The Nexa Blocks – Gutenberg Blocks, Page Builder for Gutenberg Editor & FSE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in versions up to and including 1.1.1. This is due to the import_demo() function accepting a user-supplied URL in the demo_json_file POST parameter and passing it directly to wp_remote_get() without any URL validation or restriction against internal or private network destinations. The nexa_blocks_nonce required for the AJAX action is publicly exposed in the HTML source of any frontend page where the plugin is active via wp_localize_script on the enqueue_block_assets hook, effectively making the nonce available to all visitors and bypassing any intended authentication barrier. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make server-side HTTP requests to arbitrary internal or external destinations, potentially exposing internal services, cloud metadata endpoints such as the AWS instance metadata service, localhost services, an

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: auxdisplay: line-display: fix OOB read on zero-length message_store() linedisp_display() unconditionally reads msg[count - 1] before checking whether count is zero, so a write of zero bytes to the message sysfs attribute hits msg[-1]: write(fd, "", 0); -> message_store(..., buf, count=0) -> linedisp_display(linedisp, buf, count=0) -> msg[count - 1] == '\n' ; OOB read The kernfs write buffer for that store is a 1-byte allocation (kernfs_fop_write_iter() does kmalloc(len + 1) with len == 0), so msg[-1] is a 1-byte read before the slab object. On a KASAN-enabled kernel this trips an out-of-bounds report and panics; on stock kernels it silently reads adjacent slab data and, if that byte happens to be '\n', the following count-- wraps ssize_t 0 to -1 and is then passed to kmemdup_nul(). linedisp_display() is reached from the message_store() sysfs callback (drivers/auxdisplay/line-display.c message attrib

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix chan ref leak in l2cap_chan_timeout() on !conn __set_chan_timer() takes a l2cap_chan reference via l2cap_chan_hold() before scheduling the delayed work. The normal path in l2cap_chan_timeout() drops this reference with l2cap_chan_put() at the end, but the early return when chan->conn is NULL skips the put, leaking the reference. Add the missing l2cap_chan_put() before the early return.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: HIDP: fix missing length checks in hidp_input_report() hidp_input_report() reads keyboard and mouse payload data from an skb without first verifying that skb->len contains enough data. hidp_recv_intr_frame() pulls the 1-byte HIDP header before dispatching to hidp_input_report(). If a paired device sends a truncated packet, the handler reads beyond the valid skb data, resulting in an out-of-bounds read of skb data. The OOB bytes may be interpreted as phantom key presses or spurious mouse movement. Replace the open-coded length tracking and pointer arithmetic with skb_pull_data() calls. skb_pull_data() returns NULL if the requested bytes are not present, eliminating the need for a manual size variable and the separate skb->len guard.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: fix UAF in iso_recv_frame iso_recv_frame reads conn->sk under iso_conn_lock but releases the lock before using sk, with no reference held. A concurrent iso_sock_kill() can free sk in that window, causing use-after-free on sk->sk_state and sock_queue_rcv_skb(). Fix by replacing the bare pointer read with iso_sock_hold(conn), which calls sock_hold() while the spinlock is held, atomically elevating the refcount before the lock drops. Add a drop_put label so sock_put() is called on all exit paths where the hold succeeded.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: serialize iso_sock_clear_timer with socket lock iso_sock_close() calls iso_sock_clear_timer() before acquiring lock_sock(sk). iso_sock_clear_timer() reads iso_pi(sk)->conn twice without the socket lock held: if (!iso_pi(sk)->conn) return; cancel_delayed_work(&iso_pi(sk)->conn->timeout_work); Concurrently, iso_conn_del() executes under lock_sock(sk) and calls iso_chan_del(), which sets iso_pi(sk)->conn to NULL and may result in the final reference to the connection being dropped: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- iso_sock_clear_timer() if (conn != NULL) ... lock_sock(sk) iso_chan_del() iso_pi(sk)->conn = NULL cancel_delayed_work(conn) /* NULL deref or UAF */ iso_pi(sk)->conn is not stable across the unlock window, causing a NULL pointer dereference o

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix UAF in hci_le_create_cis_sync hci_le_create_cis_sync() dereferences conn->conn_timeout after releasing both rcu_read_lock() and hci_dev_lock(hdev). The conn pointer was obtained from an RCU-protected iteration over hdev->conn_hash.list and is not valid once these locks are dropped. A concurrent disconnect can free the hci_conn between the unlock and the dereference, causing a use-after-free read. The cancellation mechanism in hci_conn_del() cannot prevent this because hci_le_create_cis_pending() queues hci_create_cis_sync with data=NULL: hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, hci_create_cis_sync, NULL, NULL); While hci_conn_del() dequeues with data=conn: hci_cmd_sync_dequeue(hdev, NULL, conn, NULL); Since NULL != conn, the lookup in _hci_cmd_sync_lookup_entry() never matches, and the pending work item is not cancelled. Fix this by saving conn->conn_timeout into a local variable while the lo

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: xpad - fix out-of-bounds access for Share button xpadone_process_packet() receives len directly from urb->actual_length and uses it to index the share-button byte at data[len - 18] or data[len - 26]. Since both len and data[0] are under the device's control, a broken controller can send a GIP_CMD_INPUT packet with actual_length < 18 (e.g. 5 bytes) and reach this code path, causing accesses beyond the actual array. Fix this by calculating the offset and checking bounds against the packet length.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parport: Fix race between port and client registration The parport subsystem registers port devices before they are fully initialised, resulting in a race condition where client drivers such as lp can attach to ports that are not completely initialised or even being torn down. When the port and client drivers are built as modules and loaded around the same time during boot, this occasionally results in a crash. I was able to make this happen reliably in a VM with a PC-style parallel port by patching parport_pc to fail probing: > --- a/drivers/parport/parport_pc.c > +++ b/drivers/parport/parport_pc.c > @@ -2069,7 +2069,7 @@ static struct parport *__parport_pc_probe_port(unsigned long int base, > if (!p) > goto out3; > > - base_res = request_region(base, 3, p->name); > + base_res = NULL; > if (!base_res) > goto out4; > and then running: while true; do modprobe lp & modprobe parport_pc wait

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: Correctly cap ZCR_EL2 provided by a guest hypervisor ZCR_EL2 can be updated by a VHE guest hypervisor either using ZCR_EL2 (which traps) or ZCR_EL1 (which does not trap). KVM handles both in different way: - on ZCR_EL2 trap, ZCR_EL2.LEN is immediately capped at the VM's own VL limit. This has the potential to break existing SW that relies on the full LEN field to be stateful. - on ZCR_EL1 access, we do absolutely nothing. On restoring the SVE context for an L2 guest, we directly restore the guest hypervisor's view of ZCR_EL2 into the physical ZCR_EL2. If the guest's view of the register was updated using the ZCR_EL2 accessor, the value has already been sanitised (with the caveat mentioned above). But if the guest used ZCR_EL1, the raw value is written into the HW, and the L2 guest can now access VLs that it shouldn't. Fix all the above by moving the VL capping to the restore points, ensuring that

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Ignore Port I/O requests of length '0' Explicitly ignore Port I/O requests of length '0' (or count '0'), so that setting up the software scratch area (and other code) doesn't have to worry about underflowing the length, and to allow for WARNing on trying to configure the scratch area with len==0.

The BetterDocs plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in versions up to and including 4.3.11. This is due to a missing capability check in the generate_openai_content_callback() function, which relies solely on a nonce rather than verifying user permissions. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to trigger OpenAI API calls using the site's configured API key with arbitrary user-controlled prompts, leading to unauthorized consumption of the site owner's paid AI API quota.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of the shared buffer. The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn't consult the length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert). Opportunistically rename @len => @min_len to better reflect its role.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Check PSC request indices against the actual size of the buffer When processing Page State Change (PSC) requests, validate the PSC buffer against the effective size of the scratch area, which could be less than the maximum size if the guest provided a pointer that isn't exactly at the start of the GHCB shared buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SEV: Use READ_ONCE() when reading entries/indices from PSC buffer Use READ_ONCE() when reading entries/indices from the guest-accessible Page State Change buffer to defend against TOCTOU bugs. Don't bother with READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for cases where KVM is writing (and not consuming the result!), as the guest isn't supposed to touch the buffer while it's being processed. I.e. using READ_ONCE() is all about protecting against misbehaving guests.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: mt6359: fix unchecked return value in mt6358_read_imp In mt6358_read_imp(), the variable val_v is passed to regmap_read() but the return value is not checked. If the read fails, val_v remains uninitialized and its random stack content is subsequently reported as a measurement result. Initialize val_v to zero to ensure a predictable value is reported in case of bus failure and to prevent potential stack data leakage. This also satisfies static analyzers that might otherwise flag the variable as used uninitialized.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: nxp-sar-adc: fix division by zero in write_raw Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it as a divisor. A user writing zero or a negative value to the sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel. Also prevent unsigned integer underflow when the computed cycle count is smaller than NXP_SAR_ADC_CONV_TIME, which would wrap the u32 inpsamp to a huge value.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: gyro: itg3200: fix i2c read into the wrong stack location itg3200_read_all_channels() takes `__be16 *buf' as a parameter and fills the i2c_msg destination as `(char *)&buf'. Since `buf' is the parameter (a pointer), `&buf' is the address of the local pointer slot on the stack of itg3200_read_all_channels(), not the address of the caller's scan buffer. The (char *) cast hides the type mismatch. i2c_transfer() therefore writes ITG3200_SCAN_ELEMENTS * sizeof(s16) = 8 bytes into the parameter's stack slot, which is discarded when the function returns. The caller's scan buffer in itg3200_trigger_handler() is never written to, so iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() pushes uninitialised stack contents to userspace via /dev/iio:deviceX every scan -- both a functional bug (no actual gyroscope or temperature data is delivered through the triggered buffer) and an information leak. The non-buffered read_raw() path is una

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: gyro: adis16260: fix division by zero in write_raw Add a validation check for the sampling frequency value before using it as a divisor. A user writing zero to the sampling_frequency sysfs attribute triggers a division by zero in the kernel.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: chemical: mhz19b: reject oversized serial replies mhz19b_receive_buf() appends each serdev chunk into the fixed MHZ19B_CMD_SIZE receive buffer and advances buf_idx by len without checking that the chunk fits in the remaining space. A large callback can therefore overflow st->buf before the command path validates the reply. Reset the reply state before each command and reject oversized serial replies before copying them into the fixed buffer. When an oversized reply is detected, wake the waiter and report -EMSGSIZE instead of overwriting st->buf.