When parsing a multipart form (either explicitly with Request.ParseMultipartForm or implicitly with Request.FormValue, Request.PostFormValue, or Request.FormFile), limits on the total size of the parsed form were not applied to the memory consumed while reading a single form line. This permits a maliciously crafted input containing very long lines to cause allocation of arbitrarily large amounts of memory, potentially leading to memory exhaustion. With fix, the ParseMultipartForm function now correctly limits the maximum size of form lines.

When parsing a multipart form (either explicitly with Request.ParseMultipartForm or implicitly with Request.FormValue, Request.PostFormValue, or Request.FormFile), limits on the total size of the parsed form were not applied to the memory consumed while reading a single form line. This permits a maliciously crafted input containing very long lines to cause allocation of arbitrarily large amounts of memory, potentially leading to memory exhaustion. With fix, the ParseMultipartForm function now correctly limits the maximum size of form lines.

Memory exhaustion in multipart form parsing in net/textproto and net/http

When parsing a multipart form (either explicitly with Request.ParseMul ...

An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.

An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.

An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.

An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of ...

Moderate: gvisor-tap-vsock security and bug fix update

When parsing a multipart form (either explicitly with Request.ParseMultipartForm or implicitly with Request.FormValue, Request.PostFormValue, or Request.FormFile), limits on the total size of the parsed form were not applied to the memory consumed while reading a single form line. This permits a maliciously crafted input containing very long lines to cause allocation of arbitrarily large amounts of memory, potentially leading to memory exhaustion. With fix, the ParseMultipartForm function now correctly limits the maximum size of form lines.

ELSA-2024-3831: containernetworking-plugins security and bug fix update (MODERATE)

ELSA-2024-3830: gvisor-tap-vsock security and bug fix update (MODERATE)

Уязвимость пакета golang операционной системы Debian GNU/Linux, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании (DoS)

Security update for buildah

Security update for ignition

Security update for kubernetes1.26

Security update for containerd

Security update for go1.21

Security update for go1.22