Security update for xen

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 10 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 46 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP4)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 40 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP4)

Security update for the Linux Kernel RT (Live Patch 10 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7)

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

ELSA-2026-50275: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 17 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP6)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 8 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 1 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 20 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP6)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 29 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP5)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 27 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP5)

Security update for the Linux Kernel RT (Live Patch 0 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7)

ELSA-2026-50294: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2026-50299: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2026-50262: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/slab: do not limit zeroing to orig_size when only red zoning is enabled When init (zeroing) on allocation is requested, for kmalloc() we generally have to zero the full object size even if a smaller size is requested, in order to provide krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO guarantees. But if we track the requested size, krealloc() uses that information to do the right thing, so we can zero only the requested size. With red zoning also enabled, any extra size became part of the red zone, so it must not be zeroed and thus we must zero only the requested size. However the current check is imprecise, and will trigger also when only SLAB_RED_ZONE is enabled without SLAB_STORE_USER (which enables tracking the requested size). This means enabling red zoning alone can compromise krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO contract. Fix this by using slub_debug_orig_size() instead, which is the exact check for whether the requested size is tracked. We d...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/slab: do not limit zeroing to orig_size when only red zoning is enabled When init (zeroing) on allocation is requested, for kmalloc() we generally have to zero the full object size even if a smaller size is requested, in order to provide krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO guarantees. But if we track the requested size, krealloc() uses that information to do the right thing, so we can zero only the requested size. With red zoning also enabled, any extra size became part of the red zone, so it must not be zeroed and thus we must zero only the requested size. However the current check is imprecise, and will trigger also when only SLAB_RED_ZONE is enabled without SLAB_STORE_USER (which enables tracking the requested size). This means enabling red zoning alone can compromise krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO contract. Fix this by using slub_debug_orig_size() instead, which is the exact check for whether the requested size is tracked. We d...