Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames. QUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see Section 5.1 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1 . Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are used by the remote peer to populate the Destination Connection ID field in packets sent from remote to local. Each Connection ID has a sequence number to ensure synchronization between peers. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability by first completing a handshake and then sending a specially-crafted set of frames that trigger a connection ID retirement in the victim. When the victim attempts to send a packet containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames, Section 19.16 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-19.6 requires that the sequence number

Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop ...

quiche connection ID retirement can trigger an infinite loop

Уязвимость программного обеспечения реализации транспортного протокола QUIC и HTTP/3 CloudFlare Quiche, связанная с выполнением цикла с недоступным условием выхода, позволяющая нарушителю вызвать отказ в обслуживании