Поиск уязвимостей

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: team: free skb when broadcast has no txable port bc_transmit() sends the original skb through the last txable port. When no port is txable, it returns false without consuming the skb, but team_xmit() still returns NETDEV_TX_OK. AF_PACKET sends then retain the skb and its socket write-memory charge. A TX-enabled, link-down port keeps the broadcast transmit op installed. Carrier can stay up through a second link-up, TX-disabled port or be forced on by userspace. Free the original skb on the no-port path while leaving the existing drop accounting intact. Discovered by Sashiko during review of previous commit.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openvswitch: fix soft lockup in the netlink flow dump A production compute node carrying a few thousand datapath flows hit a soft lockup inside a single netlink flow dump and panicked. ovs_flow_cmd_dump() calls ovs_flow_stats_get() for every flow it emits, and that releases stats->lock with spin_unlock_bh() once per CPU that has touched the flow. Every release is a local_bh_enable(), and each one runs the pending softirq backlog in the dumping thread's own context. The skb bounds the flows one callback emits, but not the softirq work it absorbs. On a CPU that carries the box's packet load the backlog refills as fast as it drains, so the dumping thread becomes that CPU's softirq engine. It never sleeps and it has no reschedule point, so under voluntary preemption nothing can take the CPU away from it: neither the ksoftirqd the kernel woke to take the work over, nor the stopper thread the softlockup detector dispatche...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: optee: register TEE devices only once fully initialized optee_probe() called tee_device_register() on both the client and the supplicant device before the rest of struct optee had been initialized. tee_device_register() calls cdev_device_add(), which does two things at once: it creates /dev/tee0 and /dev/teepriv0, and it links the device into the tee class so that class_find_device() can find it. From that moment on the device is reachable both from user space via tee_open() and from kernel space via tee_client_open_context(). The only gate in teedev_open() is tee_device_get(), which merely checks that teedev->desc is non-NULL, which was already set by tee_device_alloc(). Therefore, there is effectively no gate at all. A context opened in that window can run against a struct optee where - optee->call_queue.mutex is not initialized by optee_cq_init() - optee->supp mutex and completions is not initialized by optee_sup...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: sequencing: pcie-m2: Fix leaking array from of_regulator_bulk_get_all() of_regulator_bulk_get_all() allocates the consumers array and hands it to the caller, who is expected to free it at an appropriate time. pwrseq-pcie-m2.c never did, leading to a memory leak. Add an explicit kfree() for the consumers array.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: regulator: ltc3676: don't read the write-only HRST and CLIRQ registers HRST (0x1e) and CLIRQ (0x1f) are write-only command strobes. Writing HRST triggers a hard reset of the chip and writing CLIRQ clears the interrupt; reading them returns nothing useful, and the read itself fires the command. The result is that a plain register dump resets the board: cat /sys/kernel/debug/regmap/2-003c/registers walks every readable register, hits HRST, and the board reboots. Split the callback back in two so HRST and CLIRQ stay writable but are no longer readable. The readable range is left unchanged (LTC3676_BUCK1 ... LTC3676_IRQSTAT).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: regulator: of: fill in supply names in of_regulator_bulk_get_all() of_regulator_bulk_get_all() returns an array it allocated itself, and fills in only the consumer of each entry. Every other way of getting a bulk array has the supply name set, because the caller provides it, and the core expects it to be there: regulator_bulk_enable() prints it when a supply fails to enable, so a caller that hands such an array to it dereferences uninitialised memory on that path. Copy each name into the array's own allocation, right behind the entries, so that it shares the array's lifetime and callers still have nothing extra to free. That also retires the fixed 64 byte stack buffer the names were assembled in, which is_supply_name() never bounded the copy against.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: regulator: tps6594-regulator: Fix n_linear_ranges for TPS65224 BUCK2-4 The TPS65224 BUCK2, BUCK3 and BUCK4 descriptors pass 4 as n_linear_ranges, but tps65224_bucks_2_3_4_ranges[] only has two entries, covering selectors 0x00-0x45. The linear range helpers loop over n_linear_ranges entries, so any lookup of a selector above 0x45 reads past the end of the array and treats whatever follows it as two more ranges. This happens on the normal registration path when the core checks the voltage constraints against every selector. TPS652G1 uses the same descriptors and is affected too. Use ARRAY_SIZE() so the count always matches the table.

Use after free in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.216 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ch: Do not keep references to data transfer element devices ch_readconfig() looks up the scsi_device of every data transfer element whose SCSI id the changer reports in READ ELEMENT STATUS, and stores it in ch->dt[]. scsi_device_lookup() takes a reference, and nothing ever drops it: ch_destroy() frees the array with kfree(). ch->dt[] is read nowhere else - it only supplies the vendor, model and revision printed in the same loop. Once such a drive is removed, its scsi_device can never be released. It stays on the host's device list at its address, so a new device there is refused by anything that walks the list - target_core_pscsi reports "scsi_device_get() failed for H:C:T:L" - and the low-level driver's module can no longer be unloaded. Only a reboot recovers. It shows with any changer that reports its drives' ids; with the mhvtl virtual library (IBM 3573-TL personality), each create and remove of a library w...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace. It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the current tp: beq\prev, tp, _skip_scs scs_load_current _skip_scs: tp is a user-writable register. A user task that sets tp to the linear-map address of its own task_struct (&current) before trapping makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place. Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted "sd ra, -8(gp)" / "ld ra, -8(gp)" in every non-leaf function then w...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: errata: select RISCV_ALTERNATIVE_EARLY for THEAD GHOSTWRITE errata_probe_ghostwrite() only marks the CPU as vulnerable when it is called at the RISCV_ALTERNATIVES_EARLY_BOOT stage, and the mitigation in ghostwrite_enable_mitigation() only takes effect if the vulnerable state was recorded before the boot alternatives are patched. The early boot stage is only executed when CONFIG_RISCV_ALTERNATIVE_EARLY is enabled, which currently is only selected by ERRATA_THEAD_MAE. In a kernel built with ERRATA_THEAD_GHOSTWRITE=y but ERRATA_THEAD_MAE=n, the early alternatives never run, so ghostwrite_state is never set to VULNERABLE: ghostwrite_enable_mitigation() returns false, xtheadvector remains enabled, and sysfs reports "Not affected" on a vulnerable T-Head C9xx CPU. Select RISCV_ALTERNATIVE_EARLY from ERRATA_THEAD_GHOSTWRITE so that the vulnerability is detected in the early boot stage and the default mitigation is ap...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: futex: untag the user pointer before the atomic access access_ok() checks untagged_addr(uaddr), but arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() and futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic() hand the raw uaddr to the inline asm amoswap/amoadd/.../lr.w+sc.w through the "+m" (*uaddr) operand. When the tagged address ABI is enabled (CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_SUPM, prctl PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL with PMLEN != 0), those two addresses differ: a user pointer whose top PMLEN bits hold a tag passes access_ok() after untagging, but the atomic is then performed on the still-tagged raw address. Supervisor-mode data accesses are not subject to the U-mode pointer masking (that is governed by menvcfg.PMM, which the kernel does not set), so hardware does not strip the tag for the kernel's own access. With Sv57 and PMLEN=16 the tag bits overlap the canonical-address bits, so a tagged pointer can name a canonical kernel virtual address (e.g. in the linear map...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sock: Serialize dead-device detachment Rebinding an HCI socket after its controller is unregistered can race monitor control replay and crash the kernel. hci_sock_bind() clears hci_pi(sk)->hdev and drops the device reference under only the socket lock, whereas send_monitor_control_replay() holds hci_sk_list.lock for reading. Replay can observe a non-NULL hdev, then bind can clear it and drop the last reference before create_monitor_ctrl_open() reads hdev->id. This can cause a NULL pointer dereference if the pointer is reloaded, or a use-after-free if the old pointer is retained. The kernel reported: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f] RIP: 0010:create_monitor_ctrl_open+0x579/0x800 Call Trace: hci_sock_bind+0xd96/0x1190 __sys_bind+0x166/0x200 __x64_sys_bind+0x6d/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x4a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The same missing serialization lets ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix command skb lifetime during scan setup During PA sync scan setup, hci_le_set_ext_scan_param_sync() gets the address used for the PA_LINK lookup from hci_sent_cmd_data(). The returned pointer borrows storage from sent_cmd or req_skb, without holding a reference to either skb. The scan worker runs on req_workqueue while hci_cmd_work() runs on the separate device workqueue. After the scan worker loads sent_cmd, the command worker can free and replace it before hci_sent_cmd_data() dereferences the skb. The command payload can also be freed between returning from the helper and comparing the address. The connection lookup's RCU critical section does not protect the command skb. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_sent_cmd_data+0x27c/0x2f0 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: hci_sent_cmd_data+0x27c/0x2f0 hci_le_set_scan_param_sync+0x43a/0x850 hci_passive_scan_sync+0xb0...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: Reject concurrent BIS listener setup iso_sock_listen() drops the socket lock before calling iso_listen_bis() to preserve the hdev->lock ordering. Two concurrent listen() calls on the same broadcast socket can therefore both observe BT_BOUND. Caller A can attach connA and release the locks, then caller B can acquire them and attach connB before A publishes BT_LISTEN. __iso_chan_add() checks whether connB already has a socket, but not whether the socket already has a connection. The second attachment overwrites iso_pi(sk)->conn, leaking the connA reference and leaving connA->sk intact. Socket teardown follows connB, so later events on connA can cause a stale socket access. Recheck BT_BOUND and require iso_pi(sk)->conn to be NULL after taking both the HCI device and socket locks in iso_listen_bis(). The connection check also covers the interval between attachment and publication of BT_LISTEN. Reject a c...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: Serialize concurrent connect calls iso_sock_connect() checks the socket state before taking the socket lock and drops the lock again before setting up a connection. Two callers can both pass the admission check while the socket is open or bound. Caller A can copy its destination for route selection, then caller B can replace the socket destination before A binds or connects the CIS. A then uses B's destination with the route selected for its own request. B can also proceed after A attaches a connection and sets BT_CONNECT. For deferred BIS setup, B can bind a second BIS and overwrite iso_pi(sk)->conn, leaving the first connection's reference and conn->sk back-pointer stranded. Concurrent CIS connects can likewise replace the socket's connection. Later teardown only detaches the current connection, so a callback on the old connection can race with socket release and access a freed socket. KASAN report...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: serialise sco_conn lifetime against sco_recv_scodata() sco_recv_scodata() upgrades the weak hcon->sco_data back-pointer to a strong reference under hdev->lock: hci_dev_lock(hdev); hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_handle(hdev, handle); ... conn = sco_conn_hold_unless_zero(hcon->sco_data); hci_dev_unlock(hdev); but the pointer is cleared from the other side without that lock. When the last sco_conn reference is dropped, sco_conn_free() ran conn->hcon->sco_data = NULL; with no hdev->lock held, so the RX path could read hcon->sco_data and call kref_get_unless_zero() on an sco_conn that was concurrently freed: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_conn_hold_unless_zero+0xbe/0x160 Write of size 4 by task kworker/u17:0 Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work Call Trace: sco_conn_hold_unless_zero+0xbe/0x160 sco_recv_scodata+0x13f/0x490 hci_rx_work+0x3af/0x730 kref_get_unless_zero() only guards against a zero refcount, not a...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: free the skb when the DLC has no owner rfcomm_recv_data() hands the skb to d->data_ready() and returns 0 without freeing it, so the callback owns the skb from that point on. The tty implementation frees it when the DLC has been detached from its device: static void rfcomm_dev_data_ready(struct rfcomm_dlc *dlc, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct rfcomm_dev *dev = dlc->owner; if (!dev) { kfree_skb(skb); return; } The socket implementation returns without freeing it, and the skb is leaked. A connected DLC can have no owner: rfcomm_sock_destruct() clears d->owner, while the DLC itself stays on the session until it is closed. Data frames that arrive in that window still find d->state == BT_CONNECTED in rfcomm_recv_data() and are handed to the callback, one leaked skb each. The leak does not stop on its own either. The remote runs out of credits only once RFCOMM_RX_THROTTLED is set, and for a socket the onl...

Out of bounds write in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.216 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: connect the session socket without rfcomm_mutex An RFCOMM connect() issued while a BR/EDR link is being authenticated makes lockdep report a circular dependency, and the reported cycle is a real AB/BA between rfcomm_mutex and hdev->lock. rfcomm_security_cfm() is called from the HCI event path, which already holds hdev->lock: hci_rx_work() hci_event_packet() hci_cc_read_enc_key_size() [hdev->lock] hci_encrypt_cfm() [hci_cb_list_lock] rfcomm_security_cfm() [rfcomm_mutex] while an RFCOMM connect() from userspace takes the same two locks the other way round: rfcomm_sock_connect() rfcomm_dlc_open() [rfcomm_mutex] __rfcomm_dlc_open() rfcomm_session_create() kernel_connect() l2cap_sock_connect() l2cap_chan_connect() [hdev->lock] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected kworker/u131:1/1128 is trying to acquire lock: rfcomm_mutex, at: rfcomm_security_cfm+0x31/0x3e0 ...