Количество 15
Количество 15

CVE-2023-52659
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical address to provide a virtual address for. One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses above the 1TB range due to the above. Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function, instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation. While it might be argu...

CVE-2023-52659
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical address to provide a virtual address for. One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses above the 1TB range due to the above. Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function, instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation. While it might be argu...

CVE-2023-52659
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical address to provide a virtual address for. One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses above the 1TB range due to the above. Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function, instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation. While it might be ar

CVE-2023-52659
CVE-2023-52659
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x ...
GHSA-jpp4-rwwf-g5qm
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical address to provide a virtual address for. One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses above the 1TB range due to the above. Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function, instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation. While it might be...

BDU:2024-09955
Уязвимость компонентов x86/mm ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании

ROS-20241113-02
Множественные уязвимости kernel-lt

SUSE-SU-2024:2203-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel

SUSE-SU-2024:2135-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
ELSA-2024-9315
ELSA-2024-9315: kernel security update (MODERATE)

SUSE-SU-2024:2019-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel

SUSE-SU-2024:2190-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel

SUSE-SU-2024:2008-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel

SUSE-SU-2024:2973-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
Уязвимостей на страницу
Уязвимость | CVSS | EPSS | Опубликовано | |
---|---|---|---|---|
![]() | CVE-2023-52659 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical address to provide a virtual address for. One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses above the 1TB range due to the above. Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function, instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation. While it might be argu... | 0% Низкий | около 1 года назад | |
![]() | CVE-2023-52659 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical address to provide a virtual address for. One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses above the 1TB range due to the above. Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function, instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation. While it might be argu... | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | около 1 года назад |
![]() | CVE-2023-52659 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical address to provide a virtual address for. One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses above the 1TB range due to the above. Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function, instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation. While it might be ar | 0% Низкий | около 1 года назад | |
![]() | 0% Низкий | 9 месяцев назад | ||
CVE-2023-52659 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x ... | 0% Низкий | около 1 года назад | ||
GHSA-jpp4-rwwf-g5qm In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical address to provide a virtual address for. One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses above the 1TB range due to the above. Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function, instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation. While it might be... | 0% Низкий | около 1 года назад | ||
![]() | BDU:2024-09955 Уязвимость компонентов x86/mm ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 1 года назад |
![]() | ROS-20241113-02 Множественные уязвимости kernel-lt | CVSS3: 8.8 | 7 месяцев назад | |
![]() | SUSE-SU-2024:2203-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 12 месяцев назад | ||
![]() | SUSE-SU-2024:2135-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 12 месяцев назад | ||
ELSA-2024-9315 ELSA-2024-9315: kernel security update (MODERATE) | 7 месяцев назад | |||
![]() | SUSE-SU-2024:2019-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | около 1 года назад | ||
![]() | SUSE-SU-2024:2190-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 12 месяцев назад | ||
![]() | SUSE-SU-2024:2008-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | около 1 года назад | ||
![]() | SUSE-SU-2024:2973-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | 10 месяцев назад |
Уязвимостей на страницу