Уязвимость функции lo_export(), lo_read(), lo_lseek64() и lo_tell64() клиентской библиотеке libpq системы управления базами данных PostgreSQL, позволяющая нарушителю перезаписать память стека pg_dump или psql

Use of inherently dangerous function PQfn(..., result_is_int=0, ...) in PostgreSQL libpq lo_export(), lo_read(), lo_lseek64(), and lo_tell64() functions allows the server superuser to overwrite a client stack buffer with an arbitrarily-large response. Like gets(), PQfn(..., result_is_int=0, ...) stores arbitrary-length, server-determined data into a buffer of unspecified size. Because both the \lo_export command in psql and pg_dump call lo_read(), the server superuser can overwrite pg_dump or psql stack memory. Versions before PostgreSQL 18.4, 17.10, 16.14, 15.18, and 14.23 are affected.

Use of inherently dangerous function PQfn(..., result_is_int=0, ...) in PostgreSQL libpq lo_export(), lo_read(), lo_lseek64(), and lo_tell64() functions allows the server superuser to overwrite a client stack buffer with an arbitrarily-large response. Like gets(), PQfn(..., result_is_int=0, ...) stores arbitrary-length, server-determined data into a buffer of unspecified size. Because both the \lo_export command in psql and pg_dump call lo_read(), the server superuser can overwrite pg_dump or psql stack memory. Versions before PostgreSQL 18.4, 17.10, 16.14, 15.18, and 14.23 are affected.

Use of inherently dangerous function PQfn(..., result_is_int=0, ...) in PostgreSQL libpq lo_export(), lo_read(), lo_lseek64(), and lo_tell64() functions allows the server superuser to overwrite a client stack buffer with an arbitrarily-large response. Like gets(), PQfn(..., result_is_int=0, ...) stores arbitrary-length, server-determined data into a buffer of unspecified size. Because both the \lo_export command in psql and pg_dump call lo_read(), the server superuser can overwrite pg_dump or psql stack memory. Versions before PostgreSQL 18.4, 17.10, 16.14, 15.18, and 14.23 are affected.

PostgreSQL libpq lo_* functions let server superuser overwrite client stack memory

Use of inherently dangerous function PQfn(..., result_is_int=0, ...) i ...

Use of inherently dangerous function PQfn(..., result_is_int=0, ...) in PostgreSQL libpq lo_export(), lo_read(), lo_lseek64(), and lo_tell64() functions allows the server superuser to overwrite a client stack buffer with an arbitrarily-large response. Like gets(), PQfn(..., result_is_int=0, ...) stores arbitrary-length, server-determined data into a buffer of unspecified size. Because both the \lo_export command in psql and pg_dump call lo_read(), the server superuser can overwrite pg_dump or psql stack memory. Versions before PostgreSQL 18.4, 17.10, 16.14, 15.18, and 14.23 are affected.

Important: postgresql:15 security update

Important: postgresql:18 security update

Important: postgresql:16 security update

Important: postgresql:15 security update

ELSA-2026-27738: libpq security update (IMPORTANT)

Security update for postgresql14

Security update for postgresql14

Security update for postgresql15

Security update for postgresql14

Security update for postgresql15

Security update for postgresql15

Security update for postgresql16

Security update for postgresql16