Поиск уязвимостей
Количество 21
Количество 21
CVE-2024-39483
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the p...
CVE-2024-39483
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the p...
CVE-2024-39483
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the
CVE-2024-39483
KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked
CVE-2024-39483
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: K ...
GHSA-jx29-mm4x-qpqh
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, t...
BDU:2024-09028
Уязвимость ядра операционной системы Linux, связанная с недостаточной нейтрализацией специальных элементов в запросе, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании
RLSA-2024:8162
Moderate: kernel security update
ELSA-2024-8162
ELSA-2024-8162: kernel security update (MODERATE)
ALT-PU-2023-4401
ALT-PU-2023-4401: package `kernel-image-un-def` update to version 6.4.3-alt1
ROS-20241205-02
Множественные уязвимости kernel-lt
ALT-PU-2024-1867
ALT-PU-2024-1867: package `kernel-image-mp` update to version 6.7.4-alt1
ALT-PU-2023-4482
ALT-PU-2023-4482: package `kernel-image-mp` update to version 6.4.4-alt1
ALT-PU-2024-10855
ALT-PU-2024-10855: package `kernel-image-pine` update to version 6.10.3-alt2
ELSA-2024-12815
ELSA-2024-12815: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT)
SUSE-SU-2024:3195-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
SUSE-SU-2024:3383-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
SUSE-SU-2024:3194-1
Security update for the Linux Kernel
ALT-PU-2024-13979
ALT-PU-2024-13979: package `kernel-image-rpi-un` update to version 6.6.56-alt1
ALT-PU-2023-4663
ALT-PU-2023-4663: package `kernel-image-pine` update to version 6.4.7-alt1
Уязвимостей на страницу
Уязвимость | CVSS | EPSS | Опубликовано | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2024-39483 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the p... | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 2 лет назад | |
CVE-2024-39483 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the p... | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 2 лет назад | |
CVE-2024-39483 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 2 лет назад | |
CVE-2024-39483 KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | почти 2 года назад | |
CVE-2024-39483 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: K ... | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 2 лет назад | |
GHSA-jx29-mm4x-qpqh In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: WARN on vNMI + NMI window iff NMIs are outright masked When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected). However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly). Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, t... | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 2 лет назад | |
BDU:2024-09028 Уязвимость ядра операционной системы Linux, связанная с недостаточной нейтрализацией специальных элементов в запросе, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании | CVSS3: 5.5 | 0% Низкий | больше 2 лет назад | |
RLSA-2024:8162 Moderate: kernel security update | около 2 лет назад | |||
ELSA-2024-8162 ELSA-2024-8162: kernel security update (MODERATE) | около 2 лет назад | |||
ALT-PU-2023-4401 ALT-PU-2023-4401: package `kernel-image-un-def` update to version 6.4.3-alt1 | CVSS3: 8.1 | больше 3 лет назад | ||
ROS-20241205-02 Множественные уязвимости kernel-lt | CVSS3: 8.8 | почти 2 года назад | ||
ALT-PU-2024-1867 ALT-PU-2024-1867: package `kernel-image-mp` update to version 6.7.4-alt1 | CVSS3: 8.1 | почти 3 года назад | ||
ALT-PU-2023-4482 ALT-PU-2023-4482: package `kernel-image-mp` update to version 6.4.4-alt1 | CVSS3: 8.1 | больше 3 лет назад | ||
ALT-PU-2024-10855 ALT-PU-2024-10855: package `kernel-image-pine` update to version 6.10.3-alt2 | CVSS3: 8.1 | больше 2 лет назад | ||
ELSA-2024-12815 ELSA-2024-12815: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT) | почти 2 года назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2024:3195-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | около 2 лет назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2024:3383-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | около 2 лет назад | |||
SUSE-SU-2024:3194-1 Security update for the Linux Kernel | около 2 лет назад | |||
ALT-PU-2024-13979 ALT-PU-2024-13979: package `kernel-image-rpi-un` update to version 6.6.56-alt1 | CVSS3: 7.8 | около 2 лет назад | ||
ALT-PU-2023-4663 ALT-PU-2023-4663: package `kernel-image-pine` update to version 6.4.7-alt1 | CVSS3: 9.8 | больше 3 лет назад |
Уязвимостей на страницу