Количество 9
Количество 9
CVE-2022-49789
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: zfcp: Fix double free of FSF request when qdio send fails We used to use the wrong type of integer in 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' to cache the FSF request ID when sending a new FSF request. This is used in case the sending fails and we need to remove the request from our internal hash table again (so we don't keep an invalid reference and use it when we free the request again). In 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' we used to cache the ID as 'int' (signed and 32 bit wide), but the rest of the zfcp code (and the firmware specification) handles the ID as 'unsigned long'/'u64' (unsigned and 64 bit wide [s390x ELF ABI]). For one this has the obvious problem that when the ID grows past 32 bit (this can happen reasonably fast) it is truncated to 32 bit when storing it in the cache variable and so doesn't match the original ID anymore. The second less obvious problem is that even when the original ID has not yet grown past 32 bit, as...
CVE-2022-49789
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: zfcp: Fix double free of FSF request when qdio send fails We used to use the wrong type of integer in 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' to cache the FSF request ID when sending a new FSF request. This is used in case the sending fails and we need to remove the request from our internal hash table again (so we don't keep an invalid reference and use it when we free the request again). In 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' we used to cache the ID as 'int' (signed and 32 bit wide), but the rest of the zfcp code (and the firmware specification) handles the ID as 'unsigned long'/'u64' (unsigned and 64 bit wide [s390x ELF ABI]). For one this has the obvious problem that when the ID grows past 32 bit (this can happen reasonably fast) it is truncated to 32 bit when storing it in the cache variable and so doesn't match the original ID anymore. The second less obvious problem is that even when the original ID has not yet grown past 32 bit, as...
CVE-2022-49789
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: zfcp: Fix double free of FSF request when qdio send fails We used to use the wrong type of integer in 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' to cache the FSF request ID when sending a new FSF request. This is used in case the sending fails and we need to remove the request from our internal hash table again (so we don't keep an invalid reference and use it when we free the request again). In 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' we used to cache the ID as 'int' (signed and 32 bit wide), but the rest of the zfcp code (and the firmware specification) handles the ID as 'unsigned long'/'u64' (unsigned and 64 bit wide [s390x ELF ABI]). For one this has the obvious problem that when the ID grows past 32 bit (this can happen reasonably fast) it is truncated to 32 bit when storing it in the cache variable and so doesn't match the original ID anymore. The second less obvious problem is that even when the original ID has not yet grown past 32 bit, as
CVE-2022-49789
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s ...
GHSA-j9f5-mv8w-78qj
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: zfcp: Fix double free of FSF request when qdio send fails We used to use the wrong type of integer in 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' to cache the FSF request ID when sending a new FSF request. This is used in case the sending fails and we need to remove the request from our internal hash table again (so we don't keep an invalid reference and use it when we free the request again). In 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' we used to cache the ID as 'int' (signed and 32 bit wide), but the rest of the zfcp code (and the firmware specification) handles the ID as 'unsigned long'/'u64' (unsigned and 64 bit wide [s390x ELF ABI]). For one this has the obvious problem that when the ID grows past 32 bit (this can happen reasonably fast) it is truncated to 32 bit when storing it in the cache variable and so doesn't match the original ID anymore. The second less obvious problem is that even when the original ID has not yet grown past 32 bit,...
SUSE-SU-2025:01982-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
SUSE-SU-2025:02262-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
SUSE-SU-2025:01983-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
SUSE-SU-2025:02173-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
Уязвимостей на страницу
Уязвимость | CVSS | EPSS | Опубликовано | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2022-49789 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: zfcp: Fix double free of FSF request when qdio send fails We used to use the wrong type of integer in 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' to cache the FSF request ID when sending a new FSF request. This is used in case the sending fails and we need to remove the request from our internal hash table again (so we don't keep an invalid reference and use it when we free the request again). In 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' we used to cache the ID as 'int' (signed and 32 bit wide), but the rest of the zfcp code (and the firmware specification) handles the ID as 'unsigned long'/'u64' (unsigned and 64 bit wide [s390x ELF ABI]). For one this has the obvious problem that when the ID grows past 32 bit (this can happen reasonably fast) it is truncated to 32 bit when storing it in the cache variable and so doesn't match the original ID anymore. The second less obvious problem is that even when the original ID has not yet grown past 32 bit, as... | CVSS3: 7.8 | 0% Низкий | 9 месяцев назад | |
CVE-2022-49789 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: zfcp: Fix double free of FSF request when qdio send fails We used to use the wrong type of integer in 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' to cache the FSF request ID when sending a new FSF request. This is used in case the sending fails and we need to remove the request from our internal hash table again (so we don't keep an invalid reference and use it when we free the request again). In 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' we used to cache the ID as 'int' (signed and 32 bit wide), but the rest of the zfcp code (and the firmware specification) handles the ID as 'unsigned long'/'u64' (unsigned and 64 bit wide [s390x ELF ABI]). For one this has the obvious problem that when the ID grows past 32 bit (this can happen reasonably fast) it is truncated to 32 bit when storing it in the cache variable and so doesn't match the original ID anymore. The second less obvious problem is that even when the original ID has not yet grown past 32 bit, as... | CVSS3: 7.1 | 0% Низкий | 9 месяцев назад | |
CVE-2022-49789 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: zfcp: Fix double free of FSF request when qdio send fails We used to use the wrong type of integer in 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' to cache the FSF request ID when sending a new FSF request. This is used in case the sending fails and we need to remove the request from our internal hash table again (so we don't keep an invalid reference and use it when we free the request again). In 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' we used to cache the ID as 'int' (signed and 32 bit wide), but the rest of the zfcp code (and the firmware specification) handles the ID as 'unsigned long'/'u64' (unsigned and 64 bit wide [s390x ELF ABI]). For one this has the obvious problem that when the ID grows past 32 bit (this can happen reasonably fast) it is truncated to 32 bit when storing it in the cache variable and so doesn't match the original ID anymore. The second less obvious problem is that even when the original ID has not yet grown past 32 bit, as | CVSS3: 7.8 | 0% Низкий | 9 месяцев назад | |
CVE-2022-49789 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s ... | CVSS3: 7.8 | 0% Низкий | 9 месяцев назад | |
GHSA-j9f5-mv8w-78qj In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: zfcp: Fix double free of FSF request when qdio send fails We used to use the wrong type of integer in 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' to cache the FSF request ID when sending a new FSF request. This is used in case the sending fails and we need to remove the request from our internal hash table again (so we don't keep an invalid reference and use it when we free the request again). In 'zfcp_fsf_req_send()' we used to cache the ID as 'int' (signed and 32 bit wide), but the rest of the zfcp code (and the firmware specification) handles the ID as 'unsigned long'/'u64' (unsigned and 64 bit wide [s390x ELF ABI]). For one this has the obvious problem that when the ID grows past 32 bit (this can happen reasonably fast) it is truncated to 32 bit when storing it in the cache variable and so doesn't match the original ID anymore. The second less obvious problem is that even when the original ID has not yet grown past 32 bit,... | CVSS3: 7.8 | 0% Низкий | 9 месяцев назад | |
SUSE-SU-2025:01982-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 8 месяцев назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2025:02262-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 7 месяцев назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2025:01983-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 8 месяцев назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2025:02173-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 7 месяцев назад |
Уязвимостей на страницу