In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl() Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they dereference pIE->length: - issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte past the end of the buffer. - join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has the same problem under the same conditions. Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue. Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info(): 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain. 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end.

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's `rtl8723bs` Wi-Fi driver. Insufficient boundary checks in the information element (IE) parsing loops within the `issue_assocreq()` and `join_cmd_hdl()` functions allow a remote attacker to cause an out-of-bounds read. By sending specially crafted, truncated IE data from a malicious Wi-Fi Access Point, an attacker could trigger a system crash, leading to a denial of service.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl() Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they dereference pIE->length: - issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte past the end of the buffer. - join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has the same problem under the same conditions. Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue. Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info(): 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain. 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end.

staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl()

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl() Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they dereference pIE->length: - issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte past the end of the buffer. - join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has the same problem under the same conditions. Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue. Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info(): 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain. 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end.