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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virt: vmgenid: set driver_data before registering notification handlers Both probe paths register their notification handler before assigning driver_data, which the handler dereferences. In the devicetree path, the notification IRQ can fire as soon as devm_request_irq() registers the handler: the interrupt may already be pending at probe time, for example when a VMM injects the generation-changed notification while restoring a guest from a snapshot that was taken before the driver had probed (Firecracker does exactly this on snapshot restore). The IRQ is also requested with IRQF_SHARED, so another device sharing the line can trigger the handler just as early. The handler then calls vmgenid_notify(), which dereferences the still-NULL driver_data and panics: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.18.38+ #1 PREEMPT(none) Ha...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vc_screen: reload vc pointer before if (ret) in vcs_write() to avoid UAF The reload of 'vc' added by commit 8fb9ea65c9d1 ("vc_screen: reload load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_write() to avoid UAF") sits after the 'if (ret)' block, so the copy-failure break path exits the loop without reloading vc. If the vc was kfree()'d via vc_port_destruct during the unlocked copy_from_user() window, the post-loop 'if (written && vc) vcs_scr_updated(vc)' is reached with a stale non-NULL vc. The '&& vc' guard from commit a287620312dc ("vc_screen: fix null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier() during concurrent vcs_write") only handles the NULL case, not this stale-non-NULL case; vcs_notifier() then reads param->vc->vc_num from freed memory: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in vcs_notifier+0x7c/0xd0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff888007149190 Call Trace: vcs_notifier+0x7c/0xd0 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x70/0xa0 vcs_scr_updated+0x77/0xa0 vcs_...

Use after free in Base in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.216 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vt: selection: Fix unsigned underflow and slab-out-of-bounds read in paste_selection() In paste_selection(), the loop copies min_t(unsigned int, vc_sel.buf_len - pasted,tty->receive_room) bytes per iteration into tty_ldisc_receive_buf() and increments pasted += count. Because the selection mutex (vc_sel.lock) is dropped inside the loop Whenever the line discipline buffer fills up and paste_selection() sleeps on tty->write_wait, a concurrent TIOCLINUX (TIOCL_SETSEL) ioctl can replace vc_sel.buffer with a shorter selection and reduce vc_sel.buf_len below pasted. When paste_selection() resumes, vc_sel.buf_len - pasted underflows as an unsigned integer to a large positive value, causing tty_ldisc_receive_buf(ld, vc_sel.buffer + pasted, NULL, count) to read up to 4094 bytes out-of-bounds past the newly allocated vc_sel.buffer. Fix this by terminating the loop when pasted >= vc_sel.buf_len. Kernel stack trace (Linux 7.3.0...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vt: skip screen update for DEC alignment test on backgroup consoles [BUG] Recently, we encountered a KASAN warning as follows: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in fb_pad_aligned_buffer+0x11f/0x140 Read of size 1 at addr ff1100015fd9f6a4 by task tty_fbcon_oob/1239 CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1239 Comm: tty_fbcon_oob Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1 #100 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-4.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> ... kasan_report+0xf0/0x120 fb_pad_aligned_buffer+0x11f/0x140 ccw_putcs+0x86c/0xa80 fbcon_putcs+0x338/0x410 do_update_region+0x21d/0x450 do_con_write+0x1e0e/0x4880 con_write+0x13/0x80 n_tty_write+0x374/0x1010 file_tty_write.isra.0+0x404/0x7a0 ... reproduce: 1) open /dev/tty0, set a KDFONTOP ioctl with op.op = KD_FONT_OP_SET, op.width = 8 and op.height = 16 (visible VC1) 2) open /dev/tty1, set a KDFONTOP ioctl with op.op = KD_FONT_OP_SET, op.width = 28 and op.height = 24 (in...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: caiaq: unregister the input device when probe fails setup_card() registers the input device, whose name and phys point into struct snd_usb_caiaqdev, and then goes on to snd_card_register() and snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(). If either fails, snd_probe() calls snd_card_free(), which frees the device state but leaves the input device registered: card_free() only clears the pointer, and the input device is unregistered from snd_disconnect() alone. Reading its "uevent" attribute afterwards dereferences freed memory: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x4a9/0x4f0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880208f5043 by task caiaq/4967 add_uevent_var+0x183/0x3a0 input_dev_uevent+0x162/0x900 dev_uevent+0x2f1/0x870 uevent_show+0x1ca/0x3a0 ... Unregister the input device on the probe error path, as snd_disconnect() does. snd_usb_caiaq_input_disconnect() is a no-op when no input device was registered. Reproduced with a raw-gadge...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: line6: reject oversized playback packets Each playback URB is handed a slice of out.buffer that is exactly LINE6_ISO_PACKETS * max_packet_size_out bytes, sized from the OUT endpoint, but the number of bytes written into that slice is never compared against it. submit_audio_out_urb() takes the frame count from prev_fsize, which audio_in_callback() derived from the *IN* endpoint's received packet length, and rescales it with the playback frame size; when prev_fsize is still zero it synthesizes a length from the sample rate instead. On a device declaring a large IN wMaxPacketSize and a small OUT wMaxPacketSize, the resulting memcpy(), or the memset() when the playback stream is idle, runs past its slice and, as the reproducer below shows, beyond the allocation. usb_submit_urb() is not a backstop. max_packet_size_out comes from usb_maxpacket(), which returns only the low 11 bits of wMaxPacketSize, while USB core...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: accel: kionix-kx022a: Fix array boundary check The driver performs a sanity check for an array size, when converting a register value to an array index. The check incorrectly accepts the sizeof(array) as a last index, when last valid index should be sizeof(array) - 1. Fix the check by bailing out when index >= sizeof(array).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: core: avoid double-free of OTP NVMEM device If factory OTP setup fails after the user OTP NVMEM device has been registered, mtd_otp_nvmem_add() unregisters the user device but leaves mtd->otp_user_nvmem set. On an error, the caller unregisters it again. For -EOPNOTSUPP, registration continues and normal teardown unregisters it again. Clear mtd->otp_user_nvmem after unregistering it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: core: call _get_device() with the master MTD __get_mtd_device() calls the master's _get_device() callback with mtd, which may be a partition. __put_mtd_device() passes the master. This breaks gluebi partitions because gluebi_get_device() uses container_of() and therefore requires the master MTD. Pass the master to _get_device(), matching _put_device().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-cgroup: save IRQ state in blkg_tryget_closest() bio_set_dev() associates the bio with a blkg through bio_associate_blkg(). If the blkg lookup misses, blkg_tryget_closest() takes q->queue_lock with spin_lock_irq() and releases it with spin_unlock_irq(), which unconditionally enables local interrupts. Callers may call bio_set_dev() with interrupts already disabled, e.g. dm-thin's pool_map() does so while holding pool->lock taken with spin_lock_irq(). The nested spin_unlock_irq() then enables interrupts while pool->lock is still held, so an I/O completion softirq can run on the same CPU, re-acquire pool->lock (thin_endio(), or overwrite_endio() -> complete_mapping_preparation()) and deadlock. lockdep reports this as inconsistent SOFTIRQ-ON-W to IN-SOFTIRQ-W usage. Commit 3a762de55b4e ("block: save irq state in blkg_lookup_create()") fixed the same problem while the lock lived in blkg_lookup_create(), but commit 9...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: of/overlay: don't leak fragment references when changeset init fails init_overlay_changeset() stores the number of initialized fragments in ovcs->count only on full success. When find_target() or the __symbols__ lookup fails partway through, the target and overlay references taken for the fragments initialized so far are never dropped: free_overlay_changeset() bounds its cleanup loop by ovcs->count, which is still 0. Store the running count on the error path so free_overlay_changeset() puts whatever was set up. The store is guarded by ovcs->fragments because on the allocation-failure path cnt still holds the counting pass total while there is no fragments array; everywhere else cnt only counts fully-initialized fragments.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wfx: validate MIB read length before copying to caller wfx_hif_read_mib() copies reply->length bytes from the firmware response into the caller-provided buffer without checking that reply->length does not exceed val_len. A firmware response with a length field larger than expected overruns the caller buffer and reads past the end of the reply allocation. Replace the dead -ENOMEM check with an active validation that reply->length fits within val_len before the memcpy.

Integer overflow in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.216 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: drop oversized fragments to avoid extra_len overflow In ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(), fragment payloads are accumulated into entry->extra_len as subsequent fragments arrive: entry->extra_len += rx->skb->len; When the final fragment arrives, the head fragment is dequeued, and pskb_expand_head() is called with entry->extra_len to ensure sufficient tailroom for all queued fragments before copying: if (skb_tailroom(rx->skb) < entry->extra_len) { if (unlikely(pskb_expand_head(rx->skb, 0, entry->extra_len, GFP_ATOMIC))) { ... } } while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&entry->skb_list))) { skb_put_data(rx->skb, skb->data, skb->len); dev_kfree_skb(skb); } In commit 69f132236827 ("mac80211: shrink struct ieee80211_fragment_entry"), entry->extra_len was narrowed from unsigned int to u16 in order to reduce structure memory footprint. However, an IEEE 802.11 frame sequence can contain up to 16 fragments (frag numbers 0..15...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath9k: reject short WMI command responses ath9k_wmi_rsp_callback() removes the validated WMI header and copies the number of bytes expected by the waiting command into its response buffer. A device response shorter than that expectation can therefore be read beyond the skb payload. Record -EMSGSIZE for a short response, complete the waiter, and return the stored status from the command path. This also prevents callers from consuming stale response bytes as a successful reply.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath9k_htc: bound TX aggregation to MAX_TX_BUF_SIZE __hif_usb_tx() dequeues up to MAX_TX_AGGR_NUM (20) frames into a single tx_buf of MAX_TX_BUF_SIZE (32768) bytes, limiting the batch by record count but never by cumulative byte length. With large frames (MTU 2304), 20 aggregated frames of 2292 bytes each exceed the allocation (20 * 2296 = 45920 bytes), so the memcpy() in the loop writes up to 13152 bytes past tx_buf->buf before usb_submit_urb(). Peek the queue head and stop before copying any record that would cross MAX_TX_BUF_SIZE, then dispatch the current batch. Leftover skbs remain queued and are drained on the next URB completion. The byte bound changes the loop's exit semantics: it can now exit before i == tx_skb_cnt - 1. Stock only finalized tx_buf->len on that last index (len += offset), so an early break would submit a URB holding only the last record's length while every dequeued skb is freed on comp...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtc: ac100: Fix clock provider use-after-free on probe failure ac100_rtc_register_clks() registers the RTC-32k clock with clk_hw_register_fixed_rate() and the clock provider with of_clk_add_hw_provider(). Neither is device managed, and both are released only from ac100_rtc_remove(). The driver core does not call remove() when probe() fails: really_probe() reaches probe_failed below the device_remove() call and goes straight to releasing the device's managed resources. ac100_rtc_probe() ends with return devm_rtc_register_device(chip->rtc); so if that fails after the clocks have been registered, the provider is left on the global of_clk_providers list holding chip->clk_data, which was allocated with devm_kzalloc() and is freed while probe() unwinds. A later lookup on this device tree node then reads freed memory in of_clk_hw_onecell_get(). Consumers that do exactly that exist in tree: the wifi power sequence nodes on ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtc: mpfs: fix unchecked devm_clk_get() error pointer in probe() devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "rtcref")'s return value was passed straight into clk_get_rate() without checking it for an error first, unlike the "rtc" clock a few lines above which is correctly checked with IS_ERR(). clk_get_rate() only guards against a NULL clk, not an error pointer: if (!clk) return 0; ... rate = clk_core_get_rate_recalc(clk->core); so if devm_clk_get() ever returns an error pointer here (for example ERR_PTR(-EPROBE_DEFER), which is the normal, expected outcome if the clkcfg clock-provider this RTC depends on has not registered its clocks yet by the time this driver probes), clk_get_rate() dereferences that error pointer instead of returning 0, crashing instead of letting probe defer. Capture the clock in the existing 'clk' local and check it with IS_ERR() before calling clk_get_rate(), matching the handling already used for the "rtc" cl...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: validate TX status rate metadata minstrel_ht_tx_status() converts the HT/VHT rate reported in a TX status into a group and rate index and uses those to index the minstrel_ht rate tables. The existing validation only checked that an entry was present and had tries recorded; it did not check that the reported MCS, spatial stream count and bandwidth are representable by the tables, so malformed metadata passed to minstrel_ht_get_stats() or minstrel_ht_ri_get_stats() could be used as an out-of-bounds index. Validate the rate metadata in the common TX status path instead of only in minstrel_ht, since the values are used by more than rate control. The legacy ieee80211_tx_rate array and the rate_info based entries are sanitized in ieee80211_tx_status_ext() and ieee80211_tx_rate_update() before any consumer runs: an entry that does not describe a valid rate for its encoding is dropped. minstrel_ht keeps th...