FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 exposes a gRPC API server on port 50052 with no authentication mechanism. The server is initialized with grpc::InsecureServerCredentials() (src/fastnetmon.cpp line 477) and a source code comment explicitly acknowledges 'Listen on the given address without any authentication mechanism.' None of the RPC methods in src/api.cpp (ExecuteBan, ExecuteUnBan, GetBanlist, GetTotalTrafficCounters, etc.) perform any credential verification. The ExecuteBan and ExecuteUnBan methods trigger security-critical actions: BGP route announcements that can blackhole network traffic, and execution of external notification scripts via popen(). An attacker with local network access can ban arbitrary IP addresses (causing denial of service to legitimate traffic), unban active attacks (disabling DDoS mitigation), and trigger script execution. There is also no role-based access control separating read-only monitoring from destructive administrative operations.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an integer overflow in the BGP AS_PATH attribute encoder. In src/bgp_protocol.hpp, the IPv4UnicastAnnounce::get_attributes() function computes attribute_length as 'sizeof(bgp_as_path_segment_element_t) + this->as_path_asns.size() * sizeof(uint32_t)' and stores it in a uint8_t field (line 600-605). Since uint8_t can only hold values 0-255, an AS_PATH containing more than 63 ASNs (2 + 64*4 = 258 > 255) causes silent truncation. The truncated length is used for buffer sizing, while the actual data written is the full untruncated amount, resulting in a heap buffer overflow. Similarly, the path_segment_length field at line 621 is also uint8_t, truncating with more than 255 ASNs.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an integer overflow vulnerability in the packet capture buffer allocation. In src/packet_storage.hpp, the allocate_buffer() function computes memory_size_in_bytes as 'buffer_size_in_packets * (max_captured_packet_size + sizeof(fastnetmon_pcap_pkthdr_t)) + sizeof(fastnetmon_pcap_file_header_t)' using unsigned int (32-bit) arithmetic. With max_captured_packet_size=1500 and sizeof(fastnetmon_pcap_pkthdr_t)=16, each packet requires approximately 1516 bytes. If buffer_size_in_packets exceeds approximately 2,832,542, the multiplication overflows, resulting in a much smaller allocation than expected. Subsequent write_packet() calls then write past the allocated buffer, causing heap corruption. The buffer_size_in_packets value is derived from the ban_details_records_count configuration parameter, which is parsed using atoi() with no overflow checking.

GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab EE affecting all versions from 18.8 before 18.10.7, 18.11 before 18.11.4, and 19.0 before 19.0.1 that, under certain conditions, could have allowed an authenticated user to cause specific Duo AI workflows to run under another user's identity due to improper user identity resolution when triggering Duo AI workflow runners.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an off-by-one heap-based buffer overflow in the dynamic_binary_buffer_t class (src/dynamic_binary_buffer.hpp). Five methods (append_dynamic_buffer, append_data_as_pointer, append_data_as_object_ptr, memcpy_from_ptr, memcpy_from_object_ptr) use an incorrect bounds check of the form 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size + 1)' instead of the correct 'if (offset + length > maximum_internal_storage_size)'. This allows writing exactly one byte past the end of the heap-allocated buffer. The class is used pervasively in BGP message encoding/decoding, NetFlow template processing, and Flow Spec NLRI construction. An attacker who can send network traffic (NetFlow, sFlow, IPFIX, or BGP) to a FastNetMon instance can trigger this overflow, potentially achieving arbitrary code execution by corrupting heap metadata. Notably, the append_byte() method uses the correct bounds check, confirming the inconsistency.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains multiple out-of-bounds reads in the BGP MP_REACH_NLRI IPv6 attribute decoder. The function decode_mp_reach_ipv6() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp contains a TODO comment at line 156 explicitly acknowledging 'we should add sanity checks to avoid reads after attribute memory block.' The function casts raw pointers to structure types without verifying sufficient data exists (line 158), uses the attacker-controlled length_of_next_hop field to determine memcpy size (line 181), and computes prefix_length by dereferencing a pointer calculated from multiple attacker-controlled offsets without bounds validation (line 189). The prefix_length is then used to calculate number_of_bytes_required_for_prefix which becomes a memcpy length (line 202) with no check against remaining buffer size.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec("echo `date` \"- {FASTNETMON] - " . $msg . " \" >> " . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon's C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains a stack-based buffer overflow in the BGP NLRI (Network Layer Reachability Information) decoder. The function decode_bgp_subnet_encoding_ipv4_raw() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp reads prefix_bit_length directly from the BGP packet (line 99) without validating it is <= 32 for IPv4 prefixes. This value is passed to how_much_bytes_we_need_for_storing_certain_subnet_mask() which computes ceil(prefix_bit_length / 8), returning up to 32 bytes for a prefix_bit_length of 255. The result is used as the length argument to memcpy() (line 106), which copies into a 4-byte uint32_t stack variable (prefix_ipv4). This causes a stack buffer overflow of up to 28 bytes, which can be exploited for arbitrary code execution. Additionally, the unvalidated prefix_bit_length is passed to convert_cidr_to_binary_netmask_local_function_copy() (line 111), where a shift of (32 - cidr) with cidr > 32 causes undefined behavior.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 has out-of-bounds memory access because it incorrectly parses BGP path attributes with the extended length flag set. In src/bgp_protocol.hpp, the parse_raw_bgp_attribute() function correctly identifies when extended_length_bit is set and sets length_of_length_field to 2, but then reads only a single byte for the attribute value length (attribute_value_length = value[2] at line 173). Per RFC 4271 Section 4.3, when the Extended Length bit is set, the Attribute Length field is two octets and the value should be read as a 16-bit big-endian integer from value[2] and value[3]. As a result, any attribute longer than 255 bytes has its length silently truncated to the low byte (e.g., 300 bytes = 0x012C is read as 0x2C = 44 bytes). The remaining 256 bytes are then misinterpreted as subsequent attributes, causing cascading parse failures and potential out-of-bounds memory access.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an out-of-bounds read in the NetFlow v9 options template parser. In process_netflow_v9_options_template() (src/netflow_plugin/netflow_v9_collector.cpp), the scope parsing loop (lines 224-229) iterates until scopes_offset reaches the attacker-controlled option_scope_length value, reading netflow9_template_flowset_record_t structures at each step. No bounds check validates that (zone_address + scopes_offset + sizeof(record)) stays within the flowset. The same issue affects the options field loop (lines 241-257) with option_length. Furthermore, option_scope_length is not validated to be a multiple of sizeof(netflow9_template_flowset_record_t), potentially causing misaligned reads. An attacker can trigger reads past the end of the UDP packet buffer.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the NetFlow v9 data flowset processor. In src/netflow_plugin/netflow_v9_collector.cpp, the Data template branch (lines 1695-1702) iterates over flow records without performing a per-iteration bounds check against the packet end pointer. In contrast, the Options template branch (lines 1709-1719) correctly checks 'if (pkt + offset + field_template->total_length > packet_end)' before each iteration. The Data branch omits this check entirely. Since template definitions are sent by the network peer (and are unauthenticated UDP), an attacker can craft templates that cause the parser to read arbitrary memory past the packet buffer. This can leak sensitive memory contents or cause a crash.

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an out-of-bounds read in the IPv4 packet parser. In src/simple_packet_parser_ng.cpp, after validating that the packet contains at least sizeof(ipv4_header_t) bytes (20 bytes), the code advances the local_pointer by '4 * ipv4_header->get_ihl()' (line 164) without validating that (a) IHL >= 5 (the minimum valid value per RFC 791), or (b) 4 * IHL bytes are actually available in the packet. The IHL field is 4 bits, allowing values 0-15, so the advance can be 0-60 bytes. An IHL value of 15 with only 20 bytes validated causes a 40-byte over-read. An IHL of 0-4 causes the pointer to not advance past the IP header, resulting in the TCP/UDP header being parsed from IP header data (type confusion). This vulnerability is reachable via any packet capture interface.

OpenStack Ironic through before 35.0.2 allows file overwrite via directory traversal during deployment with a crafted ISO image.

Impact: A bad regular expression is generated any time you have three or more parameters within a single segment, separated by something that is not a period (.). For example, /:a-:b-:c or /:a-:b-:c-:d. The backtrack protection added in path-to-regexp@0.1.12 only prevents ambiguity for two parameters. With three or more, the generated lookahead does not block single separator characters, so capture groups overlap and cause catastrophic backtracking. Patches: Upgrade to path-to-regexp@0.1.13 Custom regex patterns in route definitions (e.g., /:a-:b([^-/]+)-:c([^-/]+)) are not affected because they override the default capture group. Workarounds: All versions can be patched by providing a custom regular expression for parameters after the first in a single segment. As long as the custom regular expression does not match the text before the parameter, you will be safe. For example, change /:a-:b-:c to /:a-:b([^-/]+)-:c([^-/]+). If paths cannot be rewritten and versions cannot be upgrade...

A flaw in Node.js HTTP/2 client allows a server to send an unlimited number of ORIGIN frames, which could lead to an Out of Memory error on the client. This vulnerability affects all supported release lines: **Node.js 22**, **Node.js 24**, and **Node.js 26**.

A flaw in Node.js TLS hostname handling can cause Node.js unicode dot separator handling can lead to tls wildcard-depth authentication bypass due to resolver and verifier hostname normalization mismat. This can lead to confidentiality impact or bypass of the intended security boundary under affected configurations. This vulnerability affects all supported release lines: **Node.js 22**, **Node.js 24**, and **Node.js 26**.

A flaw in Node.js Permission Model enforcement allows Bypass via `process.report.writeReport()` Path Misvalidation. This can lead to confidentiality impact or bypass of the intended security boundary under affected configurations. This vulnerability affects all supported release lines: **Node.js 22**, **Node.js 24**, and **Node.js 26**.

A flaw in Node.js proxy tunnel error handling could expose proxy credentials in `ERR_PROXY_TUNNEL` error messages. When proxy credentials are embedded in the proxy URL, they may be exposed through error handling paths and captured by logs, diagnostics, or other error consumers. This vulnerability affects all supported release lines: **Node.js 22**, **Node.js 24**, and **Node.js 26**.

Apache Shiro’s Jakarta EE module used the HTTP Referer header in certain cases to issue redirect after a user login. In affected versions, insufficient validation of this client-controlled value could allow an attacker to influence the redirect target in applications using the Jakarta EE module. This issue affects Apache Shiro from 2.0-alpha to 2.2.0, and 3.0.0-alpha-1, only when using shiro-jakarta-ee integration module.

An issue was discovered in Django 6.0 before 6.0.7 and 5.2 before 5.2.16. `UpdateCacheMiddleware` and the `cache_page()` decorator cache responses that vary on cookies when the incoming request carries unrelated cookies, which allows remote attackers to read private data from the shared cache. Earlier, unsupported Django series (such as 5.0.x, 4.1.x, and 3.2.x) were not evaluated and may also be affected. Django would like to thank Chris Whyland for reporting this issue.