In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: forcedeth: fix off-by-one when saving/restoring non-PCI config space nv_suspend() and nv_resume() walk the non-PCI configuration space with for (i = 0; i <= np->register_size/sizeof(u32); i++) which runs one iteration too many. saved_config_space is declared as u32 saved_config_space[NV_PCI_REGSZ_MAX/4]; and NV_PCI_REGSZ_VER3 is equal to NV_PCI_REGSZ_MAX (0x604), so on a VER3 device register_size/sizeof(u32) is exactly the array length and the last iteration addresses one element past the end. The element it lands on is np->name_rx[0..3]: saved_config_space[] is followed immediately by char name_rx[IFNAMSIZ + 3], and char needs no padding. Nothing observable is corrupted by that, because nv_request_irq() rewrites name_rx with sprintf() before it is ever passed to request_irq(). The bug is the out-of-bounds access itself, which UBSAN reports and which CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y turns into a trap that aborts the running kern...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: forcedeth: fix off-by-one when saving/restoring non-PCI config space nv_suspend() and nv_resume() walk the non-PCI configuration space with for (i = 0; i <= np->register_size/sizeof(u32); i++) which runs one iteration too many. saved_config_space is declared as u32 saved_config_space[NV_PCI_REGSZ_MAX/4]; and NV_PCI_REGSZ_VER3 is equal to NV_PCI_REGSZ_MAX (0x604), so on a VER3 device register_size/sizeof(u32) is exactly the array length and the last iteration addresses one element past the end. The element it lands on is np->name_rx[0..3]: saved_config_space[] is followed immediately by char name_rx[IFNAMSIZ + 3], and char needs no padding. Nothing observable is corrupted by that, because nv_request_irq() rewrites name_rx with sprintf() before it is ever passed to request_irq(). The bug is the out-of-bounds access itself, which UBSAN reports and which CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y turns into a trap that aborts the running kern...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: forcedeth: fix off-by-one when saving/restoring non-PCI config space nv_suspend() and nv_resume() walk the non-PCI configuration space with for (i = 0; i <= np->register_size/sizeof(u32); i++) which runs one iteration too many. saved_config_space is declared as u32 saved_config_space[NV_PCI_REGSZ_MAX/4]; and NV_PCI_REGSZ_VER3 is equal to NV_PCI_REGSZ_MAX (0x604), so on a VER3 device register_size/sizeof(u32) is exactly the array length and the last iteration addresses one element past the end. The element it lands on is np->name_rx[0..3]: saved_config_space[] is followed immediately by char name_rx[IFNAMSIZ + 3], and char needs no padding. Nothing observable is corrupted by that, because nv_request_irq() rewrites name_rx with sprintf() before it is ever passed to request_irq(). The bug is the out-of-bounds access itself, which UBSAN reports and which CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y turns into a trap that aborts the runnin

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: forcedeth: fix off-by-one when saving/restoring non-PCI config space nv_suspend() and nv_resume() walk the non-PCI configuration space with for (i = 0; i <= np->register_size/sizeof(u32); i++) which runs one iteration too many. saved_config_space is declared as u32 saved_config_space[NV_PCI_REGSZ_MAX/4]; and NV_PCI_REGSZ_VER3 is equal to NV_PCI_REGSZ_MAX (0x604), so on a VER3 device register_size/sizeof(u32) is exactly the array length and the last iteration addresses one element past the end. The element it lands on is np->name_rx[0..3]: saved_config_space[] is followed immediately by char name_rx[IFNAMSIZ + 3], and char needs no padding. Nothing observable is corrupted by that, because nv_request_irq() rewrites name_rx with sprintf() before it is ever passed to request_irq(). The bug is the out-of-bounds access itself, which UBSAN reports and which CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP=y turns into a trap that aborts the run...