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On most platforms, Go uses the given system root certificates. However, in some narrower cases, the system trust stores may not be updated without further action. To defend against the narrower set of cases that may remain affected, a denylist was added in crypto/x509 to return an error when calling Verify with any of the known intermediate certificates that are no longer considered to be trustworthy.

Go: CVE-2026-111943 Distrust compromised intermediate certificates in crypto/x509

On most platforms, Go uses the given system root certificates. However ...

Important: skopeo security update

ELSA-2026-70641: skopeo security update (IMPORTANT)

Important: go-toolset:rhel8 security, bug fix, and enhancement update

Important: golang security, bug fix, and enhancement update

Important: golang security, bug fix, and enhancement update

Security update for go1.26-openssl

Security update for go1.26-openssl

Security update for go1.27

Security update for go1.27

Important: ignition security update

Important: ignition security update

ELSA-2026-91720: ignition security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2026-91719: ignition security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2026-95518: delve security update (IMPORTANT)

Previously, after a channel has been established, a malicious peer could send crafted messages that would deadlock the entire connection. Now, we handle all RFC 4254 channel messages; global requests are handled explicitly. Then, treat all other messages as a protocol error and tear the connection down instead of buffering and blocking.

Previously, after a channel has been established, a malicious peer could send crafted messages that would deadlock the entire connection. Now, we handle all RFC 4254 channel messages; global requests are handled explicitly. Then, treat all other messages as a protocol error and tear the connection down instead of buffering and blocking.

Previously, after a channel has been established, a malicious peer could send crafted messages that would deadlock the entire connection. Now, we handle all RFC 4254 channel messages; global requests are handled explicitly. Then, treat all other messages as a protocol error and tear the connection down instead of buffering and blocking.