In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsverity: Fix bpf_get_fsverity_digest() dynptr assumptions The BPF verifier and the dynptr abstraction ensure that the memory space referenced by a dynptr remains valid. They do not, however, provide any guarantee that the contents of the memory are stable. kfuncs are expected to remain memory-safe even if concurrent modifications occur. bpf_get_fsverity_digest() didn't follow that: it could crash if arg->digest_size was concurrently modified. Fix that by using the known-good value hash_alg->digest_size instead. Also widen 'dynptr_sz' and 'out_digest_sz' to u64 to match the return type of __bpf_dynptr_size(). It doesn't appear that it can actually be more than INT_MAX currently (since __bpf_dynptr_data_rw() excludes file-based pointers), but the correct type might as well be used.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsverity: Fix bpf_get_fsverity_digest() dynptr assumptions The BPF verifier and the dynptr abstraction ensure that the memory space referenced by a dynptr remains valid. They do not, however, provide any guarantee that the contents of the memory are stable. kfuncs are expected to remain memory-safe even if concurrent modifications occur. bpf_get_fsverity_digest() didn't follow that: it could crash if arg->digest_size was concurrently modified. Fix that by using the known-good value hash_alg->digest_size instead. Also widen 'dynptr_sz' and 'out_digest_sz' to u64 to match the return type of __bpf_dynptr_size(). It doesn't appear that it can actually be more than INT_MAX currently (since __bpf_dynptr_data_rw() excludes file-based pointers), but the correct type might as well be used.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsverity: Fix bpf_get_fsverity_digest() dynptr assumptions The BPF verifier and the dynptr abstraction ensure that the memory space referenced by a dynptr remains valid. They do not, however, provide any guarantee that the contents of the memory are stable. kfuncs are expected to remain memory-safe even if concurrent modifications occur. bpf_get_fsverity_digest() didn't follow that: it could crash if arg->digest_size was concurrently modified. Fix that by using the known-good value hash_alg->digest_size instead. Also widen 'dynptr_sz' and 'out_digest_sz' to u64 to match the return type of __bpf_dynptr_size(). It doesn't appear that it can actually be more than INT_MAX currently (since __bpf_dynptr_data_rw() excludes file-based pointers), but the correct type might as well be used.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsverity: Fix bpf_get_fsverity_digest() dynptr assumptions The BPF verifier and the dynptr abstraction ensure that the memory space referenced by a dynptr remains valid. They do not, however, provide any guarantee that the contents of the memory are stable. kfuncs are expected to remain memory-safe even if concurrent modifications occur. bpf_get_fsverity_digest() didn't follow that: it could crash if arg->digest_size was concurrently modified. Fix that by using the known-good value hash_alg->digest_size instead. Also widen 'dynptr_sz' and 'out_digest_sz' to u64 to match the return type of __bpf_dynptr_size(). It doesn't appear that it can actually be more than INT_MAX currently (since __bpf_dynptr_data_rw() excludes file-based pointers), but the correct type might as well be used.

ELSA-2026-500248: Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update (IMPORTANT)