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Security update for kubernetes1.23

ALT-PU-2023-1321: package `kubernetes` update to version 1.24.8-alt1

ALT-PU-2022-3314: package `kubernetes` update to version 1.24.8-alt1

ELSA-2022-10036: kubernetes security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2022-10035: kubernetes security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2022-10034: kubernetes security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2022-10033: kubernetes security update (IMPORTANT)

Windows workloads can run as ContainerAdministrator even when those workloads set the runAsNonRoot option to true.

Windows workloads can run as ContainerAdministrator even when those workloads set the runAsNonRoot option to true.

Windows workloads can run as ContainerAdministrator even when those wo ...

Windows workloads can run as ContainerAdministrator even when those workloads set the runAsNonRoot option to true.

ALT-PU-2023-1529: package `kubernetes` update to version 1.26.3-alt1

ALT-PU-2023-1520: package `kubernetes` update to version 1.26.3-alt1

Users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can modify Node objects and send proxy requests to them. Kubernetes supports node proxying, which allows clients of kube-apiserver to access endpoints of a Kubelet to establish connections to Pods, retrieve container logs, and more. While Kubernetes already validates the proxying address for Nodes, a bug in kube-apiserver made it possible to bypass this validation. Bypassing this validation could allow authenticated requests destined for Nodes to to the API server's private network.

Users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can modify Node objects and send proxy requests to them. Kubernetes supports node proxying, which allows clients of kube-apiserver to access endpoints of a Kubelet to establish connections to Pods, retrieve container logs, and more. While Kubernetes already validates the proxying address for Nodes, a bug in kube-apiserver made it possible to bypass this validation. Bypassing this validation could allow authenticated requests destined for Nodes to to the API server's private network.

Users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can modify Node objects and send proxy requests to them. Kubernetes supports node proxying, which allows clients of kube-apiserver to access endpoints of a Kubelet to establish connections to Pods, retrieve container logs, and more. While Kubernetes already validates the proxying address for Nodes, a bug in kube-apiserver made it possible to bypass this validation. Bypassing this validation could allow authenticated requests destined for Nodes to to the API server's private network.

Node address isn't always verified when proxying

Users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network ...

Users authorized to list or watch one type of namespaced custom resource cluster-wide can read custom resources of a different type in the same API group without authorization. Clusters are impacted by this vulnerability if all of the following are true: 1. There are 2+ CustomResourceDefinitions sharing the same API group 2. Users have cluster-wide list or watch authorization on one of those custom resources. 3. The same users are not authorized to read another custom resource in the same API group.

Users authorized to list or watch one type of namespaced custom resource cluster-wide can read custom resources of a different type in the same API group without authorization. Clusters are impacted by this vulnerability if all of the following are true: 1. There are 2+ CustomResourceDefinitions sharing the same API group 2. Users have cluster-wide list or watch authorization on one of those custom resources. 3. The same users are not authorized to read another custom resource in the same API group.