In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write resp_report_zones() sizes the reply buffer from the CDB allocation length. The v3 fix rounds alloc_len up with ALIGN() before deriving the descriptor count: rep_max_zones = (ALIGN((u64)alloc_len, RZONES_DESC_HD) - RZONES_DESC_HD) >> ilog2(RZONES_DESC_HD); arr_len = (u64)RZONES_DESC_HD * (rep_max_zones + 1); For alloc_len in 0xFFFFFFC1..0xFFFFFFFF, ALIGN() rounds up to 0x100000000, so arr_len is 4 GB. On 32-bit, kzalloc()'s size_t is 32-bit and truncates 0x100000000 to 0; kzalloc(0) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !arr check, and desc = arr + 64 is then dereferenced in the loop -> out-of-bounds write / panic. Clamp rep_max_zones to devip->nr_zones. The loop already stops at sdebug_capacity (after nr_zones zones), so a report can never hold more than nr_zones descriptors; the clamp does not change the report, it only bounds arr_len to (nr_zones +...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write resp_report_zones() sizes the reply buffer from the CDB allocation length. The v3 fix rounds alloc_len up with ALIGN() before deriving the descriptor count: rep_max_zones = (ALIGN((u64)alloc_len, RZONES_DESC_HD) - RZONES_DESC_HD) >> ilog2(RZONES_DESC_HD); arr_len = (u64)RZONES_DESC_HD * (rep_max_zones + 1); For alloc_len in 0xFFFFFFC1..0xFFFFFFFF, ALIGN() rounds up to 0x100000000, so arr_len is 4 GB. On 32-bit, kzalloc()'s size_t is 32-bit and truncates 0x100000000 to 0; kzalloc(0) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !arr check, and desc = arr + 64 is then dereferenced in the loop -> out-of-bounds write / panic. Clamp rep_max_zones to devip->nr_zones. The loop already stops at sdebug_capacity (after nr_zones zones), so a report can never hold more than nr_zones descriptors; the clamp does not change the report, it only bounds arr_len to (nr_zones +...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write resp_report_zones() sizes the reply buffer from the CDB allocation length. The v3 fix rounds alloc_len up with ALIGN() before deriving the descriptor count: rep_max_zones = (ALIGN((u64)alloc_len, RZONES_DESC_HD) - RZONES_DESC_HD) >> ilog2(RZONES_DESC_HD); arr_len = (u64)RZONES_DESC_HD * (rep_max_zones + 1); For alloc_len in 0xFFFFFFC1..0xFFFFFFFF, ALIGN() rounds up to 0x100000000, so arr_len is 4 GB. On 32-bit, kzalloc()'s size_t is 32-bit and truncates 0x100000000 to 0; kzalloc(0) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !arr check, and desc = arr + 64 is then dereferenced in the loop -> out-of-bounds write / panic. Clamp rep_max_zones to devip->nr_zones. The loop already stops at sdebug_capacity (after nr_zones zones), so a report can never hold more than nr_zones descriptors; the clamp does not change the report, it only bounds arr_len to (nr

scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix REPORT ZONES alloc_len underflow OOB write resp_report_zones() sizes the reply buffer from the CDB allocation length. The v3 fix rounds alloc_len up with ALIGN() before deriving the descriptor count: rep_max_zones = (ALIGN((u64)alloc_len, RZONES_DESC_HD) - RZONES_DESC_HD) >> ilog2(RZONES_DESC_HD); arr_len = (u64)RZONES_DESC_HD * (rep_max_zones + 1); For alloc_len in 0xFFFFFFC1..0xFFFFFFFF, ALIGN() rounds up to 0x100000000, so arr_len is 4 GB. On 32-bit, kzalloc()'s size_t is 32-bit and truncates 0x100000000 to 0; kzalloc(0) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which passes the !arr check, and desc = arr + 64 is then dereferenced in the loop -> out-of-bounds write / panic. Clamp rep_max_zones to devip->nr_zones. The loop already stops at sdebug_capacity (after nr_zones zones), so a report can never hold more than nr_zones descriptors; the clamp does not change the report, it only bounds arr_len to ...