In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtk: validate WMT event SKB length before struct access btmtk_usb_hci_wmt_sync() casts the WMT event response SKB data to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt (7 bytes) and struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc (9 bytes) without first checking that the SKB contains enough data. A short firmware response causes out-of-bounds reads from SKB tailroom. Use skb_pull_data() to validate and advance past the base WMT event header. For the FUNC_CTRL case, pull the additional status field bytes before accessing them.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: use kzalloc to zero-initialize security descriptor buffer Commit 62e7dd0a39c2d ("smb: common: change the data type of num_aces to le16") split struct smb_acl's __le32 num_aces field into __le16 num_aces and __le16 reserved. The reserved field corresponds to Sbz2 in the MS-DTYP ACL wire format, which must be zero [1]. When building an ACL descriptor in build_sec_desc(), we are using a kmalloc()'ed descriptor buffer and writing the fields explicitly using le16() writes now. This never writes to the 2 byte reserved field, leaving it as uninitialized heap data. When the reserved field happens to contain non-zero slab garbage, Samba rejects the security descriptor with "ndr_pull_security_descriptor failed: Range Error", causing chmod to fail with EINVAL. Change kmalloc() to kzalloc() to ensure the entire buffer is zero-initialized. [1] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/202...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix OOB read and infinite loop in hci_le_create_big_complete_evt hci_le_create_big_complete_evt() iterates over BT_BOUND connections for a BIG handle using a while loop, accessing ev->bis_handle[i++] on each iteration. However, there is no check that i stays within ev->num_bis before the array access. When a controller sends a LE_Create_BIG_Complete event with fewer bis_handle entries than there are BT_BOUND connections for that BIG, or with num_bis=0, the loop reads beyond the valid bis_handle[] flex array into adjacent heap memory. Since the out-of-bounds values typically exceed HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX (0x0EFF), hci_conn_set_handle() rejects them and the connection remains in BT_BOUND state. The same connection is then found again by hci_conn_hash_lookup_big_state(), creating an infinite loop with hci_dev_lock held. Fix this by terminating the BIG if in case not all BIS could be setup properly.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: pm: ADD_ADDR rtx: fix potential data-race This mptcp_pm_add_timer() helper is executed as a timer callback in softirq context. To avoid any data races, the socket lock needs to be held with bh_lock_sock(). If the socket is in use, retry again soon after, similar to what is done with the keepalive timer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix a potential clc buffer length underflow The buf_len is used to limit the iterations for retrieving the country power setting and may underflow under certain conditions due to changes in the power table in CLC. This underflow leads to an almost infinite loop or an invalid power setting resulting in driver initialization failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-tcp: fix race between ICReq handling and queue teardown nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() updates queue->state after sending an Initialization Connection Response (ICResp), but it does so without serializing against target-side queue teardown. If an NVMe/TCP host sends an Initialization Connection Request (ICReq) and immediately closes the connection, target-side teardown may start in softirq context before io_work drains the already buffered ICReq. In that case, nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() sets queue->state to NVMET_TCP_Q_DISCONNECTING and drops the queue reference under state_lock. If io_work later processes that ICReq, nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() can still overwrite the state back to NVMET_TCP_Q_LIVE. That defeats the DISCONNECTING-state guard in nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() and allows a later socket state change to re-enter teardown and issue a second kref_put() on an already released queue. The ICResp se...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/chrome: cros_ec_typec: Init mutex in Thunderbolt registration cros_typec_register_thunderbolt() missed initializing the `adata->lock` mutex. This leads to a NULL dereference when the mutex is later acquired (e.g. in cros_typec_altmode_work()). Initialize the mutex in cros_typec_register_thunderbolt() to fix the issue.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing Even after applying commit 7244491dab34 ("RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet can still trigger panic. That patch handled payload_size() underflow only for valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown opcode. The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit and reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver. The check added there reads pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE where header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length. The rxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB opcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so length == 0 and the check degenerates to pkt->paylen < 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE which does not constrain pkt->paylen enough. rxe_icrc_hdr...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack without initialisation: struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast; The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field: /* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */ struct ifla_vf_broadcast { __u8 broadcast[32]; }; The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len as the length: memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len); On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs) dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via: nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast) leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable. The other...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: check for nEPT/nNPT in slow flush hypercalls Checking is_guest_mode(vcpu) is incorrect, because translate_nested_gpa() is only valid if an L2 guest is running *with nested EPT/NPT enabled*. Instead use the same condition as translate_nested_gpa() itself.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm-verity-fec: fix reading parity bytes split across blocks (take 3) fec_decode_bufs() assumes that the parity bytes of the first RS codeword it decodes are never split across parity blocks. This assumption is false. Consider v->fec->block_size == 4096 && v->fec->roots == 17 && fio->nbufs == 1, for example. In that case, each call to fec_decode_bufs() consumes v->fec->roots * (fio->nbufs << DM_VERITY_FEC_BUF_RS_BITS) = 272 parity bytes. Considering that the parity data for each message block starts on a block boundary, the byte alignment in the parity data will iterate through 272*i mod 4096 until the 3 parity blocks have been consumed. On the 16th call (i=15), the alignment will be 4080 bytes into the first block. Only 16 bytes remain in that block, but 17 parity bytes will be needed. The code reads out-of-bounds from the parity block buffer. Fortunately this doesn't normally happen, since it can occur only fo...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix double free in create_space_info() error path When kobject_init_and_add() fails, the call chain is: create_space_info() -> btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() -> kobject_init_and_add() -> failure -> kobject_put(&space_info->kobj) -> space_info_release() -> kfree(space_info) Then control returns to create_space_info(): btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() returns error -> goto out_free -> kfree(space_info) This causes a double free. Keep the direct kfree(space_info) for the earlier failure path, but after btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() has called kobject_put(), let the kobject release callback handle the cleanup.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmi: Check event message buffer response for bad data The event message buffer response data size got checked later when processing, but check it right after the response comes back. It appears some BMCs may return an empty message instead of an error when fetching events. There are apparently some new BMCs that make this error, so we need to compensate.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/ocrdma: Don't NULL deref uctx on errors in ocrdma_copy_pd_uresp() Sashiko points out that pd->uctx isn't initialized until late in the function so all these error flow references are NULL and will crash. Use the uctx that isn't NULL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mana: Fix mana_destroy_wq_obj() cleanup in mana_ib_create_qp_rss() Sashiko points out there are two bugs here in the error unwind flow, both related to how the WQ table is unwound. First there is a double i-- on the first failure path due to the while loop having a i--, remove it. Second if mana_ib_install_cq_cb() fails then mana_create_wq_obj() is not undone due to the above i--.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: remove station if connection prep fails If connection preparation fails for MLO connections, then the interface is completely reset to non-MLD. In this case, we must not keep the station since it's related to the link of the vif being removed. Delete an existing station. Any "new_sta" is already being removed, so that doesn't need changes. This fixes a use-after-free/double-free in debugfs if that's enabled, because a vif going from MLD (and to MLD, but that's not relevant here) recreates its entire debugfs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: isofs: validate block number from NFS file handle in isofs_export_iget isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent() pass an attacker- controlled block number (ifid->block or ifid->parent_block) from the NFS file handle to isofs_export_iget(), which only rejects block == 0 before calling isofs_iget() and ultimately sb_bread(). A crafted file handle with fh_len sufficient to pass the check added by commit 0405d4b63d08 ("isofs: Prevent the use of too small fid") can still drive the server to read any in-range block on the backing device as if it were an iso_directory_record. That earlier fix was assigned CVE-2025-37780. sb_bread() on an out-of-range block returns NULL cleanly via the EIO path, so there is no memory-safety violation. For in-range reads of adjacent-partition data on the same block device, the unrelated bytes end up in iso_inode_info fields that reach the NFS client as dentry metadata. The deployment ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: virtio_bt: clamp rx length before skb_put virtbt_rx_work() calls skb_put(skb, len) where len comes directly from virtqueue_get_buf() with no validation against the buffer we posted to the device. The RX skb is allocated in virtbt_add_inbuf() and exposed to virtio as exactly 1000 bytes via sg_init_one(). Checking len against skb_tailroom(skb) is not sufficient because alloc_skb() can leave more tailroom than the 1000 bytes actually handed to the device. A malicious or buggy backend can therefore report used.len between 1001 and skb_tailroom(skb), causing skb_put() to include uninitialized kernel heap bytes that were never written by the device. The same path also accepts len == 0, in which case skb_put(skb, 0) leaves the skb empty but virtbt_rx_handle() still reads the pkt_type byte from skb->data, consuming uninitialized memory. Define VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE once and reuse it in alloc_skb() and sg_init_one(),...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: b43: enforce bounds check on firmware key index in b43_rx() The firmware-controlled key index in b43_rx() can exceed the dev->key[] array size (58 entries). The existing B43_WARN_ON is non-enforcing in production builds, allowing an out-of-bounds read. Make the B43_WARN_ON check enforcing by dropping the frame when the firmware returns an invalid key index.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: protect memcg_path kfree() with damon_sysfs_lock Patch series "mm/damon/sysfs-schemes: fix use-after-free for [memcg_]path". Reads of 'memcg_path' and 'path' files in DAMON sysfs interface could race with their writes, results in use-after-free. Fix those. This patch (of 2): damon_sysfs_scheme_filter->mmecg_path can be read and written by users, via DAMON sysfs memcg_path file. It can also be indirectly read, for the parameters {on,off}line committing to DAMON. The reads for parameters committing are protected by damon_sysfs_lock to avoid the sysfs files being destroyed while any of the parameters are being read. But the user-driven direct reads and writes are not protected by any lock, while the write is deallocating the memcg_path-pointing buffer. As a result, the readers could read the already freed buffer (user-after-free). Note that the user-reads don't race when the same open file...