Уязвимость функции ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() модуля drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c драйвера сетевых устройств CAN ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

Уязвимость kernel-lt

Уязвимость kernel-lt

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: ems_usb: ems_usb_read_bulk_callback(): check the proper length of a message When looking at the data in a USB urb, the actual_length is the size of the buffer passed to the driver, not the transfer_buffer_length which is set by the driver as the max size of the buffer. When parsing the messages in ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() properly check the size both at the beginning of parsing the message to make sure it is big enough for the expected structure, and at the end of the message to make sure we don't overflow past the end of the buffer for the next message.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: ems_usb: ems_usb_read_bulk_callback(): check the proper length of a message When looking at the data in a USB urb, the actual_length is the size of the buffer passed to the driver, not the transfer_buffer_length which is set by the driver as the max size of the buffer. When parsing the messages in ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() properly check the size both at the beginning of parsing the message to make sure it is big enough for the expected structure, and at the end of the message to make sure we don't overflow past the end of the buffer for the next message.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: ems_usb: ems_usb_read_bulk_callback(): check the proper length of a message When looking at the data in a USB urb, the actual_length is the size of the buffer passed to the driver, not the transfer_buffer_length which is set by the driver as the max size of the buffer. When parsing the messages in ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() properly check the size both at the beginning of parsing the message to make sure it is big enough for the expected structure, and at the end of the message to make sure we don't overflow past the end of the buffer for the next message.

can: ems_usb: ems_usb_read_bulk_callback(): check the proper length of a message

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: c ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: ems_usb: ems_usb_read_bulk_callback(): check the proper length of a message When looking at the data in a USB urb, the actual_length is the size of the buffer passed to the driver, not the transfer_buffer_length which is set by the driver as the max size of the buffer. When parsing the messages in ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() properly check the size both at the beginning of parsing the message to make sure it is big enough for the expected structure, and at the end of the message to make sure we don't overflow past the end of the buffer for the next message.

ALT-PU-2026-6748: package `kernel-image-un-def` update to version 6.1.167-alt1

ALT-PU-2026-7359: package `kernel-image-std-def` update to version 5.10.253-alt1

ALT-PU-2026-7109: package `kernel-image-rt` update to version 5.10.254-alt1.rt150

ALT-PU-2026-6772: package `kernel-image-pine` update to version 6.18.19-alt1

ALT-PU-2026-4865: package `kernel-image-6.18` update to version 6.18.19-alt1

ALT-PU-2026-6044: package `kernel-image-rpi-un` update to version 6.12.79-alt1

ALT-PU-2026-7006: package `kernel-image-6.12` update to version 6.12.85-alt1

ALT-PU-2026-7004: package `kernel-image-rt` update to version 6.12.85-alt1

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel