In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/memory: fix spurious warning when unmapping device-private/exclusive pages Device private and exclusive entries are only supported for anonymous folios. This condition is tested in __migrate_device_pages() and make_device_exclusive() using folio_test_anon(). However the unmap path tests this assumption using vma_is_anonymous(). This is wrong because whilst anonymous VMAs can only contain folios where folio_test_anon() is true the opposite relation does not hold. A folio for which folio_test_anon() is true does not imply vma_is_anonymous() is true. Such a condition can occur if for example a folio is part of a private filebacked mapping. In this case vma_is_anonymous() is false as the mapping is filebacked, but folio_test_anon() may be true, thus permitting devices to migrate the folio to device private memory. This can lead to the following spurious warnings during process teardown: [ 772.737706] ----------...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/memory: fix spurious warning when unmapping device-private/exclusive pages Device private and exclusive entries are only supported for anonymous folios. This condition is tested in __migrate_device_pages() and make_device_exclusive() using folio_test_anon(). However the unmap path tests this assumption using vma_is_anonymous(). This is wrong because whilst anonymous VMAs can only contain folios where folio_test_anon() is true the opposite relation does not hold. A folio for which folio_test_anon() is true does not imply vma_is_anonymous() is true. Such a condition can occur if for example a folio is part of a private filebacked mapping. In this case vma_is_anonymous() is false as the mapping is filebacked, but folio_test_anon() may be true, thus permitting devices to migrate the folio to device private memory. This can lead to the following spurious warnings during process teardown: [ 772.737706] ----------...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/memory: fix spurious warning when unmapping device-private/exclusive pages Device private and exclusive entries are only supported for anonymous folios. This condition is tested in __migrate_device_pages() and make_device_exclusive() using folio_test_anon(). However the unmap path tests this assumption using vma_is_anonymous(). This is wrong because whilst anonymous VMAs can only contain folios where folio_test_anon() is true the opposite relation does not hold. A folio for which folio_test_anon() is true does not imply vma_is_anonymous() is true. Such a condition can occur if for example a folio is part of a private filebacked mapping. In this case vma_is_anonymous() is false as the mapping is filebacked, but folio_test_anon() may be true, thus permitting devices to migrate the folio to device private memory. This can lead to the following spurious warnings during process teardown: [ 772.737706] --------

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: m ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/memory: fix spurious warning when unmapping device-private/exclusive pages Device private and exclusive entries are only supported for anonymous folios. This condition is tested in __migrate_device_pages() and make_device_exclusive() using folio_test_anon(). However the unmap path tests this assumption using vma_is_anonymous(). This is wrong because whilst anonymous VMAs can only contain folios where folio_test_anon() is true the opposite relation does not hold. A folio for which folio_test_anon() is true does not imply vma_is_anonymous() is true. Such a condition can occur if for example a folio is part of a private filebacked mapping. In this case vma_is_anonymous() is false as the mapping is filebacked, but folio_test_anon() may be true, thus permitting devices to migrate the folio to device private memory. This can lead to the following spurious warnings during process teardown: [ 772.737706] -----...