Уязвимость компонента net/tls ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket. This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry. We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock, so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read (not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len). If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record. Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel crash...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket. This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry. We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock, so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read (not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len). If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record. Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel crash...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket. This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry. We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock, so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read (not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len). If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record. Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel cras

tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: t ...

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 4 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 15 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP6)

Security update for the Linux Kernel RT (Live Patch 4 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket. This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry. We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock, so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read (not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len). If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record. Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel c...

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 1 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 11 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP6)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 12 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP6)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 13 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP6)

Security update for the Linux Kernel RT (Live Patch 2 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7)

Security update for the Linux Kernel RT (Live Patch 13 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP6)

Security update for the Linux Kernel RT (Live Patch 1 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 0 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP7)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 10 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP6)

Security update for the Linux Kernel (Live Patch 7 for SUSE Linux Enterprise 15 SP6)