In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit() route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) (or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data. However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20) only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled linear buffer length. Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit() route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) (or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data. However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20) only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled linear buffer length. Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit() route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) (or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data. However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20) only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled linear buffer length. Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit() route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) (or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data. However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20) only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled linear buffer length. Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer.

vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: v ...

ELSA-2026-500249: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT)

ELSA-2026-500248: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT)