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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix the sub-buffer array base in rb_meta_subbuf_idx() On a persistent ring buffer, rb_meta_subbuf_idx() can return an index one sub-buffer too high. rb_setup_ids_meta_page() then fills subbuf_ids[] shifted by one and leaves subbuf_ids[0] NULL, which __rb_map_vma() dereferences when userspace maps trace_pipe_raw. rb_update_meta_reader() writes two such indices into meta->buffers[], which rb_cpu_meta_valid() would reject on the next boot, discarding the previous boot's trace. A CPU's sub-buffer array starts after its meta header and the nr_subbufs integers that follow, aligned up to a sub-buffer. rb_meta_subbuf_idx() inverts that calculation but skips only the integers, not the header, so its base is one sub-buffer low whenever the omitted header size crosses the alignment boundary. Invert the calculation with rb_subbufs_from_meta() rather than repeating it. rb_range_buffer() maps an index back to an ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix the sub-buffer array base in rb_meta_subbuf_idx() On a persistent ring buffer, rb_meta_subbuf_idx() can return an index one sub-buffer too high. rb_setup_ids_meta_page() then fills subbuf_ids[] shifted by one and leaves subbuf_ids[0] NULL, which __rb_map_vma() dereferences when userspace maps trace_pipe_raw. rb_update_meta_reader() writes two such indices into meta->buffers[], which rb_cpu_meta_valid() would reject on the next boot, discarding the previous boot's trace. A CPU's sub-buffer array starts after its meta header and the nr_subbufs integers that follow, aligned up to a sub-buffer. rb_meta_subbuf_idx() inverts that calculation but skips only the integers, not the header, so its base is one sub-buffer low whenever the omitted header size crosses the alignment boundary. Invert the calculation with rb_subbufs_from_meta() rather than repeating it. rb_range_buffer() maps an index back to an ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix the sub-buffer array base in rb_meta_subbuf_idx() On a persistent ring buffer, rb_meta_subbuf_idx() can return an index one sub-buffer too high. rb_setup_ids_meta_page() then fills subbuf_ids[] shifted by one and leaves subbuf_ids[0] NULL, which __rb_map_vma() dereferences when userspace maps trace_pipe_raw. rb_update_meta_reader() writes two such indices into meta->buffers[], which rb_cpu_meta_valid() would reject on the next boot, discarding the previous boot's trace. A CPU's sub-buffer array starts after its meta header and the nr_subbufs integers that follow, aligned up to a sub-buffer. rb_meta_subbuf_idx() inverts that calculation but skips only the integers, not the header, so its base is one sub-buffer low whenever the omitted header size crosses the alignment boundary. Invert the calculation with rb_subbufs_from_meta() rather than repeating it. rb_range_buffer() maps an index back to an

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: r ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix the sub-buffer array base in rb_meta_subbuf_idx() On a persistent ring buffer, rb_meta_subbuf_idx() can return an index one sub-buffer too high. rb_setup_ids_meta_page() then fills subbuf_ids[] shifted by one and leaves subbuf_ids[0] NULL, which __rb_map_vma() dereferences when userspace maps trace_pipe_raw. rb_update_meta_reader() writes two such indices into meta->buffers[], which rb_cpu_meta_valid() would reject on the next boot, discarding the previous boot's trace. A CPU's sub-buffer array starts after its meta header and the nr_subbufs integers that follow, aligned up to a sub-buffer. rb_meta_subbuf_idx() inverts that calculation but skips only the integers, not the header, so its base is one sub-buffer low whenever the omitted header size crosses the alignment boundary. Invert the calculation with rb_subbufs_from_meta() rather than repeating it. rb_range_buffer() maps an index back to...