In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback svc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in tls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through tls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only sock_hold(req->hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct svc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of(). Two close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed svc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards its return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has already set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have finished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The cancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces the same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns <= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns false, the function does not drain...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback svc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in tls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through tls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only sock_hold(req->hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct svc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of(). Two close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed svc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards its return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has already set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have finished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The cancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces the same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns <= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns false, the function does not drain...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback svc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in tls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through tls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only sock_hold(req->hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct svc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of(). Two close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed svc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards its return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has already set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have finished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The cancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces the same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns <= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns false, the function does not drain

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback svc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in tls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through tls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only sock_hold(req->hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct svc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of(). Two close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed svc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards its return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has already set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have finished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The cancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces the same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() returns <= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns false, the function does not dr...