In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: params: fix charp corruption on allocation failure param_set_charp() stores charp parameters in allocated memory after slab is available, and releases the previous value when the parameter is updated. The previous value is released before the replacement allocation succeeds. If kmalloc_parameter() fails, the setter returns -ENOMEM with the parameter left as NULL. Failing zswap's compressor update before zswap is initialized can later trigger: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:strcmp+0x10/0x30 Call Trace: zswap_setup+0x3b1/0x490 zswap_enabled_param_set+0x5b/0xa0 param_attr_store+0x93/0xe0 module_attr_store+0x1c/0x30 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x116/0x1f0 Allocate and copy the replacement first, then replace the parameter value only after allocation succeeds.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: xdr_buf_trim: clamp buf->len to avoid underflow xdr_buf_trim() trims `len` bytes from the tail of an xdr_buf by walking the tail, pages, and head iovecs. Each per-section step uses min_t() so it never removes more bytes than that section holds, but the final accounting at the fix_len label subtracts the total bytes actually consumed from buf->len without any clamp: fix_len: buf->len -= (len - trim); When the caller has set buf->len to a value smaller than the sum of the iov_lens, (len - trim) can exceed buf->len and the unsigned subtraction wraps to near UINT_MAX. gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reaches xdr_buf_trim() in exactly that state: buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); buf->len is a small wire-derived value while the iov_lens are at page scale, so the per-section loops legitimately ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv() validates only an upper bound on the wire-supplied opaque length before handing the buffer to gss_unwrap(): if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr)) goto unwrap_failed; offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr); ... maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf); The wire value `len` flows unchanged as the upper bound into the krb5 unwrap path, so a len in [0, 16] passes this check and is handed to gss_unwrap(). For a krb5 v2 context that lands in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), which reads the 16-byte RFC 4121 token header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 and then calls rotate_left() before any integrity check. With a sub-header length the header reads run past the token, and _rotate_left()'s `shift %= buf->len` path can divide by zero when buf->len has been driven to zero by the truncated token. A header-only token (len == 16) is equally invalid: with a non-zer...

Incorrect boundary conditions, integer overflow in the Audio/Video component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 151, Firefox ESR 140.11, Thunderbird 151, and Thunderbird 140.11.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: route to a populated pool in svc_pool_for_cpu() svc_set_num_threads() spreads the requested threads evenly across the service's pools (base = nrservs / sv_nrpools). When a service runs fewer threads than it has pools -- e.g. an nfsd configured with fewer threads than the host has NUMA nodes while running in "pernode" or "percpu" mode -- the trailing pools are left with no threads at all. svc_xprt_enqueue() selects a pool from the CPU servicing the transport, queues the transport on that pool's sp_xprts, and only wakes a thread from the same pool. Each thread services exclusively its own pool, so a transport that lands on a threadless pool is enqueued on sp_xprts and never picked up: the connection hangs indefinitely. Have svc_pool_for_cpu() skip pools that currently have no threads, falling back to the next populated pool. This trades NUMA locality for a guarantee that the work is actually serviced. sp_n...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: always drain cache_cleaner before destroying a cache_detail sunrpc_destroy_cache_detail() only cancels the global cache_cleaner delayed_work when cache_list is empty. During per-netns teardown cache_list is never empty because init_net's caches remain registered, so the cancel never fires. After unlink, the caller proceeds to cache_destroy_net() which kfrees the cache_detail while cache_clean() may still hold a dangling pointer to it. The result is a use-after-free: cache_dequeue() takes cd->queue_lock on freed memory, and cache_put() dereferences cd->cache_put as a function pointer from freed slab. Drop the list_empty guard so that cancel_delayed_work_sync() always runs, ensuring any in-flight cache_clean() completes before the cache_detail is freed. Re-arm the cleaner afterwards if other caches are still registered.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Check svc pool percpu counter allocation __svc_create() initializes three per-pool percpu_counter stats and ignores every return value. On SMP, percpu_counter_init() fails when __alloc_percpu_gfp() cannot satisfy the allocation, leaving the failed counter with fbc->counters == NULL and its embedded raw_spinlock_t, list_head, and count never initialized. __svc_create() returns the half-constructed svc_serv to nfsd, lockd, or the NFS callback service anyway. Once that service is live, the hot-path increments in svc_xprt_enqueue(), svc_handle_xprt(), and svc_pool_wake_idle_thread() reach a counter whose backing pointer is NULL. The pointer is a per-cpu offset, so the access does not fault: it resolves to offset zero of the current CPU's per-cpu area and silently corrupts whatever variable lives there. A /proc/fs/nfsd/pool_stats read walks the same NULL per-cpu storage and returns garbage, and on CONFIG_DEBUG_SP...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: close backchannel before destroying callback service A backchannel receive can complete a request while the NFS callback service is being torn down. xprt_complete_bc_request() removes the request from bc_pa_list, drops bc_alloc_count, marks the request in use, and then asks xprt_enqueue_bc_request() to hand it to the callback service. If teardown has already cleared xprt->bc_serv, xprt_enqueue_bc_request() currently returns without enqueueing or freeing the committed request. The xprt_get() taken on entry is leaked as well. If the producer wins the race before bc_serv is cleared, it can also enqueue onto sv_cb_list after nfs_callback_down() has stopped the callback threads, leaving the request linked to a svc_serv that is about to be freed. Close the producer side before callback threads are stopped. Add xprt_svc_shutdown_bc() to clear xprt->bc_serv under bc_pa_lock, and call it on callback shutdown and c...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: defer rq_argp and rq_resp free until after RCU grace period svc_rqst_free() frees rqstp->rq_argp and rqstp->rq_resp synchronously via kfree(), but defers the rqstp struct free via kfree_rcu(). After svc_exit_thread() calls list_del_rcu() and svc_rqst_free(), there is a window where RCU readers that started before list_del_rcu() can still traverse the thread list and find the rqstp. These readers (e.g. nfsd_nl_rpc_status_get_dumpit()) dereference rqstp->rq_argp, which has already been freed — a use-after-free. Fix this by moving the kfree of rq_argp and rq_resp into an explicit call_rcu() callback alongside the struct free. Resources not accessed by RCU readers (bvec, buffer pages, scratch folio, auth_data) remain synchronously freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: fix gssx_dec_option_array error path bugs Four coupled defects in the gssx XDR option-array decoder make the error paths unsafe: a NULL deref in the caller, a refcount leak on the decoded group_info, and a latent use-after-free that the leak fix would otherwise expose. gssx_dec_option_array() sets oa->count = 1 before allocating oa->data. If that allocation fails, -ENOMEM is returned with oa->count == 1 and oa->data == NULL. All other error paths jump to free_oa: which frees oa->data and NULLs it but also leaves oa->count == 1. The caller trusts the count: gssp_accept_sec_context_upcall() gssx_dec_accept_sec_context() gssx_dec_option_array() /* fails, count=1 data=NULL */ data = res.options.data[0].value /* NULL deref */ Independently, free_creds: releases the partially decoded svc_cred with a bare kfree(creds). gssx_dec_linux_creds() installs a groups_alloc() result into creds->cr_group_info; tha...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: fix use-after-free in __rpc_clnt_handle_event and __rpc_clnt_remove_pipedir Normal client creation goes through rpc_setup_pipedir(), which records clnt->pipefs_sb, but the mount-event path in __rpc_clnt_handle_event() calls rpc_setup_pipedir_sb() directly and never refreshes that field. The umount path also removes the directory without clearing clnt->pipefs_sb. After a late pipefs mount or any remount, rpc_clnt_remove_pipedir() compares the current superblock against a stale pipefs_sb pointer and skips cleanup, leaving pipefs dentries whose inode private data still points at a freed rpc_clnt, leading to a potential use-after-free during subsequent rpc_info_open() or rpc_show_info() calls. Fix this by properly updating clnt->pipefs_sb upon mount events and clearing it during unmount or failure paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reads the EC and RRC header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 before validating that the token is at least GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) bytes long, and its rotate_left() helper passes buf->len - base to xdr_buf_subsegment() without verifying that base <= buf->len. When a caller hands in a sub-16-byte token, or a token whose declared len leaves base past the end of the buffer, three distinct failures follow: gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(offset, len, buf) ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset ec = *(ptr + 4) /* OOB read on short head */ rrc = *(ptr + 6) /* OOB read on short head */ rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc) xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, base, buf->len - base) /* u32 wrap when base > len */ _rotate_left(&subbuf, shift) shift %= buf->len /* divide-by-zero when base == len */ After decryption, the cleanup arithmetic has...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: harden gss_unwrap_resp_priv length checks gss_unwrap_resp_priv() validates the RPCSEC_GSS opaque length with offset = (u8 *)(p) - (u8 *)head->iov_base; if (offset + opaque_len > rcv_buf->len) goto unwrap_failed; maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx->gc_gss_ctx, offset, offset + opaque_len, rcv_buf); Both operands are u32 and the sum is computed in u32. A reply with opaque_len near 0xffffffff makes offset + opaque_len wrap to a small value that is below rcv_buf->len, so the bound check passes and gss_unwrap() is called with end < begin. The check also lacks a lower bound, so any opaque_len in [0, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) is accepted and forwarded to gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), whose pre-decrypt header reads at ptr+4 and ptr+6 then run past the token. A krb5p NFS server returning a crafted RPCSEC_GSS reply can drive the client into out-of-bounds reads in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() and the rotate_left() loop that follows. Fix by replaci...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: init gssp_lock before publishing proc entry create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() publishes /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy via proc_create_data() before init_gssp_clnt() runs mutex_init() on sn->gssp_lock. Once the dentry is linked under proc_subdir_lock it is immediately reachable from userspace, so a write that lands in the window drives set_gssp_clnt() into mutex_lock() on a zero-initialized struct mutex. create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry(net) proc_create_data("use-gss-proxy", ...) /* dentry live */ init_gssp_clnt(sn) mutex_init(&sn->gssp_lock) /* too late */ write_gssp() set_gssp_clnt(net) mutex_lock(&sn->gssp_lock) /* uninitialized */ gssp_rpc_create(...) sn->gssp_clnt = clnt mutex_unlock(&sn->gssp_lock) The window spans only the two statements between proc_create_data() returning and init_gssp_clnt(), so a writer reaches it only if the registering thread is preempted there while anoth...

Sandbox escape due to use-after-free in the Disability Access APIs component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 151, Firefox ESR 115.36, Firefox ESR 140.11, Thunderbird 151, and Thunderbird 140.11.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Reject krb5 v2 wrap tokens with oversized ec field gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() sets buf->len to a logical length, which can be much smaller than head[0].iov_len (the allocated receive-page capacity). It then calls xdr_buf_trim() with a trim length derived from the 16-bit "extra count" (ec) field in the Kerberos v2 token header. The ec field is authenticated by the post-decrypt memcmp() against the encrypted header copy, so a randomly-mutated value is rejected. However, any peer holding a valid GSS context can legitimately encrypt a token whose ec exceeds the plaintext length. Per RFC 4121, such a token is structurally malformed. Although xdr_buf_trim() now clamps the buf->len subtraction to avoid unsigned underflow, the buffer is still left in a semantically invalid state (zero length, inconsistent iov lengths) when ec is oversized. Reject these tokens before calling xdr_buf_trim(), giving callers a well-defined...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Reject short RFC 4121 MIC tokens in gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2 gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2() reads the token ID at ptr[0..1], the flags byte at ptr[2], and padding at ptr[3..7], then passes ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN and cksum_len to gss_krb5_mic_build_sg(). None of these accesses check read_token->len first. The minimum safe token size is GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) plus ctx->krb5e->cksum_len (12-24, depending on the enctype). All callers accept shorter tokens from the wire: - gss_unwrap_resp_integ() enforces only an upper bound (offset + len <= rcv_buf->len) before allocating mic.data = kmalloc(len) and passing it to gss_verify_mic(). A malicious NFS server can therefore supply a short checksum opaque, producing a small slab allocation that the Kerberos MIC verifier reads past. - gss_validate() enforces only len <= RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE (400) before passing the wire-supplied length to gss_validate_seqno_mic(), which con...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: wait for in-flight client TLS handshake callback xs_tls_handshake_sync() gives xs_tls_handshake_done() a reference to the lower transport before submitting the handshake request. On timeout or signal, the synchronous waiter drops that reference after calling tls_handshake_cancel(). handshake_req_cancel() returns false when handshake_complete() has already marked the request complete. In that case the completion callback can still be running, so dropping the callback-owned reference in the waiter can free the lower transport before xs_tls_handshake_done() stores xprt_err or drops its own reference. If cancellation loses to completion, wait until xs_tls_handshake_done() signals handshake_done and let the callback release its reference. This mirrors the server-side handshake lifetime handling and keeps the timeout or signal return value unchanged.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Reorder rpcrdma_rn_unregister before rdma_destroy_id svc_rdma_free() caches rdma->sc_cm_id->device before teardown, then calls rdma_destroy_id(sc_cm_id) which frees the cm_id. rpcrdma_rn_unregister() follows, but between those two calls the transport's sc_rn entry is still installed in the device's rd_xa. A concurrent ib_unregister_device walk can dispatch svc_rdma_xprt_done() against the now-freed sc_cm_id. Move rpcrdma_rn_unregister() before rdma_destroy_id() so the transport's notification entry is removed from the xarray before the cm_id it references is destroyed. Also guard the sc_cm_id dereference with a NULL check: the following patches introduce paths that reach svc_rdma_free() with sc_cm_id == NULL (listener create failure, ADDR_CHANGE replacement failure).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: svcrdma: Clear sc_cm_id when ADDR_CHANGE replacement fails When svc_rdma_listen_handler() handles RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_CHANGE, it creates a replacement listener cm_id and returns 1, telling the CM core to destroy the old one. If the replacement allocation fails, sc_cm_id still points at the old cm_id that the CM core is about to destroy. Any subsequent dereference of sc_cm_id -- such as svc_rdma_detach()'s rdma_disconnect() call -- is a use-after-free. NULL sc_cm_id on the failure path and guard svc_rdma_detach()'s rdma_disconnect() call against NULL so that the listener can be torn down safely when the server shuts down.