Bluetooth LE and BR/EDR Secure Connections pairing and Secure Simple Pairing using the Passkey entry protocol in Bluetooth Core Specifications 2.1 through 5.3 may permit an unauthenticated man-in-the-middle attacker to identify the Passkey used during pairing by reflection of a crafted public key with the same X coordinate as the offered public key and by reflection of the authentication evidence of the initiating device, potentially permitting this attacker to complete authenticated pairing with the responding device using the correct Passkey for the pairing session. This is a related issue to CVE-2020-26558.

Bluetooth LE and BR/EDR Secure Connections pairing and Secure Simple Pairing using the Passkey entry protocol in Bluetooth Core Specifications 2.1 through 5.3 may permit an unauthenticated man-in-the-middle attacker to identify the Passkey used during pairing by reflection of a crafted public key with the same X coordinate as the offered public key and by reflection of the authentication evidence of the initiating device, potentially permitting this attacker to complete authenticated pairing with the responding device using the correct Passkey for the pairing session. This is a related issue to CVE-2020-26558.

Bluetooth LE and BR/EDR Secure Connections pairing and Secure Simple Pairing using the Passkey entry protocol in Bluetooth Core Specifications 2.1 through 5.3 may permit an unauthenticated man-in-the-middle attacker to identify the Passkey used during pairing by reflection of a crafted public key with the same X coordinate as the offered public key and by reflection of the authentication evidence of the initiating device, potentially permitting this attacker to complete authenticated pairing with the responding device using the correct Passkey for the pairing session. This is a related issue to CVE-2020-26558.

Bluetooth LE and BR/EDR Secure Connections pairing and Secure Simple Pairing using the Passkey entry protocol in Bluetooth Core Specifications 2.1 through 5.3 may permit an unauthenticated man-in-the-middle attacker to identify the Passkey used during pairing by reflection of a crafted public key with the same X coordinate as the offered public key and by reflection of the authentication evidence of the initiating device, potentially permitting this attacker to complete authenticated pairing with the responding device using the correct Passkey for the pairing session. This is a related issue to CVE-2020-26558.