs on such a device calls blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues() on the shared set, shrinking set->nr_hw_queues. __blk_mq_realloc_hw_ctxs() only grows the q->queue_hw_ctx[] allocation, so on shrink it merely exits and NULLs the now-excess hctx slots. null_map_queues(), however, keeps mapping CPUs with the unchanged g_submit_queues/g_poll_queues, so mq_map[] ends up pointing at those NULLed hctx slots. blk_mq_map_swqueue() then dereferences the NULL hctx (hctx->cpumask), crashing the kernel: [ 460.218374] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000098-0x000000000000009f] [ 460

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: null_blk: serialize configfs attribute stores with the lock The NULLB_DEVICE_ATTR _store takes no lock: apply_fn attributes (submit_queues, poll_queues) get dev->NAME written again after apply_fn returns, outside its lock; APPLY=NULL attributes are entirely lockless. configfs only serializes stores per-open-file, so concurrent stores on separate fds race. For apply_fn attributes, once one store's apply_fn has reconfigured the hardware, a second (losing) store can still overwrite dev->NAME afterwards. This leaves dev->submit_queues out of sync with the live queue count, which is later caught by the WARN_ON_ONCE() in null_map_queues(). For !apply_fn attributes, power_store()'s null_add_dev() validates and builds the device under "lock" but only sets CONFIGURED afterwards. A store slipping in during this window can change a field mid-setup -- for example, zone_nr_conv can be pushed above nr_zones after it has already

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: null_blk: serialize configfs attribute updates with device setup The attribute store methods generated with NULLB_DEVICE_ATTR() refuse to change the configuration of a live device by testing NULLB_DEV_FL_CONFIGURED, but that flag is only set by nullb_device_power_store() after null_add_dev() has returned, and the store methods take no lock at all. configfs only serializes writes to the same open file (buffer->mutex), so a write to any attribute can run concurrently with null_add_dev() and change the device configuration while it is being used. null_add_dev() reads the configuration several times, e.g. dev->zoned is read once to set up the queue limits and once to initialize the zone resources: CPU0: echo 1 > nullb0/power CPU1: echo 1 > nullb0/zoned nullb_device_power_store() mutex_lock(&lock) null_add_dev() if (dev->zoned) -> false /* no BLK_FEAT_ZONED */ nullb_device_zoned_s

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-iolatency: clear delay state when freeing policy data io.latency can throttle a group which has no latency target of its own. When a sibling misses its target, check_scale_change() scales down its peers, and a peer that reaches queue depth one gets blkcg_use_delay() called on it on every further scale-down, even with min_lat_nsec == 0. iolatency_pd_offline() resets the target through iolatency_set_min_lat_nsec(), which clears the delay only on a nonzero to zero transition, so it never clears such a peer. Freeing the policy data then leaves blkg->use_delay set and blkcg->congestion_count elevated with nothing left that can drop it. blk_cgroup_congested() then returns true for every task in that cgroup and its descendants for as long as the cgroup lives: page_cache_sync_ra() cuts readahead to a single page, page_cache_async_ra() skips it altogether, and __folio_throttle_swaprate() takes swap_avail_lock and sched

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-iocost: clear delay state when freeing policy data iocg_kick_delay() turns sufficiently large debt into an explicit block-cgroup delay with blkcg_set_delay(), setting blkg->use_delay to -1 and incrementing blkcg->congestion_count. Clearing it again depends on iocg_kick_delay() running from the period timer, the waitq timer or the issue path. ioc_pd_free() removes the iocg from active_iocgs and cancels its waitq timer, and no further bios can arrive, so once it has run nothing is left which can reduce the debt and clear the delay. The blkcg stays marked congested for the rest of its life. blk_cgroup_congested() then returns true for every task in that cgroup and its descendants: page_cache_sync_ra() cuts readahead to a single page, page_cache_async_ra() skips it altogether, and __folio_throttle_swaprate() takes swap_avail_lock and schedules a throttle on anonymous folio allocation. Clear it explicitly, after

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk: avoid teardown retry loop on xarray allocation failure __ublk_shmem_remove_ranges() removes matching maple tree ranges in batches, but first stores each range into a temporary xarray so that the pages can be unpinned after dropping the maple tree lock. That temporary xarray is filled under the maple tree lock with xa_store(..., GFP_ATOMIC). If the store fails before mas_erase(), the current range is left in the tree and the helper returns false. The outer ublk_shmem_remove_ranges() loop then immediately retries the same range. While the atomic allocation keeps failing, the teardown path has no forward progress. The issue can be reproduced with radix_tree_node failslab injection after a SHMEM_ZC buffer has already been registered: # Kernel config: # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_UBLK=y # CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y # CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION=y # CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS=y # CONFIG_FAILSLAB=y echo 10 > /p

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: block: mtip32xx: synchronize ioctls with device removal The ioctl handlers only test REMOVE_PENDING before entering mtip_hw_ioctl(). Removal can set that bit immediately afterwards and free dd->port in mtip_hw_exit() while an ioctl still dereferences it. An already open block device can reach the handlers while del_gendisk() is in progress. Serialize both native and compat ioctls with removal. Set REMOVE_PENDING before taking the mutex so new callers fail after an in-flight ioctl has drained, and hold the mutex until the port has been torn down.

The NEX-Forms – Ultimate Forms Plugin for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 9.2.2. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the saved_admin_email, saved_user_email, and saved_user_email_address fields of arbitrary form entries belonging to other users, and cause the site to dispatch attacker-controlled email content to attacker-chosen recipient addresses.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix deadlock in complain-mode change_hat The use of change_hat when in complain mode can cause a deadlock when the hat doesn't exist and a new learning profile is created for the missing profile. This is because change_hat() has taken the lock to search the hat list and creating the new learning profile needs to take the lock to add it to the list. From the bug report: Originally found in 7.0.0 in LTS ubuntu 26.04 with pam_apparmor + su in complain mode set to change hats. Then verified in newest available vanilla kernel I've compiled to see if still present: 7.2-rc7 vanilla -> affected checked also some other kernels: 6.18.44 vanilla -> affected 6.12.95 with debian patches -> unaffected On systems without bug (for example 6.12.95 debian) it just prints: aa_change_hat rc=0 On systems with bug, the executable always hangs, prints nothing and becomes unkillable. (And once stuck this way, it will caus

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (coretemp) Fix core_data leak on CPUs without PTS pdata->core_data is allocated in init_temp_data() when the first core temp_data of a package is created, but it is only released from destroy_temp_data(), and only in the branch that handles the package temp_data. Package temp_data is created solely when the CPU supports X86_FEATURE_PTS. On a CPU without it, coretemp_cpu_online() never calls coretemp_add_core() with pkg_flag set, so pdata->pkg_data stays NULL. coretemp_cpu_offline() then skips the removal of the package interface, destroy_temp_data() is never called for package data, and the array is still allocated when coretemp_device_remove() frees the platform data that pointed at it. Release the array in coretemp_device_remove(). destroy_temp_data() sets pdata->core_data to NULL when it frees it, so the added kfree() is a no-op on CPUs that do have PTS. Tested on an Intel Core i5-1135G7. The driver was

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Check pointer type for all atomic RMW paths Atomic RMW verification records an instruction pointer type only when the current destination is PTR_TO_ARENA. A second path can therefore reach the same instruction with an ordinary pointer without comparing it against the saved arena type. The post-verification fixup uses the saved type to rewrite the instruction to BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC for every path. Record the actual destination type for all atomic RMW paths so the existing mismatch check rejects incompatible uses of one instruction.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: Do not skip lock checks for single-byte ranges check_lock_range() uses inclusive ranges. Its callers pass the end offset as start + length - 1, so start == end represents a valid single-byte range rather than an empty range. The start == end shortcut therefore skips mandatory byte-range lock checks for one-byte reads, writes, copychunk operations and one-byte truncate ranges. A conflicting lock covering that byte is not checked and the operation is allowed to proceed. Remove the shortcut. The truncate size == inode->i_size case is already handled by only calling check_lock_range() when the new size differs from the current file size.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: server: fix leak of ksmbd_ipc_login_request_ext() returned buffer Free it unconditionally after ksmbd_alloc_user() calls. kmemleak splat: unreferenced object 0xffff888103b83540 (size 192): comm "pool-0", pid 16970, jiffies 4377290937 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace (crc 408ccc66): __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x730/0x920 handle_generic_event+0xec/0x1a0 [ksmbd] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe0/0x130 genl_rcv_msg+0x181/0x290 netlink_rcv_skb+0x4f/0x100 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1e6/0x2c0 netlink_sendmsg+0x20a/0x450 ____sys_sendmsg+0x2e8/0x310 ___sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xc0 __sys_sendmsg+0x63/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x670 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user() ksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp->hash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC login response with user->passkey_sz = resp->hash_sz; user->passkey = kmalloc(resp->hash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP); if (user->passkey) memcpy(user->passkey, resp->hash, resp->hash_sz); resp->hash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp->hash[] is only KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login response can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy() reads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not bound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack hash[] buffer before allocating and copying. [ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611 [ 2030.242296] [ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 186

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: smbdirect: free completion queues with ib_free_cq() smbdirect_connection_destroy_qp() creates the send and receive completion queues with ib_alloc_cq_any(), which for IB_POLL_WORKQUEUE arms an internal completion handler that runs ib_cq_poll_work() on a workqueue. Tearing those CQs down with ib_destroy_cq() frees them without first cancelling that poll work. If the provider posts a completion late -- for example Soft-RoCE (rxe) posting an RNR error from rxe_receiver() after rdma_destroy_qp() -- the handler re-queues ib_cq_poll_work() on the already-freed CQ, and a follow-on access faults in rxe_req_notify_cq(). Use ib_free_cq(), which cancel_work_sync()es the poll work before freeing the CQ, so no completion handler can run against a freed queue. [ 1236.599526] ================================================================== [ 1236.602142] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ib_cq_poll_work+0xd0/0x1a0 [ 1236

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: smbdirect: destroy QP before mem pools on accept failure On the rdma_accept_failed error path of smbdirect_accept_connect_request(), the receive io posted just above is owned by the QP (recv_io is set to NULL after a successful post). The error path fell through to smbdirect_connection_destroy_mem_pools() before smbdirect_connection_destroy_qp(), so the mem pools and the recv_io slab cache were destroyed while that recv_io was still outstanding on the QP. The drain in smbdirect_connection_destroy_qp() (ib_drain_qp()) is what runs the recv completion that returns the recv_io to the free list, so destroying the pools first leaves the object outstanding at kmem_cache_destroy() time ("Slab cache still has objects") and later frees it into an already-destroyed mempool (mempool_free_bulk NULL-pointer dereference). Give rdma_accept_failed its own teardown that drains the QP first, then destroys the mem pools, and re

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: smbdirect: release pending child sockets outside the handler lock smbdirect_socket_destroy() releases the listener's pending/ready child sockets while still holding the listener's handler lock, the &id_priv->handler_mutex taken via rdma_lock_handler(), not sc->listen.lock, and before the listener's own rdma_destroy_id(). That ordering has one real consequence and one cosmetic one. The real one: smbdirect_socket_release() drops the child's last reference, which destroys the child's cm_id. Doing that before the listener's rdma_destroy_id() lets _cma_cancel_listens(), running from the listener's _destroy_id(), walk an already freed child id_priv, which KASAN catches as a slab-use-after-free during listener shutdown: [ 4758.909130] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_lock+0x1469/0x1560 [ 4758.911450] Read of size 1 at addr ffff88821c381db4 by task ksmbd.control/1652 [ 4758.913262] Call Trace: [ 4758.913267