Логотип exploitDog
Консоль
Логотип exploitDog

exploitDog

Количество 4

Количество 4

nvd логотип

CVE-2024-51756

почти 2 года назад

The cap-std project is organized around the eponymous `cap-std` crate, and develops libraries to make it easy to write capability-based code. cap-std's filesystem sandbox implementation on Windows blocks access to special device filenames such as "COM1", "COM2", "LPT0", "LPT1", and so on, however it did not block access to the special device filenames which use superscript digits, such as "COM¹", "COM²", "LPT⁰", "LPT¹", and so on. Untrusted filesystem paths could bypass the sandbox and access devices through those special device filenames with superscript digits, and through them provide access peripheral devices connected to the computer, or network resources mapped to those devices. This can include modems, printers, network printers, and any other device connected to a serial or parallel port, including emulated USB serial ports. The bug is fixed in #371, which is published in cap-primitives 3.4.1, cap-std 3.4.1, and cap-async-std 3.4.1. There are no known workarounds for this

EPSS: Низкий
msrc логотип

CVE-2024-51756

12 месяцев назад

cap-std doesn't fully sandbox all the Windows device filenames

EPSS: Низкий
debian логотип

CVE-2024-51756

почти 2 года назад

The cap-std project is organized around the eponymous `cap-std` crate, ...

EPSS: Низкий
github логотип

GHSA-hxf5-99xg-86hw

почти 2 года назад

cap-std doesn't fully sandbox all the Windows device filenames

EPSS: Низкий

Уязвимостей на страницу

Уязвимость
CVSS
EPSS
Опубликовано
nvd логотип
CVE-2024-51756

The cap-std project is organized around the eponymous `cap-std` crate, and develops libraries to make it easy to write capability-based code. cap-std's filesystem sandbox implementation on Windows blocks access to special device filenames such as "COM1", "COM2", "LPT0", "LPT1", and so on, however it did not block access to the special device filenames which use superscript digits, such as "COM¹", "COM²", "LPT⁰", "LPT¹", and so on. Untrusted filesystem paths could bypass the sandbox and access devices through those special device filenames with superscript digits, and through them provide access peripheral devices connected to the computer, or network resources mapped to those devices. This can include modems, printers, network printers, and any other device connected to a serial or parallel port, including emulated USB serial ports. The bug is fixed in #371, which is published in cap-primitives 3.4.1, cap-std 3.4.1, and cap-async-std 3.4.1. There are no known workarounds for this

1%
Низкий
почти 2 года назад
msrc логотип
CVE-2024-51756

cap-std doesn't fully sandbox all the Windows device filenames

1%
Низкий
12 месяцев назад
debian логотип
CVE-2024-51756

The cap-std project is organized around the eponymous `cap-std` crate, ...

1%
Низкий
почти 2 года назад
github логотип
GHSA-hxf5-99xg-86hw

cap-std doesn't fully sandbox all the Windows device filenames

1%
Низкий
почти 2 года назад

Уязвимостей на страницу