In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: cpu_ops_sbi: Use static array for boot_data Since commit 6b9f29b81b15 ("riscv: Enable pcpu page first chunk allocator"), if NUMA is enabled, the page percpu allocator may be used on very sparse configurations, or when requested on boot with percpu_alloc=page. In that case, percpu data gets put in the vmalloc area. However, sbi_hsm_hart_start() needs the physical address of a sbi_hart_boot_data, and simply assumes that __pa() would work. This causes the just started hart to immediately access an invalid address and hang. Fortunately, struct sbi_hart_boot_data is not too large, so we can simply allocate an array for boot_data statically, putting it in the kernel image. This fixes NUMA=y SMP boot on Sophgo SG2042. To reproduce on QEMU: Set CONFIG_NUMA=y and CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y, then run with: qemu-system-riscv64 -M virt -smp 2 -nographic \ -kernel arch/riscv/boot/Image \ -append "percpu_alloc=page" Kernel out...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: cpu_ops_sbi: Use static array for boot_data Since commit 6b9f29b81b15 ("riscv: Enable pcpu page first chunk allocator"), if NUMA is enabled, the page percpu allocator may be used on very sparse configurations, or when requested on boot with percpu_alloc=page. In that case, percpu data gets put in the vmalloc area. However, sbi_hsm_hart_start() needs the physical address of a sbi_hart_boot_data, and simply assumes that __pa() would work. This causes the just started hart to immediately access an invalid address and hang. Fortunately, struct sbi_hart_boot_data is not too large, so we can simply allocate an array for boot_data statically, putting it in the kernel image. This fixes NUMA=y SMP boot on Sophgo SG2042. To reproduce on QEMU: Set CONFIG_NUMA=y and CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y, then run with: qemu-system-riscv64 -M virt -smp 2 -nographic \ -kernel arch/riscv/boot/Image \ -append "percpu_alloc=page" Kernel out...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: cpu_ops_sbi: Use static array for boot_data Since commit 6b9f29b81b15 ("riscv: Enable pcpu page first chunk allocator"), if NUMA is enabled, the page percpu allocator may be used on very sparse configurations, or when requested on boot with percpu_alloc=page. In that case, percpu data gets put in the vmalloc area. However, sbi_hsm_hart_start() needs the physical address of a sbi_hart_boot_data, and simply assumes that __pa() would work. This causes the just started hart to immediately access an invalid address and hang. Fortunately, struct sbi_hart_boot_data is not too large, so we can simply allocate an array for boot_data statically, putting it in the kernel image. This fixes NUMA=y SMP boot on Sophgo SG2042. To reproduce on QEMU: Set CONFIG_NUMA=y and CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y, then run with: qemu-system-riscv64 -M virt -smp 2 -nographic \ -kernel arch/riscv/boot/Image \ -append "percpu_alloc=pa

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: r ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: cpu_ops_sbi: Use static array for boot_data Since commit 6b9f29b81b15 ("riscv: Enable pcpu page first chunk allocator"), if NUMA is enabled, the page percpu allocator may be used on very sparse configurations, or when requested on boot with percpu_alloc=page. In that case, percpu data gets put in the vmalloc area. However, sbi_hsm_hart_start() needs the physical address of a sbi_hart_boot_data, and simply assumes that __pa() would work. This causes the just started hart to immediately access an invalid address and hang. Fortunately, struct sbi_hart_boot_data is not too large, so we can simply allocate an array for boot_data statically, putting it in the kernel image. This fixes NUMA=y SMP boot on Sophgo SG2042. To reproduce on QEMU: Set CONFIG_NUMA=y and CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y, then run with: qemu-system-riscv64 -M virt -smp 2 -nographic \ -kernel arch/riscv/boot/Image \ -append "percpu_alloc...

Уязвимость функции sbi_hsm_hart_start() компонента boot_data ядра операционной системы Linux, позволяющая нарушителю оказать воздействие на конфиденциальность, целостность и доступность защищаемой информации